Why The Authors' Argument Against Protolinguistic Body Language Is Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 63):

In sum, given that

there is no formal way to discriminate the proposed adult ‘protolinguistic’ body language from the semovergent category, 

no evidence that the proposed instances operate as protolinguistic signs and 

a common recognition that the meanings in question belong within the interpersonal domain, 

they are subsumed in this book within the semovergent category. Our position will be that

paralanguage, like verbal language, is organised metafunctionally and that

different metafunctional strands of both language and paralanguage can be instantiated simultaneously.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Throughout this chapter, the authors have failed to grasp the basic criteria of Cléirigh's model. Protolinguistic body language is distinguished from epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") in not requiring the prior evolutionary or developmental emergence of language, which means that, unlike epilinguistic body language, it is also to be observed in other socio-semiotic species.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The evidence that they are signs is that these gestures and postures mean something other than themselves. That is, they are signifiers of signifieds, tokens of values, expressions of content. The evidence that are protolinguistic is that they do not require the prior evolutionary or developmental emergence of language, as demonstrated by their use in other species.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. As previously demonstated, this "common recognition" was by colleagues using the same approach, and was the study of pictures, not body language. Because pictures are an epilinguistic semiotic system, their meaning is organised metafunctionally, not microfunctionally, and these colleagues simply interpreted the meaning of the pictures in terms of the metafunctions.

[4] As demonstrated above, this is a serious category error, since it miscategorises a semiotic system that does not require the prior emergence of language as one that does. As such, invalidates the authors' model.

[5] To be clear, this position of the authors is invalid because only epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") is both metafunctional and paralanguage. As previously demonstrated, protolinguistic body language is not metafunctional, and linguistic body language ("sonovergent paralanguage") is not paralanguage but language.

[6] To be clear, unknown to the authors, this is simply the paralinguistic use of epilinguistic body language in Cléirigh's model.

Confusing Epilinguistic Pictures With Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

As we have seen, much of what is assigned to body protolanguage involves the expression of emotions. Here we meet again the challenge of discriminating somasis and semiosis. Nonetheless, in the analysis of visual depiction, Painter et al. (2013) propose VISUAL AFFECT as an interpersonal meaning system complementing that of verbal AFFECT within the linguistic domain of APPRAISAL. 

The details of the system remain unspecified by them, but Martinec (2001) provides networks of meaning options for basic emotions with realisations specified in terms of facial movements. These systems are again treated by him as belonging within the interpersonal metafunction and thus able to be put into play alongside meanings originating from within the other metafunctions. For our own work in this domain, see Chapter 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As we have seen in previous posts, this false claim derives from the authors misconstruing Halliday's microfunctions of protolanguage as types of emotions. See

• The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"
• The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

In Cléirigh's model, following Halliday ((e.g. 2004 [1998]: 18), since emotions are personal states, they are restricted to the personal microfunction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. If body movements and postures mean something other than themselves, emotions, they are semiotic, not merely "somatic" (the authors' confusion of biological and social orders of complexity).

As previously explained, this challenge to the authors only arises from their taking the view 'from below' (body movements and postures) instead of the SFL view 'from above' (the meanings expressed), and this error derives from misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system..

[3] As previously explained, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. This means that its meaning is metafunctionally organised. Painter et al simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in instances of an epilinguistic system. Importantly, the visual depiction of emotions is irrelevant to the issue of protolinguistic body language, since it is not concerned with the meanings that can be made by an organism of a social semiotic species in whom language has not developed. See the earlier post

• Misrepresenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

For a more detailed consideration of the epilinguistic depiction of protolinguistic body language, see the review of Chapter 5 of this publication on interpersonal paralanguage.

[4] As previously explained, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

∞

Most importantly, just as an image of a pipe is not a pipe, an image of body language is not body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Either Somatic Or Interpersonal

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

What is common to most of the meanings assigned by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) to ‘protolinguistic’ microfunctions is that, if not simply somatic, they are interpersonal in nature – but not accommodated by a linguistic model that includes only SPEECH FUNCTION, MOOD and MODALITY in that metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] As previously explained, in Cléirigh's model, protolinguistic body language, by definition, excludes non-semiotic ("somatic") behaviour, and the authors' misunderstanding in this regard derives from taking the view 'from below' (body movement) instead of the view 'from above' (meaning). And, as also previously explained, in terms of orders of complexity, the authors' model of somasis confuses the biological order with the social order, and includes what Halliday (2004: 18) models as protolanguage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As explained in the previous post, this false claim derives from the authors misrepresenting epilinguistic pictorial systems, which do include interpersonal meaning, as protolinguistic body language, which does not.

[4] To be clear, a model of an evolutionarily prior system, protolinguistic body language, is not required to "accommodate" a model of an evolutionarily later system, a linguistic model, any more than a description of therapod dinosaurs must accommodate a description of the birds that evolved from them.

Misrepesenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62):

If we turn now to other SFL theorists, particularly those who have considered the visual depiction of human communicative interaction, we can see some common threads. There is a general agreement about the meanings of the way the body is oriented in relation to an addressee. 

For example, Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) system of INVOLVEMENT within their ‘visual grammar’ explains the meaning as relative detachment or involvement of the viewer with the content of the image. The meaning is realised by horizontal angle, with an oblique angle signifying greater detachment than a front-on angle. 

Painter et al. (2013) extend this to analysis of the depicted interacting characters in picture books to propose a system of ORIENTATION with different orientations between characters (face to face, side by side, back to back) comparably realising different degrees of engagement, solidarity or detachment. 

Martinec (2001) similarly has a comparable system of ANGLE (operating alongside one of SOCIAL DISTANCE) again with similar realisations.  

In all of this work the meaning systems are placed within the interpersonal metafunction and are thus seen as available alongside textual and/or ideational paralanguage systems and all three metafunctions of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since these are not independent theorists. Painter et al, at least, theorise on the basis of Kress and van Leeuwen's work, at least.

[2] Importantly, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. So here the authors are using an epilinguistic system as evidence that a protolinguistic system is epilinguistic.

[3] To be clear, Kress and van Leeuwen are concerned with a human's interpretation of an image, and Painter et al are concerned with relations within an image. Both are irrelevant to the issue at hand, since neither is concerned with the body language of an organism of a social semiotic species.

[4] To be clear, because visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system, its meaning is metafunctionally organised. These colleagues have simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in such epilinguistic systems.

[5] To be clear, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62):

Another group of behaviours from Zappavigna and Martin’s (2018) ‘body protolanguage’ category involves relative uprightness of body posture, frontal or oblique facial and body orientation and the leaning forward or backwards of the torso in relation to the addressee. These expressive movements of the body are similarly independent from any ideational meanings with which they may combine and, similarly to facial movements, may also combine with other interpersonal strands of meaning, whether linguistic (e.g. a variety of spoken mood forms) or paralinguistic (e.g. smiling or widening the eyes). There is thus neither fusion of ideational/interpersonal meaning in relation to ‘content’ nor multimodal fusion in the form of expression. The characteristics of protolanguage as a developmental semiotic are not therefore in evidence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviours' and 'expressive/facial movements' here again betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[3] To be clear, these postures and orientations also occur in other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets. When they are meaningful, they are protolinguistic on the basis that they do not require the evolutionary or developmental emergence of language.

[4] To be clear, on Cléirigh's model, these are simply examples of protolinguistic body language accompanying the ideational or interpersonal meanings of language; that is, of protolinguistic body language being used paralinguistically. 

The authors' confusion here derives from their misunderstanding that such body language expressions realise the metafunctional meanings of the linguistic instance rather than the microfunctional meanings of the protolinguistic instance. This misunderstanding, in turn, derives from the authors' notion of convergence, in which paralanguage expression is said to converge with language content. This misunderstanding, in turn, derives from the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system — a misunderstanding that invalidates their model of paralanguage.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions are irrelevant to a characterisation of protolanguage, since they do not evolve or develop until the emergence of language. The microfunctions are predecessors of the metafunctions, not a fusion of them. On the other hand, as Halliday's previously cited data (Halliday 2004 [1975]: 36) demonstrate, multimodality is not a necessary condition of protolanguage.

[6] To be clear, the characteristics of protolanguage as a developmental semiotic are merely characteristics of protolanguage in relation to the ontogenesis of language. Protolinguistic body language is concerned with protolanguage in its own right, not as a means to a linguistic end. 

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

To explore this, some examples of adult paralinguistic behaviour classified by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) as protolinguistic will be briefly discussed. One group comprises various facial expressions such as smiling, raising, lowering or widening the eyes, opening the mouth and the presence or absence of eye contact with the addressee, all features of ‘social communion’ that predate even protolanguage (see Figure 2.1).  

As has been discussed, during the transition phase there is evidence that facial affect can be separated from other strands of interpersonal expression (e.g. looking happy while saying oh dear) and in the adult semiotic system affective facial expressions can clearly combine freely with any ideational meaning. In these respects, such expression forms are unlike protolinguistic signs, and the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether that instance is somatic or semiotic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviour' and 'expression(s)' here betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstanding arises from again giving priority to the view 'from below', facial expression, instead of the view 'from above', meaning. The meanings of facial expressions cannot predate protolanguage, since protolanguage is the initial semiotic system. Before protolanguage, such facial expressions have a social function only: the selection of value in the other, not a semiotic function: the expression of symbolic value for the other.

[4] Here the authors provide evidence against their own argument. To be clear, a child looking happy while saying oh dear, and an adult combining facial expressions with language are both instances of the paralinguistic use of protolinguistic body language. They are paralinguistic because they are used alongside language, and they are protolinguistic because they are semiotic systems that do require the prior evolution and development of language.

[5] This is misleading. The difference here is only that, in these instances, the protolinguistic signs are being used paralinguistically, rather than pre-linguistically.

[6] To be clear, the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether the instance is social (carries value) or protolinguistic (carries symbolic value). As previously explained, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two distinct orders of complexity: the biological and the social.

Misrepresenting The Microfunctions As Criterial Of Protolinguistic Body Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

Nor is it possible to argue that certain forms of adult paralanguage are organised in terms of microfunctions simply because it is possible to interpret them this way. As explained earlier, there is no formal way to determine the microfunction of an infant expression – it is an interpretation from context. Therefore, given that any adult communication could be assigned to a microfunction on contextual grounds, since adult language has limitless uses, this does not in itself count as evidence for microfunctional organisation. It would therefore be more appropriate for the term ‘protolanguage’ to be used only if it can be shown that the defining characteristics of protolinguistic communication are apparent, that is, if the expression form is an irreducible multimodal complex and if the meaning is similarly an inseparable bundle of ideational and interpersonal meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents the micofunctions that are used to model protolanguage as criterial of the category. To be clear, protolinguistic body language is simply body language that does not require the prior evolution or development of language, and as such, can be found in all other species with a social semiotic system. The microfunctions are not criterial in determining the category 'protolinguistic', they are merely Halliday's means of modelling paralanguage.

So here again the authors are arguing against their own misunderstanding of Cléirigh's model, instead of against Cléirigh's model itself. In terms of logical fallacies, this is an example of the

Straw man fallacy – refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognising or acknowledging the distinction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. For example, protolinguistic interjections like yuck! and ouch! are not expressed by "an irreducible multimodal complex". Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Moreover, Halliday's publications provide a wealth of examples of expressions that are not multimodal. For example, Halliday (2004 [1975]: 36):

In other species, the expression may be unimodal or multimodal. For example, in rainbow lorikeets, a 'prohibitive' regulatory function, which could be glossed as 'you just try it!) is expressed as rough growl with low rising tone (tone 3), whereas a 'threatening' regulatory function, which might be glossed as 'you're asking for it!', is expressed by the arching of the back, a lowering of the face and eye ridges, a fierce glare, and multiple wing-flaps while standing on 'tippy-toes' as if the bird was about to make a flying attack. Other examples can be found here.

[3] To be clear, this characterises human protolanguage in terms of the semiotic system it will evolve and develop into, metafunctional language, instead of in its own terms as microfunctional protolanguage. In evolutionary terms, this is analogous to characterising the features of therapod dinosaurs in terms of the features of birds.

Halliday (2004 [1975]: 52) provides a summary of the development from microfunction to metafunction:

Misrepresenting Epilinguistic ("Semovergent") Body Language As Protolinguistic

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

Secondly, it is clear that not all forms of adult facial or bodily gesture that first arise in the protolanguage are assigned to the ‘protolinguistic body language’ category by Zappavigna and Martin (2018). The pointing gesture, for example, has already been discussed as arising in early protolanguage but becomes generalised during the transition to function in concert with a variety of ideational and interpersonal forms of linguistic (or paralinguistic) expression. This gesture is accordingly accepted by Zappavigna and Martin as semovergent and part of the textual metafunction. 

In addition, forms of mime that first arise within the imaginative microfunction of protolanguage (e.g. raising an imaginary cup to the lips) are recognised in Table 2.4 as ideational and so also within the semovergent paralanguage category. It is not therefore the case that having a clear origin in protolanguage is regarded by Zappavigna and Martin as sufficient grounds for classing an adult gesture as a protolinguistic ‘leftover’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the second of authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. Where the first argument was a false claim about what is wrongly included in the category, this second argument is a false claim about what is wrongly excluded from the category.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. The protolinguistic category of body language includes all semiosis that does not require the evolution of language in the species and the development of language in the individual. See further below.

[3] To be clear, the reason why the pointing gesture is classified as epilinguistic by Cléirigh, and so as semovergent by his plagiarisers Zappavigna and Martin, is because its meaning as 'deictic identification' (p56) only emerges in the developmental transition to language, as the authors themselves acknowledge. The fact that it is not protolinguistic is demonstrated by the inability of other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus haematodus) to interpret a pointing gesture as referential.

[4] To be clear, the reason why mime is classified as epilinguistic by Cléirigh, and so as semovergent by his plagiarisers Zappavigna and Martin, is because it only emerges in the developmental transition to language, as the authors themselves acknowledge. The fact that it is not protolinguistic is demonstrated by its absence in other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus haematodus). 

But in any case, this 'let's pretend' function is of a very different nature to the expression of the ideational meanings of language in gesture for an addressee to understand, as in a game of Charades. As Halliday (2004 [1976]: 73) explains:

Finally we have the imaginative function, which is the function of language whereby the child creates an environment of his own. As well as moving into, taking over, and exploring the universe which he finds around him, the child also uses language for creating a universe of his own, a world initially of pure sound, but which gradually turns into one of story and make-believe and ‘let’s pretend’, and ultimately into the realm of poetry and imaginative writing. This we may call the ‘let’s pretend’ function of language.

[5] To be clear, as demonstrated above, the two examples of body language provided by the authors both arise only in the transition to language, and so do not qualify as protolinguistic body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Non-Semiotic ("Somatic")

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60-1):

The first point to be made is that some of the phenomena counted as protolinguistic in Zappavigna and Martin (2018) may in fact be somatic rather than semiotic. For example, forms of fidgeting, scratching a cheek or crossing feet may simply be a matter of relieving some bodily discomfort, rather than having symbolic import. It is necessary to have criteria for discriminating somatic and semiotic expression in such cases (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4–1.5), but their ambiguity is not grounds for classing them as protolinguistic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the first of the authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. However, it is an argument against what the authors mistake to be included in the category rather than an argument against the grounds for the category itself.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language is restricted to semiosis, by definition. The criterion for discriminating the semiotic from the non-semiotic is simply that if a gesture or posture means something other than itself, then it is semiotic. If fidgeting, for example, does not mean something other than itself, then it is not semiotic, and so cannot be an expression of protolinguistic body language. If, however, the fidgeting of a young offender facing a tribunal — as in the data — means that he is nervous and 'itching to leave', then it is semiotic, and because such semiosis does not require the prior evolution and development of language, it is protolinguistic.

Importantly, the authors' mistaken notion of there being ambiguity in the interpretation of such cases derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', contrā the SFL method of giving priority to the view 'from above'. That is, the authors ask what the gestures mean, instead of asking how meanings are realised in gesture. This, in turn, derives from the authors misunderstanding body language as an expression-only semiotic system, as previously explained.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two different orders of complexity: biological (behaviour) and social (communion). 

Questioning The Notion Of Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60):

This model usefully distinguishes paralinguistic behaviour that can only accompany speech (being closely tied to the interpersonal and textual systems of spoken language) from all the rest. This is our category of sonovergent paralanguage, where paralinguistic expression moves with speech prosodies. The remaining paralinguistic behaviour is divided in Table 2.4 between protolinguistic and semovergent categories, both of which may (but need not) accompany speech. The question, then, is whether it is helpful to separate out some of this expressive behaviour as protolinguistic – which would be to suggest that the adult semiotic communicative system simultaneously deploys language and (paralinguistic) protolanguage.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's 'linguistic body language' as 'sonovergent paralanguage' demonstrates two serious misunderstandings of Cléirigh's model. On the one hand, linguistic body language is not sonovergent, because its gestural expression is divergent from phonology. And on the other hand, it is not paralanguage because it is language (Halliday 1989: 30): like prosodic phonology, it realises the grammatical systems of INFORMATION (textual) and KEY (interpersonal).

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'paralinguistic behaviour' and 'expressive behaviour' confirm the observation made in the previous post that the authors have misunderstood paralanguage to be an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, there is no question that adults simultaneously deploy language and protolanguage.  Halliday (2002[1996]: 389):

Certain features of the human protolanguage, our primary semiotic, persist into adult life; for example expressions of pain, anger, astonishment or fear (rephonologised as “interjections”, like ouch!, oy!, wow! …).

Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425):

Interjections are certainly quite different from adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions; they tend to be protolinguistic remnants in adult languages.

Moreover, the theoretical advantage of separating protolinguistic body language from the other types is that it distinguishes the body language common to all social semiotic species from the body languages that are unique to humans and require the prior evolution and development of language.

The Fundamental Misunderstanding Behind The Terms 'Sonovergent' And 'Semovergent'

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60):

See Table 2.4, based on Martin et al. (2013b), where the terms ‘sonovergent’ and ‘semovergent’ replace the terms ‘linguistic and ‘epilinguistic’ used in the original.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin et al. (2013b) is Martin, Zappavigna, Dwyer and Cléirigh, and the model of body language in that paper was created and developed by Cléirigh, alone. See, for example, Cléirigh's Original Notes (2009-10).

[2] To be clear, while the function of rebranding Cléirigh's linguistic and epilinguistic body language as the authors' sonovergent and semovergent paralanguage is to disguise the fact that the authors are using Cléirigh's model, the choice of these terms discloses serious misunderstandings of not just body language and Cléirigh's model, but of semiotic systems in general.

To explain, the minimum condition of semiosis is two levels of symbolic abstraction, variously labelled 'identifier' and 'identified' (Saussure), 'expression' and 'content' (Hjelmslev), 'form' and 'meaning' etc. The authors, however, misconstrue body language as expression only. It is this misunderstanding that leads them to model body language as 'para-' to language, since, without its own content plane, it must require another semiotic system, language, to provide its content.

It is this misconception of body language as an expression-only system 'alongside' language that motivates the notion of paralanguage 'converging' with language. When paralanguage expression converges with language expression, it is classified as 'sonovergent', and when it  converges with language content, it is classified as 'semovergent'.

This misconception of body language of an expression-only system led Martin and Zappavigna (2019: 26-8) — the original version of Chapter 1 in this volume — to the self-contradictory conclusion that paralanguage is an expression system of language itself, thereby undermining the notions of convergence and of paralanguage itself. See the clarifying critiques of this conclusion at The Argument That Paralanguage Is An Expression System Of Language and Paralanguage As Language Expression.

As a result of these multiple misunderstandings, the authors' 'sonovergent' and 'semovergent' paralanguage are not valid rebrandings of Cléirigh's 'linguistic' and 'epilinguistic' body language because each opposition of terms arises from different criteria. In Cléirigh's model, body language, like all semiotic systems, has both content and expression planes. What distinguishes the different types is not a convergence with language, but the type of semiotic system involved: protolinguistic, linguistic, or epilinguistic.

Linguistic body language is the use of the body to realise the same content as prosodic phonology by different means. As such, it is language, not paralanguage, and "sono-divergent", not 'sonovergent. Like prosodic phonology, it realises the grammatical systems of INFORMATION and KEY. As language, its content plane is stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar.

Epilinguistic body language is the use of the body to realise content made possible by the evolution and development of language, but unlike language, its content plane is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar.

Protolinguistic body language is the use of the body to realise content that does not require the evolution and development of language, and thus occurs in all social semiotic species. Again, unlike language, its content plane is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. In this chapter, the authors will argue for excluding this type of body language from their model of paralanguage.

Misrepresenting The Grounds For Protolinguistic Body Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 59-60):

Although the term ‘protolanguage’ in SFL theory referred in origin to a phase in linguistic ontogenesis, Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) have suggested that for the adult communicative system, one of three proposed categories of paralanguage can be interpreted as ‘protolinguistic’ in nature. This is on the grounds that, like the infant meaning system, but unlike the other two categories they propose, it is organised in terms of microfunctions rather than metafunctions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because 'protolanguage' in SFL Theory also refers to a phase in phylogenesis. Halliday (2003: 14, 16):

When our primary semiotic evolved into a higher-order semiotic (that is, when protolanguage evolved into language) …

… in the evolution of language out of protolanguage …

[2] This is misleading, because 'protolinguistic' was Cléirigh's proposal, and for body language, not paralanguage.

[3] With regard to Cléirigh's proposal, this is very misleading indeed. The category of protolinguistic body language is not proposed on the grounds that it is microfunctionally organised. It is proposed on the basis that it is a bi-stratal social semiotic system that is evolutionarily and developmentally prior to language (and as such, also to be found in other social semiotic species). The microfunctions are the SFL way of modelling paralanguage, not criterial for the category. That is, the microfunctions are a result of the categorisation, not the reason for it.

The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 54):

While modelling protolanguage from the perspective of affect does not lend itself as readily to tracking the development of the system as protodialogue (involving calls, greetings, offers, refusals, acknowledgements, playful exchanges) and imaginative play, it has the advantage of emphasising the continuity with the earlier, emotion-charged forms of social communion and of allowing for a clearer focus on the origins of the verbal ATTITUDE system in the adult semantics of APPRAISAL (Martin and White, 2005).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, a model of protolanguage from the perspective of emotion ("affect") is a model of the sensing that might accompany protolanguage — like a model of sensing that might accompany language — not a model of the meaning that is actually expressed. As previously explained, it is not a question of whether protolanguage is "emotion-charged", but of whether it is emotions that constitute the content of what is expressed.

[2] To be clear, it is Halliday's linear taxonomy of complexity that provides a means of understanding the developmental move from pre-semiotic social communion to protolanguage. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

… a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" … . A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is social; it is biological with the added component of value. Again, the value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors.

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver. It is when this value becomes symbolic value that the social system acquires the added component of meaning that makes it a semiotic system: protolanguage.

[3] To be clear, the 'clearer focus' that is allowed by modelling protolanguage from the perspective of emotion ("affect") is the important distinction between the protolanguage systems that are common to all social semiotic species and the language systems that are unique to humans.

Moreover, the ATTITUDE system of AFFECT is concerned with the interpersonal assessment by reference to emotion, not with emotion as experiential meaning. As Halliday (2008: 179-80) explains, as a system of interpersonal assessment, the system of ATTITUDE arises from the systemisation of POLARITY and MODALITY:

In terms of children’s early language development, the interpersonal metafunction provides the prototype of how meanings come to be grammaticalised. The two systems that were first grammaticalised by one small child (Nigel, aged 0;10) were:

POLARITY: positive / negative
MODALITY: VALUE: low / high

followed shortly by the two forms of “appreciation” in conjunction with the feature “positive”:

APPRECIATION (positive): impact (“that’s interesting”) / quality (“that tastes nice”)

Note that these were not yet mother tongue; they were protolanguage, realised by sounds and gestures. But they were systemic, or at least proto-systemic; and they provided the model for the linguistic systems of appraisal, where each lexical item realises the intersection of an appraisal feature with polarity and/or modality.

The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 52-3):

Despite the strongly emotional nature of earlier protoconversation, in this [Halliday's] interpretation, symbolic expressions of feeling are seen as restricted to the personal microfunction, where the child uses symbols to construe a sense of self in contradistinction to the environment. However, it could be argued that emotional states underlie each of the four initial microfunctions as shown in Table 2.3. 

This makes room for an alternative interpretation of the early protolanguage as a system of semioticised affect, as argued in Painter (2003). Figure 2.2 presents a representation of Hal’s protolanguage at ten-and-a-half months in these terms. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the expression of 'affective and cognitive states' are restricted to the personal microfunction in Halliday's model (e.g. Halliday 2004 [1998]: 18), is that these are expressions of personal states, not expressions of regulatory, instrumental or interactional states.

[2] To be clear, it is not a question of whether emotional states underlie the microfunctions, but of whether they constitute the content that is expressed in each case. After all, 'it could be argued that' emotional states underlie absolutely everything that humans participate in, both semiotic and material.

[3] To be clear, as the authors admit, this alternative interpretation is a model of emotional states that underlie protolanguage, not of protolanguage itself. That is, it is a model of the inner experience of the meaner, "proto-sensing", not a model of the symbolic processing of the meaner's protolanguage, "proto-saying".

[4] To be clear, the use of the word 'affect' here foreshadows the upcoming confusion of 'emotion', in its experiential sense of sensing, with 'affect' in its interpersonal sense of appraising.

∞

Significantly, the authors' interpretation of emotional expression as protolinguistic directly contradicts the overall argument of this chapter, which is to argue against the theoretical utility of including a protolinguistic category in their model of paralanguage.

Misrepresenting The Proposal Put Forward By Cléirigh (2010)

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 50):

This section will outline the nature of the protolanguage system from the descriptions in the case studies by Halliday (1975), Painter ([1984] 2015) and Torr (1997). This will provide a basis for a later discussion of the proposal put forward by Cléirigh (2010) and found in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) that some aspects of adult paralanguage remain protolinguistic in nature.

Blogger Comments:

On the one hand, it is revealing that Cléirigh is only properly acknowledged when there is to be critique. On the other hand, this is misleading because Cléirigh's proposal is not about paralanguage, but about body language, which may or may not serve as paralanguage, and also applies to species without language, in which case it cannot serve as paralanguage

Somasis: Confusing Biological And Social Orders Of Complexity

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 47-8):

By two or three months of age, then, the infant’s expressive but pre-symbolic behaviour can be modelled, as shown in Figure 2.1, as either ‘biological behaviour’ or ‘social communion’. The former may have meaning for the adult but is unaddressed, while the latter involves shared address but no content. Both are regarded here as examples of ‘somasis’, that is, human vocal and bodily behaviour that is not being deployed for meaning-making.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, bodily behaviour that does not realise meaning is irrelevant to a model of semiotic systems. It has only become an issue here because the authors take the view 'from below', expression, in contradistinction to the SFL perspective 'from above', content.

[2] To be clear, classifying 'social' as 'biological' confuses different orders of complexity. On Halliday's model, which the authors have previously cited, but misunderstood, a social system is of a different order of complexity, because it is a biological system with the added component of value. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 508, 509):

Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. …

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is, as the name implies, social, not biological ('somatic'). That is, it is biological with the added component of value. The value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that have been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors. This can be seen, for example, in the peacock's courtship display, where the fanning of a peacock's tail selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of a peahen. 

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver.

The Model Of Paralanguage In Martin et al. (2013b) And Zappavigna And Martin (2018)

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 45):

This chapter elaborates in greater detail the ontogenetic perspective underlying the accounts of paralanguage provided by Matthiessen (2009) and Cléirigh (2010) – the latter informing Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) – which have influenced our model. … 

Following this account, Section 2.6 presents a case for our current adaptation of the model of adult paralanguage found in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) by expanding the semovergent category of adult communication to include aspects previously regarded as ‘protolinguistic body language’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, this is misleading, because Cléirigh (2010) is a model of body language in which one type, linguistic, is language, not paralanguage, and the other two types, protolinguistic and epilinguistic, can function in the absence of language.

On the other hand, the perspective underlying Cléirigh (2010) is as much phylogenetic as ontogenetic, since the types of body language are distinguished in terms of the evolution of semiosis in the species just as much as in terms of the development of semiosis in the individual.

[2] To be clear, the terms 'informing' and 'influenced' here are misleading because the model in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) is Cléirigh's model.

[3] Here again, the authors remind the reader that Cléirigh's model of body language is their model of paralanguage. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[4] Again, the model in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) is Cléirigh's model.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, expanding the semovergent category means contracting the number of paralanguage types to just one, since sonovergent paralanguage is language, not paralanguage, because it serves the same function as prosodic phonology.

On the other hand, including protolinguistic body language in the semovergent category creates a contradiction in terms, since the semovergent category is the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language, which is distinguished from the protolinguistic variety in requiring the prior development/evolution of language. Since protolinguistic body language is the body language that humans share with all other social semiotic species, the authors are here claiming that the body language of, say baboons, requires the prior development/evolution of language.