Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 34):

As outlined by Martin and White (2005) attitude may not be explicitly inscribed in language but invoked by ideational choices a speaker expects a reaction to. We introduced an example of this in (64) earlier; a headshot from this image is blown up in (64''), as the vlogger introduces the good news that her hair dye is back in stock at Target. Her smiling face makes explicit the affect that her language does not.

Blogger Comments:

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Meaning Of A Smile.

[1] This misrepresents the metafunctions as separate modules, instead of complementary perspectives on meaning.  Choices that invoke attitude are interpersonal choices.  Moreover, a speaker can "expect a reaction" to ideational meaning in the absence of attitude.

[2] Here again the authors deploy the logical fallacy of 'begging the question' (petitio principi), since they assume the point their argument needs to establish, namely that the speaker's smile realises an assessment: the goodness of the 'news that her hair dye is back in stock at Target' (the authors' interpretation, not the speaker's words).

To be clear, the speaker's smile coincides only with the word Target, on which the tonic falls, marking it as the focus of New information.  So the timing of the smile is an instance of linguistic body language (Martin's sonovergent body language), and functions textually.

This also means that, if an assessment is being realised by the smile, it is solely an assessment of Target.  However, no assessment is being made here, the smile simply realises the speaker's positive emotion, as will be argued below.

To be clear, a smile is a physiological process that manifests a state of consciousness: a token of a senser's sensing, to adapt Halliday & Matthiessen's (1999: 210) phrase.  On Cléirigh's model, such behaviours are the raw material from which protolanguage develops. For example, in rainbow lorikeets, semiotic expressions of anger function socio-semiotically as expressions of the regulatory microfunction ('I want you-&-me'), in Halliday's model of protolanguage.

On Cléirigh's model, the speaker's smile is thus interpreted as an instance of the personal microfunction of protolinguistic body language, realising a positive emotion.  By the same token, the speaker's eye gaze is interpreted as an instance of the interactional microfunction of protolinguistic body language, signifying engagement with the viewer.

		meaning	kinetic expression
action	regulatory	I want, refuse, threaten	ø eg raised fist, glower
	instrumental	give me, I invite you	ø eg extended hand
reflection	interactional	togetherness, bonding	ø eg mutual eye gaze
	personal	emotions	ø eg smiling face

(adapted from Matthiessen 2007: 5)

(Note that emoticons (emojis) are thus epilinguistic (pictorial) reconstruals of protolinguistic body language.)

So, contrary to the author's claims, the smile does not realise an attitudinal assessment (AFFECT), and constitutes an instance of protolinguistic body language, not epilinguistic body language ('semovergent paralanguage').

[3] As argued above, this is not true.  Moreover, if it were true, it would be an instance of 'semovergent paralanguage' "resonating" with what is not actually said.