Misunderstanding Textual Prominence

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 183, 184):

A paralinguistic beat can also give prominence to interpersonal meaning. The hand beat in image 5 of (17'') not only syncs with the final tonic segment form, but its low-falling trajectory is interpersonally ‘in tune with’ the major pitch contour of a falling tone 1 (see Chapters 3 and 5) – prominence is thus added to the meaning of this tone (here, providing information). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because the hand beat serves the same linguistic tonicity, it gives prominence to whatever metafunctional meaning it highlights as the New element of an information unit.

[2] To be clear, form is the tonic syllable, not the tonic segment. The tonic segment begins with the tonic foot and includes all subsequent feet in the tone group.

[3] To be clear, the direction of a beating gesture does not distinguish tones. For example, there is no rising beat for tone 2, no level beat for tone 3, no fall-rise beat for tone 4, and no rise-fall beat for tone 5. A downward movement is the default direction, regardless of the tone.

[4] This confuses the textual function of TONICITY with the interpersonal function of TONE. The choice of tonic prominence realises the choice of New information, whereas the choice of tone realises the choice of KEY for a given choice of MOOD. The choice of tonic gives prominence to an element of structure, not to the choice of tone.

[5] This confuses SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) with KEY (lexicogrammar). 'Giving information' (statement) is SPEECH FUNCTION, and it is realised in the grammar by MOOD. The system of TONE, on the other hand, realises the system of KEY for a given MOOD.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of A Discourse Move

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 156, 157-8):

In Coraline’s first encounter with Wybie, a boy of her own age from the same neighbourhood, he accuses her of being a water witch to which she responds: //3 ^ and if / I’m a / water / witch //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. The focus in (30) is on the second tone group of this utterance, that is, //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. … 

In the spoken language of this tone group there is apparently no resonant inscribed or invoked linguistic AFFECT. However, before we assume a divergent semovergent relation, there is more to be considered in the verbal and imagic co-text. 

The spoken language in (30) configures a question through a wh- interrogative on a falling tone 1 (signalling ‘certainty’). Taken in conjunction with the PARALINGUISTIC expressions [anger], this discourse move (then where’s the secret well) can be interpreted as a rhetorical question, one that challenges Wybie’s judgemental accusation that she is a water witch. From the perspective of affiliation and the negotiation of bonds (Section 5.3.4), Coraline is forcefully rejecting the coupling proposed by Wybie.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'certainty' realised by tone 1 is 'polarity known'. Halliday (1994: 302):

[2] This misunderstands both the text and the notion of a rhetorical question. A rhetorical question is one that does not demand information from an addressee. The question then where’s the secret well is not rhetorical, because demands from the addressee the information that would validate the proposition that she is a water witch.

Engagement

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 37-8):

Turning to ENGAGEMENT, Hao and Hood (2019) note the significance of hand position as far as supporting the expansion and contraction of heteroglossia is concerned – with supine hands opening up dialogism and prone hands closing it down. In the following example the vlogger’s supine hands converge with the modalisation probably, reinforcing acknowledgement of the viewer’s voice:

 

Two moves later the hands flip over to prone position in support of the negative move shutting down the expectation that the vlogger was in control of the new colour of her hair.

 Blogger Comments:

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Semovergent Paralanguage Of ENGAGEMENT.

[1] This is misleading; the speaker's handshape does not "converge" with modalisation probably. To be clear, the speaker's handshape is timed with the tonic hair.  The timing of the gesture thus instantiates textual linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage), highlighting hair as the focus of New information.  On this basis, the handshape instantiates ideational epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage), realising hair.

In this first instance, the authors have again tried to make the data fit their theory, instead of using the data as a resource for theorising.

[2] This is misleading; the speaker's hands are not in a prone position — lying flat, palm downwards — in this instance.  Instead, each hand has the tips of the thumb and curved forefinger touching to form a horizontal circle, with the other fingers below them and similarly curved.  This handshape is consistent with holding an object, such as a bottle of hair dye, which would be an instance of ideational epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage).

In this second instance, the authors have again tried to make the data fit their theory, instead of using the data as a resource for theorising.

As in the first instance above, the gestures also realise the meanings of linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage).  In terms of the textual metafunction, both hands beat down on the salient syllables not and find, highlighting both Finite and Predicator, and then on the tonic hair, marking  the Complement hair dye as the focus of New information.  In terms of the interpersonal metafunction, both hands stay level for the tonic segment (hair dye that I), in line with the level/low-rising tone choice (tone 3).  (Note that this tone group is incorrectly analysed as tone 4 by Smith, which, with declarative MOOD, would realise the KEY meaning 'reservation'.)

Lastly, the reader may also want to consider why the speaker would need to shut down the possibility of other points of view on the proposition I could not find the hair dye that I bought previously when I dyed my hair.

Negotiation: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 15):

In terms of grammatical metaphor NEGOTIATION allows us to realise moves directly, or metaphorically through so-called indirect speech acts:

(39)
What’s his name? (congruent interrogative clause requesting information)
- Andy. 

(40)
Tell me his name. (metaphorical imperative clause requesting information)
- Andy. 

(41)
His name is…? (metaphorical declarative clause requesting information)
- Andy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands grammatical metaphor. To be clear, NEGOTIATION (Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION) does not enable ("allow") moves to be realised congruently ("directly") or metaphorically by the grammatical system of MOOD. That is, SPEECH FUNCTION is not the Agent of realisation but the Medium or Range of the realisation.

[2] To be clear, the technical term here is demand, not request. A request is typically a command: a demand for goods-&-services.

[3] To be clear, this metaphorical clause realises a demand for a service: a process of saying (tell).

[4] To be clear, this metaphorical clause deploys cohesion: the ellipsis of the Identified/New after presenting the Identifier as Theme.

Stratification And Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 10):

Phonology and lexicogrammar are treated as different levels of abstraction, with phonological oppositions realising lexicogrammatical ones. The Danish linguist Hjelmslev (1961) referred to these levels of languages as the expression plane and content plane, respectively.

In the model of stratification assumed here, Hjelmlsev’s content plane is itself modelled as a stratified system, with discourse semantics realised through lexicogrammar. This makes it possible to entertain the possibility that [hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back ] was in fact negotiated in conversation as a request for goods and services rather that an offer of information. … What is significant here is that even though the first move is grammatically declarative, its speech function is negotiated as one we might normally associate with an imperative clause (a clause such as Get some of my hair dye from Target for me, will you?, for example).

(16)
So hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back.
— OK, I’ll go to Target for you.

The process whereby the content plane makes meaning on two levels, one symbolising the other, is referred to in SFL as grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1985). The grammatical metaphor in (16) is an interpersonal one, with declarative mood symbolising a command.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading because it is not true. Hjelmslev modelled semiotic systems in terms of content and expression planes. Halliday stratified Hjelmslev's content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar.

[2] To be clear, the 'model of stratification assumed here' is Halliday's, with Halliday's 'semantics' rebranded as Martin's 'discourse semantics'. For the theoretical shortcomings of Martin's discourse semantics, see here (English Text 1992) and here (Working With Discourse 2007).

[3] This deliberately misleads the intended readership of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. It is not Martin's derived model of stratification, but Halliday's original model that provided the system of SPEECH FUNCTION and its metaphorical realisation in the grammatical system of MOOD.

[4] To be clear, this text is from a monologue in which there is no conversation and no negotiation. The data can be viewed here.

[5] To be clear, in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, commodities, goods–&–services and information, are either demanded of given, not requested or offered. An offer is the giving of goods–&–services.

More importantly, this declarative clause is not a demand for goods–&–services, a command, but a giving of information, a statement, and so is not an instance of metaphor. The speaker states that she hopes to get back her preferred hair colour now that her preferred brand of hair dye is back in stock. She is not commanding anyone to do anything.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of grammatical metaphor. Symbolisation is simply the relation between strata. Grammatical metaphor is an incongruent symbolisation: when meaning and its symbolisation in wording do not agree.

"System Depends On And Is Motivated By Structure"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5, 6):

These grammatical oppositions are formalised in Figure 1.2. …

We will not go into detail about this kind of formalisation here; detailed accounts can be found in Matthiessen and Halliday (2009) and Martin et al. (2013a). We introduce the system network in Figure 1.2 at this point to clarify what it means to say that SFL involves a relational theory of meaning (rather than a representational one). This means that SFL treats language (and semiosis) as a resource for meaning (rather than a set of rules about what one can say or not). What matters are the relationships among choices, as they are formalised in system networks. The basic organising principle for descriptions is thus paradigmatic, rather than syntagmatic. Note however that for a paradigmatic choice to be meaningful, it must have structural consequences; system depends on and is motivated by structure (Martin et al., 2020).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, having just presented clause structures that differ in terms of their realisation of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION (see previous post), the authors misrepresent these as the grammatical oppositions of MOOD.

[2] This is potentially misleading for the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. The system network was introduced by Halliday in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar (1969) to represent Firth's notion of system.

[3] To be clear, SFL is a dimensional theory of meaning. Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Martin, on the other hand, misunderstands SFL as modelling language in terms of "interacting modules". For example,  Martin (1992: 488):

The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components?

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Semiotic systems that do not have "structural consequences" include paralanguage and traffic lights.

[5] This is very seriously misleading indeed, because it is the exact opposite of SFL methodology. SFL does not give priority to structure in such matters, since this would be giving priority to the view 'from below' instead of the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness…

This methodological error is the dominant recurring motif in Martin (2013), as demonstrated here. Moreover, Martin's notion that structure is necessary to meaning derives from the 'syntacticist' tradition of Formal linguistics. Halliday (2007 [1978]: 186):

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a great deal of meaning in a one-word sentence. Whether one claims that there is also structure is likely to depend on whether one subscribes to the syntacticist notion that structure is necessary to meaning.