Confusing Functional Syntagmatic Relations With Formal Constituency

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 209):

Working from a functional paradigm we of course have to approach the relation of ‘sign languages’ to one another differently. In essence this means adopting a paradigmatic perspective and formalising their meaning potential as far as possible in system networks specifying the relation of one sign (in Saussure’s sense of the term) to another. 

The crucial question we then need to ask is whether meanings combine with one another. …The paralinguistic systems we describe in this volume do combine ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings but apparently without involving syntagmatic relations (i.e. parts configuring as wholes).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the Saussurean sign includes both content ('signified') and expression ('signifier'), whereas system networks specify relations within one or the other, e.g. lexicogrammar or phonology. For some of Martin's misunderstandings of Saussure, see:

• Misunderstanding What Saussure Was "Struggling Against"
• Mistaking Saussure's Rejected Model For Saussure's 'Sign' [1]
• Mistaking Saussure's Rejected Model For Saussure's 'Sign' [2]
• Misunderstanding The Saussurean Sign
• The "Non-Privileging" Of Either Level Of Symbolic Abstraction
• Misunderstanding Saussure's Coins Example
• Misunderstanding The Bonding Of Signified And Signifier And The Relation Of Form To Substance
• Seriously Misunderstanding The Sign In Relation To Linguistics And Semiotics

[2] To be clear, this confuses structural relations along the syntagmatic axis (e.g. Pretonic ^ Tonic) with the part-whole relations of the rank scale (e.g. feet (parts) as constituents of a tone group (whole)).

Misrepresenting Matthiessen As Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Register

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207-8):

Modelling concurrence and resonance is more of a challenge. One response would be to quantify the semantic ‘weight’ of the contributions from alternative modalities in terms of degrees of commitment – where commitment refers, following Martin (2010), to the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy of selections from both optional and obligatory systems. Figueredo and Figueredo (2019) outline a quantitative model for measurements of this kind. This would offer us a gauge of how much meaning language and paralanguage were committing but not tell us much about the kinds of meaning involved. 

Another response, perhaps better suited to this shortcoming, would be to turn to a higher-order semiotic such as register (Matthiessen, 2007) or genre (Bateman, 2008) and assign it responsibility for the distribution of meaning across modalities. Models of this kind take advantage of work on the relation of hierarchically organised categories in language (i.e. system realised in structure, higher ranks realised by lower ones and more abstract strata realised through more concrete ones) to explore intermodality – in effect treating co-instantiation across modalities as if it were realisation within a modality.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis. That is, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do. But Martin also confuses 'delicacy' in the technical sense of a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' in the sense of a scale of decreasing generality in a hyponymic taxonomy experiential meanings. See the earlier post Why Martin's Notion Of Commitment Is Invalid.

[2] This is very misleading indeed, because it knowingly misrepresents Matthiessen as supporting Martin's misunderstanding of register as a higher-order semiotic. Matthiessen, of course, follows Halliday in modelling register as a language variation (instantiation), not as a system more abstract than language (stratification).

[3] This confuses constituency (rank scale) with symbolic abstraction (realisation). All ranks are of the same level of symbolic abstraction, so a higher rank is not realised by a lower rank.

[4] To be clear, here the authors advocate making the same type of theoretical error that Martin made in his misunderstanding of register. With register, Martin modelled different types of language in terms of a more abstract stratum, and here he proposes modelling different types of semiotic system in terms of a more abstract stratum.

Problems With The Semovergence Of Discourse Semantics And Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207, 208):

And, as outlined in Table 7.2, semovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems concur with one another (ideational meaning), resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, 'semovergence' derives from the authors' original misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that "converges with" (realises) the content of language. This view was assumed in Chapter 1, which was previously published as Martin & Zappavigna (2019), and was partially maintained in Chapter 4, where ideational networks confused content with expression, but abandoned by Chapters 5 and 6, where interpersonal and textual networks distinguished content from expression.

[2] To be clear, the authors' model of semovergent paralanguage substitutes the discourse semantics of Martin for the semantics of Halliday in Cléirigh's model of epilinguistic body language, but maintains Cléirigh's terms 'articulatory' and 'mimetic'. Cf.

Of the authors' paralinguistic discourse semantic systems,

• IDEATION is a rebranding of the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rather than the discourse semantics of Martin (1992);
• APPRAISAL is a linguistic system misapplied to protolanguage;
• IDENTIFICATION is a system of DEIXIS that classifies referents; and
• PERIODICITY is a system without a network that merely correlates the location of a speaker with what he says, without regard to how each identifies the other (realisation).

Some Of The Problems With The Paralinguistic System Networks

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199-200):

Our final step, for this book, was to map the meaning potential of each of these five paralinguistic systems. Ideational resources were presented in Chapter 4, focusing on the construal of paralinguistic entities and paralinguistic figures (both static and dynamic). Interpersonal resources were presented in Chapter 5, focusing on the enactment of FACIAL AFFECT, VOICE QUALITY and a range of attendant social relations. Textual resources were presented in Chapter 6, focusing on PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. The affordances of each resource were formalised in system networks, outlining the range of meanings involved and their relation to one another (i.e. their valeur).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 4, the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and all eight of the system networks confused discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[2] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 5, the authors mistook depictions on animated clay puppets for human paralanguage, modelled the bodily expression of emotion in terms of a linguistic system, AFFECT, despite the fact that other species express their emotions bodily demonstrates that these systems are protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, not interpersonal.

[3] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 6, the authors' system of DEIXIS models potential referents, not deixis, and the authors' model of PERIODICITY merely correlates a lecturer's location with what he is saying at the time, without demonstrating any realisation relation between his language and his location.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. No networks were provided for the system of PERIODICITY, and all eight of the ideational networks confused meaning with expression features.

The Irrelevance Of 'Somatic Behaviour' To A Model Of Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 197-8):

An early step in our work involved drawing a distinction between somatic and semiotic behaviour (Figure 7.1), drawing on functional studies of language development – where the distinction bears critically on the emergence of protolanguage (our focus in Chapter 2).

 

We accept in drawing this distinction that all behaviour has the potential to be treated as meaningful or not by speakers. A clear example comes from the data underpinning Chapter 5, as Coraline swings rhythmically back and forth several times on a squeaky door, staring at her father who is busy at this desk as she does so (example (1)) – until he responds verbally and paralinguistically to this behaviour as a request for attention.

We can further illustrate this point anecdotally to show that it is not just human behaviour that can be construed as meaningful. In 2018 one of our authors, along with her sister-in-law and her partner (another of our authors), participated in an informal memorial ashes ceremony on the edge of a reef in South Australia – pouring the sister-in-law’s partner’s ashes into the ocean there where that couple, keen divers, had spent many weekends and holidays exploring the reef together. As they did so a large ray swam slowly by. This was interpreted by all involved as a remarkable meaningful event, retold and enjoyed on many occasions with close relatives and friends – with the ray construed as a dear loved one saying goodbye. In cases such as these somasis is recontextualised as semiosis by the meaning-making interlocutors involved. What is crucial from the perspective of discourse analysis is the uptake of what went on, or not, by meaners.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, an earlier step in their work involved taking Cléirigh's model and having multiple meetings in attempts to understand it.

[2] To be clear, the perspective taken by SFL theory is 'from above'; that is, it is concerned with questions of what meanings are distinguished and how they are expressed. From this perspective, gestures that do not realise meanings are irrelevant to a model of paralanguage. The need for a distinction between semiotic and "somatic" behaviour only arises from mistakenly taking the opposite perspective 'from below': the question of whether gestures express meanings.

[3] To be clear, the authors' focus in Chapter 2 was an argument against Cléirigh's 'protolinguistic' body language, the type that humans share with all other social semiotic species. The purpose of removing this type of body language was to allow for the interpretation of facial expressions of emotion in terms of one linguistic system of APPRAISAL, AFFECT, in Chapter 5, despite the fact that emotions are facially expressed in species without language.

[4] To be clear, this confuses two different roles of interlocutor: speaker ('sayer') and interpreter ('senser'). The fact that interlocutors can mentally construe material order phenomena as semiotic order metaphenomena is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage. In SFL Theory, a model of body language identifies the potential meanings that can be distinguished by speakers, with their bodies, while speaking.

The Unacknowledged Information Unit

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 187):

It is important to recall here that clause and tone group may or may not map onto each other (Chapter 3), as evident in (19) and (19'). In (19) the underlining in each clause specifies Theme. However, New is specified in the tone group as the tonic syllable that composes phonological prominence through the major pitch movement of the tone group. This is shown in bold italics in (19').

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses content with expression. To be clear, New is a function in the structure of an information unit. A tone group realises an information unit, and its tonic realises the Focus of New information. It will be seen later that an explicit recognition of the information unit makes the problems with PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY more obvious.

[2] This confuses TONICITY with TONE. To be clear, the tonic syllable doesn't "compose" phonological prominence through the major pitch movement. The tonic is distinguished in terms of relative loudness ± duration. It is the pitch movement at the tonic that identifies the tone of the tone group.

Misunderstanding Textual Prominence

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 183, 184):

A paralinguistic beat can also give prominence to interpersonal meaning. The hand beat in image 5 of (17'') not only syncs with the final tonic segment form, but its low-falling trajectory is interpersonally ‘in tune with’ the major pitch contour of a falling tone 1 (see Chapters 3 and 5) – prominence is thus added to the meaning of this tone (here, providing information). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because the hand beat serves the same linguistic tonicity, it gives prominence to whatever metafunctional meaning it highlights as the New element of an information unit.

[2] To be clear, form is the tonic syllable, not the tonic segment. The tonic segment begins with the tonic foot and includes all subsequent feet in the tone group.

[3] To be clear, the direction of a beating gesture does not distinguish tones. For example, there is no rising beat for tone 2, no level beat for tone 3, no fall-rise beat for tone 4, and no rise-fall beat for tone 5. A downward movement is the default direction, regardless of the tone.

[4] This confuses the textual function of TONICITY with the interpersonal function of TONE. The choice of tonic prominence realises the choice of New information, whereas the choice of tone realises the choice of KEY for a given choice of MOOD. The choice of tonic gives prominence to an element of structure, not to the choice of tone.

[5] This confuses SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) with KEY (lexicogrammar). 'Giving information' (statement) is SPEECH FUNCTION, and it is realised in the grammar by MOOD. The system of TONE, on the other hand, realises the system of KEY for a given MOOD.

Problems With The Authors' Scope And Demarcation Analysis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 176-7):

In example (15) the PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS identifies time as [virtual:location] and selects for both SCOPE and DEMARCATION. 

In image 1 in (15), the ‘pinch’ point of left thumb and index finger selects for SCOPE as [narrow], as does the left index finger point in image 2. Both these vectors contrast with the right-hand vector in image 2 where an open palm with spread fingers and thumb configures SCOPE as relatively [broad]. The narrow pinch point in image 1 syncs sonovergently with today and semovergently with the meaning of the narrowly defined time reference. The relatively broad righthand point in image 2 syncs sonovergently with future and semovergently with the relatively open time reference. 

The PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS in (15) also selects for DEMARCATION as [delineation]. In the second image, the left index finger extends outwards from the body, sustaining its semovergence with today. The left index finger delineates a boundary line, a [virtual:location] from which time stretches into the future, the [virtual:location] identified to the right. Our data suggest that the selection of [virtual:semiotic], whether [prospective] or [retrospective], does not select for either relative SCOPE or DEMARCATION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, this is an example of using body language to make endophoric reference, with the left-right dimension of interpersonal space ideationally construing the past-future dimension of interpersonal time, and the pointing gesture signalling that the meanings 'present' and 'future' are recoverable from those construals by body language. Again, the vector is "resolved" and so the "deixis" is not virtual.

[2] To be be clear, selecting features from systems is the process of instantiation, and it is not a (more inclusive) system that does the selecting.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't instantiate ('select') content plane features, they realise them. That is, the authors here confuse interstratal realisation with system instantiation.

[4] To be clear, it is the expression (hand shape) that is broad or narrow, not the content. As previously explained, on the authors' model, this hand shape realises the ENGAGEMENT feature 'expansion'.

[5] To be clear, the timing of the gesture is linguistic and textual, because, like the tonic, it realises the focus of New information, in this case: today and future.

[6] To be clear, the gesture points to a spatial location that symbolises a temporal location. Any location can be construed as a boundary between other locations, but there is no evidence here that the gesture construes the location as a boundary. This is a case of making the data fit the theory instead of using the theory to account for the data.

Misrepresenting The Relative Size Of Referents As Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 174):

The three images in (10) show variations in SCOPE of paralinguistic deixis through vectors expressed with hand or fingers. SCOPE varies from relatively [broad] via the palm of the hand in image 1, to relatively [narrow] via an index finger in image 2, to maximally [narrow] via a little finger in image 3.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these gestures make exophoric reference to metaphenomena in the environment of the paralanguage through physical contact. The identity that recoverable from the different finger gestures in the second and third images is a written word [narrow], whereas the identity that recoverable from the splayed hand gesture is a written paragraph [broad]. The efficacy of the latter gesture diminishes rapidly with distance between the gesture and the referent. Again, 'broad' and 'narrow' are features that distinguish the size of referents. They are not deictic in function because they do not make distinctions with regard to the here-&-now of the speaker/gesturer.

Confusing Reference With Engagement

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 173-4):

In (9), from our cultural studies lecture, the lecturer is eliciting responses from students in relation to a projected orientalist image.

In the first image in (9), the lecturer verbally refers non-specifically to any student as a potential respondent (anyone). In paralanguage synchronous with underlined spoken language she extends both forearms with supine hands in front of her body – angling them outwards at roughly 45°. The deictic gestures select for relatively [broad] in SCOPE – the two diverging vectors effectively identify the whole class. 

In the second image, synchronous with the lexical construal of a location in up the back, the lecturer points with an index finger, narrowing the SCOPE of identification to a specific student.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, anyone has no reference function because it does not signal that a specific identity is recoverable elsewhere. Non-specific determiners like any do not function as reference items (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 365).

[2] To be clear, in the first image, these are not pointing gestures, which is consistent with the absence of reference in the language it accompanies. Instead, on the authors' own model, the supine hands realise the engagement feature 'expansion', acknowledging other voices, which is consistent with the instantiation of the engagement feature 'expansion' in the language it accompanies.

[3] To be clear, if the gesture is interpreted as pointing to the whole class, then the feature 'broad' describes the referent, the class.

[4] To be clear, in the second image, the gesture simply makes exophoric reference to the environment of the paralanguage: to a student remote from the speaker.

Confusing Demarcation With Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 168-70):

Paralinguistically, a [virtual:semiosis] entity may be identified either retrospectively or prospectively through an unresolved embodied vector. In a number of instances in the data the selection [virtual:semiosis:retrospective] is realised through a gestural flick – a small, fleeting vertically directed vector expressed with an index finger or hand (body parts that facilitate speed of movement). The flick gesture synchronises with a silent beat (^) which marks a juncture (e.g. a phase or stage boundary) in the flow of meaning in a text. The deictic gesture identifies a preceding segment of text (a semiotic entity), one that bears a logical connection to the coming phase or stage of discourse. The subsequent text is frequently initiated with an internal connector such as so.

Example (5) shows one such instance from the data. … Following presentation of a phase of argument from the airline’s legal counsel, the plaintiff’s argument is introduced in (5). As the phonological transcription reveals, the vertical flick syncs with a silent beat (^) preceding the commencement of the last tone group, which begins with the internal connector so.

In (6) the first image captures the conclusion of Edmonds’s argument everything’s mucked up. Image 2 shows the vertical flick (circled), realised in sync with the culminative silent beat (^). It retrospectively identifies the preceding semiotic entity – in this case a stage of the storytelling in which both parties (British Airways and Edmonds) put their arguments to the court. The conclusion of that stage converges with the lecturer closing his eyes and dropping his head. In image 3 the lecturer reorients his body to his left in sync with the internal connector so as he commences a new stage of the lecture in which he discusses the logic of the preceding arguments.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the timing of the gesture with a pause between a quote and a non-quote might be taken as evidence that the function of the gesture is demarcation (punctuating text) rather than deixis (pointing with respect to the speaker).

[2] To be clear, the authors provide no evidence in support of this claim. It would seem that the authors have given priority to the view 'from below' rather than the view 'from above': that is, since the gesture resembles pointing, it must have a deictic function, therefore it must refer back to the previous text.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of 'Actual' Paralinguistic Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 166, 167): 

Example (2) illustrates contrasting instances accompanying the verbal text you’re wearing a stripy shirt – explain this image to me. In each of the three frames a resolved vector is expressed with a hand or index finger point. …  In the first two frames the point is directed outwards selecting [other], first to a student and then to a projected image. In the third it is directed back to the lecturer, selecting [self].

Each of the entities identified through deictic paralanguage in (2) is also tracked exophorically in the spoken text – to a student (you), to a thing (this image) and to the lecturer herself (me). However, as revealed in the first two images in (2), the resolution of the paralinguistic vector does not sync sonovergently with the verbal expressions of identification (i.e. you and this) but rather with the underlined lexis realising relevant entities – specifically the stripy quality of a student’s clothing and the thing entity image. 

In the third image the PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is synchronous with the presuming pronoun me which identifies the entity (lecturer). In this instance me is not salient as might be expected. 

This is accounted for in that the synchronous deictic gesture in image 3 is part of a gestural flow that begins on ‘explain’ and culminates with the completion of the tone group – in this case a tail that follows the tonic. The gestural movement maps the flow of information from ‘about what’ to ‘to whom’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the selection of the features 'other' and 'self' is instantiation. The relation between a pointing gesture and these features is realisation.

[2] To be clear, these three pointing gestures are exophoric to the environment of paralanguage. The features 'other' and 'self', on the other hand, distinguish the referents in the environment of paralanguage (in terms of deixis), not the paralinguistic means of referring to them.

[3] To be clear, this confuses two distinct textual functions of body language: reference and salience. The function of the pointing gesture is reference, and this is a feature of epilinguistic body language, as demonstrated by the fact that members of other species, such as rainbow lorikeets, do not respond to them as meaningful. The function of the timing of the beat of a gesture with speech is salience, and it is a feature of linguistic body language because it serves the same function as the beats of speech rhythm.

The direction of the pointing gestures identifies the referents (you, image), whereas the timing of the beat of the gestures highlights elements as salient (stripy, image), both of which, despite the authors' phonological analysis, are likely to be tonic, with each realising a focus of New information.

[4] To be clear, if the pointing gesture is timed to beat with me, it highlights me as salient. This suggests that the phonological analysis mistakes a salient syllable for a non-salient one. A more congruent rhythm would be:

// 1 ‸ex/plain this / image to / me // 

[5] To be clear, this gallant attempt does not account for the supposed lack of salience, since a lack of salience has to be explained in terms the function of salience — to highlight a potential focus of information — which the authors' account does not do. 

Misrepresenting Paralinguistic Deixis And The Problem With Presuming Reference

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 162-3):

The management of information flow in discourse is supported by the system of textual semovergence we refer to as PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS. Here the focus is on how paralanguage supports the introduction of people, things and places into texts and keeps track of them once there (Martin, 1992: 95). This section begins with a brief overview of the linguistic system of IDENTIFICATION. … 

The IDENTIFICATION system in English discourse semantics draws a basic distinction between presenting reference, which introduces entities in discourse, and presuming reference, which tracks them once there. …

The types of entities (Hao, 2020a) introduced by presenting reference include people (anyone), concrete thing entities (a stripy shirt, a beautiful green scarf) and semiotic entities (some of the key things, what kind of sense, what feeling, an idea). The linguistic resources deployed include non-specific determiners (e.g. a, an, some), an indefinite nominal group (anyone) and several instances of a ‘wh’ entity (what). …

Proper names also function as presuming reference.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this 'presuming reference' is Martin's rebranding of anaphoric reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976). It will be seen in later posts that the reference in the system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is exophoric, not endophoric, and so does not "support" keeping track of people, things and places 'once there' in the text.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'presenting reference' (Martin 1992) confuses referents with reference items (his, that etc.). It arises from confusing 'reference' as textual meaning with 'reference' as the ideational meaning of lexical items. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 33):

[3] To be clear, none of these resources indicate a recoverable identity elsewhere, so none of them function as reference items.

Foreshadowing Problems With 'Textual Paralanguage'

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 161):

This chapter adopts a textual perspective on embodied meaning-making. It deals with the way paralanguage cooperates with spoken language in the management of information flow – how it keeps track of entities in discourse and how it composes waves of ideational and interpersonal meaning (Martin, 1992; Martin and Rose, [2003] 2007). Two linguistic discourse semantic systems are involved: IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY. IDENTIFICATION has to do with the resources for introducing and tracking entities. PERIODICITY, as the term implies, has to do with resources for structuring waves of information in discourse. The discourse semantic systems are introduced in turn, together with the related paralinguistic systems that model the potential for convergence with language, those of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the theoretical problems with these discourse semantic systems in these two publications, see

• identification (Martin 1992)
• identification (Martin and Rose 2007)
• texture (Martin 1992)
• periodicity (Martin and Rose 2007).

[2] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION is his rebranding of the lexicogrammatical system of cohesive REFERENCE (Halliday & Hasan 1976) in which he confuses reference with deixis and ideational denotation (e.g. 'introducing entities'). It will be seen in the review of this chapter that the confusion of reference with deixis is the basis of the IDENTIFICATION (REFERENCE) system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS.

[3] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic system of PERIODICITY is his rebranding of writing pedagogy as linguistic theory, in which 'introductory paragraph' is rebranded 'macro-Theme', 'topic sentence' is rebranded 'hyper-Theme' (a misunderstanding of Daneš's term), 'paragraph summary' is rebranded 'hyper-New', and 'text summary' is rebranded 'macro-New'. it will be seen in the review of this chapter that the system proposed, PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY, is largely concerned with lexicogrammatical INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION, as realised through the phonological system of TONALITY. In the authors' terms, this makes the system 'sonovergent', not 'semovergent', which is contrary to their model.

Problems With Irrealis vs Realis Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 119, 136, 137):

An important distinction in the AFFECT system in language (Table 5.1) is between realis (an emotional response triggered by a present or past happening) and [ir]realis (an emotional response triggered by what might happen). Where the response is irrealis positive this is glossed as ‘desire’ and where it is negative as ‘fear’. However, in the VOICE AFFECT system [fear] is a feature (not simply a gloss) and its realisations are restricted to qualities of voice. Nonetheless the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [fear] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced negative emotion as a response to what might happen, or in the case of (13) to whom the voices might belong. …

In contrast to voiced [fear], the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [anxiety] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced emotion as a response to seeing the Ghost Children, that is, a realis happening.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this confuses interpersonal meaning (AFFECT) with experiential meaning (cause, happening). The distinction here is between mental processes of emotion ('realis') and mental processes of desideration ('irrealis').

However, the exclusive association of desire and fear with irrealis is invalid, since both can be triggered by a present or past happening, as demonstrated by He desired her from the moment he saw her and She feared the non-venomous snake the moment she saw it.

[2] Importantly, here the intersemiotic convergence is of the content of paralanguage with the content of language. This is inconsistent with the authors' model of ideational paralanguage, where it is the expression of paralanguage that converges with the content of language.

[3] To be clear, here the authors are anxious to justify their categorisation of 'fear' as irrealis (desiderative), in contrast to 'anxiety', which they categorise as realis (emotive). Their anxiety, however, is unjustified, because 'fear' can be realis, as in She feared the Ghost Children, as well as irrealis, as in She feared that the Ghost Children might harm her.

Misapplying A Confusion Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning To A Representation Of Protolanguage [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 127-8):

A further example in (8) shows how information acquired from past events can trigger a response in FACIAL AFFECT. The instance involves Coraline’s first encounter with the Cat in the orientation stage of the film’s narrative. The episode begins with Coraline exploring the neighbourhood along a steep hillside path. A rock falls onto her path from on high. She calls out but gets no response, then throws the rock in the direction from which it fell. A pained cry is heard. Extremely alarmed by this, she runs as fast as possible, sensing something is pursuing her. Startled by a loud ‘meow’ from behind, she turns to look. Seeing that it is only a cat, her facial expression of [fear] swiftly changes to [surprise], but then to [anger], as in the three images in (8).

Blogger Comments:

[1] That is:

• a Phenomenon of auditory perception (pained cry) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (alarm);
• a Phenomenon of auditory perception (a loud meow) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (surprise); and
• a Phenomenon of visual perception (a cat) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (anger).

Again this confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

[2] To be clear, here the expression of emotion does not accompany speech, so it is not functioning as paralanguage, and is not semovergent.

Misapplying A Confusion Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning To A Representation Of Protolanguage [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 127):

In (7), the trigger for facial expressions of emotion is apparently sourced internally. 

In the resolution stage of the narrative storyline in the film, Coraline meets the Cat, a good friend whom she has not seen since she threw him at the Other Mother in attempting her escape from the Other World.

In image 1 in (7) Coraline expresses both mild [surprise] and [spirit:up]. There is no immediately convergent speech, and the trigger is not interpretable at this point by the viewer. 

However, in image 2 more visual information is made available. The Cat is now revealed as standing outside Coraline’s bedroom window, and his presence retrospectively explains the trigger for her facial [surprise] and [spirit:up] in image 1. 

In image 2, convergent with her spoken language, Coraline’s expression of FACIAL AFFECT changes from [spirit:up] to [spirit:down]. Again there is no apparent trigger in the visually available information. The resonant spoken language I’m really sorry I threw you out at the Other Mother suggests that the trigger at this point is sourced internally through her reflection on past events. The broader co-text of the story supports this interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] That is, a cognitive Phenomenon is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion. This confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

[2] To be clear, in SFL terms, this is an expression of the personal microfunction of protolanguage, epilinguistically represented on a clay puppet.

[3] To be clear, if the expression of emotion does not accompany speech, then it is not functioning as paralanguage, and is not semovergent.

[4] That is, a Phenomenon of visual perception is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion. This again confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

Foreshadowing Problems With Chapter 5 Analyses

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 115):

Analyses explore the paralinguistic systems of interpersonal sonovergence in which movements of parts of the body or face rise and fall in tune with the intonation contours of the prosodic phonology and interpersonal semovergence in which paralinguistic expressions converge with interpersonal meanings in spoken discourse. … System choices are illustrated in instances from Coraline and discussion focuses on intermodal convergences in expressions of emotion and the enactment of inter-character relations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, sonovergent paralanguage is neither sonovergent nor paralanguage. It is not sonovergent because the bodily expressions diverge from the phonological expressions, and it is not paralanguage because it is language, since the expressions realise the grammatical system of KEY. Again, this is why it is termed 'linguistic' in Cléirigh's model, which the authors in this book rebrand as their own.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of convergence misunderstands paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and the notion of semovergence entails that these expressions realise the content of language. However, since the expression of these meanings (emotions) does not require the evolution and development of language, these systems are protolinguistic, not epilinguistic, which means that the meanings that are expressed are not metafunctional (interpersonal) but microfunctional (personal).

[3] As previously observed, the data used by the authors is not the body language of humans, but representations of body language on clay puppets, as constructed by animators, using the emotion-face coding proposed by Ekman. The data are thus epilinguistic depictions of a protolinguistic system.

Why All The Authors' Ideational Semovergent Systems Are Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 112-3):

This chapter has described how semovergent systems construe ideational meaning and has explored entities and figures as resources for embodied ideational meaning across language and paralanguage. These systems have been formalised in system networks that can be used by an analyst as they consider how gestures interact through a relationship of concurrence or divergence with the ideational meanings made in spoken discourse. …

A robust analytical framework for investigating ideational meaning offers a key resource for understanding human experience in social life. The ideational paralinguistic systems presented in this chapter have important potential in applied linguistics where adopting a multimodal approach to studying communication involving multiple modalities is becoming increasingly important. … We look forward to seeing how the systems explored in this chapter are taken up in disciplines such as the humanities and in studies of different semiotic modes (including face-to-face communication and communication in digital environments).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, the authors' notion of semovergent systems, where gestures realise ("interact through a relationship of concurrence") the ideational meanings of language, derives from their misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] As previously observed, all eight of the system networks in this chapter confuse discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[3] As the review of this chapter has demonstrated, the framework presented here is not even theoretically valid, let alone "robust".

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [7]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 111):

A system network bringing together the various choices we have covered in the previous sections is provided in Figure 4.8.

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the term 'paralinguistic figure' confuses discourse semantics (figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.8 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (figure) with both discourse semantic features (e.g. state figure, occurrence figure) and expression plane systems (e.g. RECURRENCE, FLOW, DIRECTION).