The Irrelevance Of 'Somatic Behaviour' To A Model Of Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 197-8):

An early step in our work involved drawing a distinction between somatic and semiotic behaviour (Figure 7.1), drawing on functional studies of language development – where the distinction bears critically on the emergence of protolanguage (our focus in Chapter 2).

 

We accept in drawing this distinction that all behaviour has the potential to be treated as meaningful or not by speakers. A clear example comes from the data underpinning Chapter 5, as Coraline swings rhythmically back and forth several times on a squeaky door, staring at her father who is busy at this desk as she does so (example (1)) – until he responds verbally and paralinguistically to this behaviour as a request for attention.

We can further illustrate this point anecdotally to show that it is not just human behaviour that can be construed as meaningful. In 2018 one of our authors, along with her sister-in-law and her partner (another of our authors), participated in an informal memorial ashes ceremony on the edge of a reef in South Australia – pouring the sister-in-law’s partner’s ashes into the ocean there where that couple, keen divers, had spent many weekends and holidays exploring the reef together. As they did so a large ray swam slowly by. This was interpreted by all involved as a remarkable meaningful event, retold and enjoyed on many occasions with close relatives and friends – with the ray construed as a dear loved one saying goodbye. In cases such as these somasis is recontextualised as semiosis by the meaning-making interlocutors involved. What is crucial from the perspective of discourse analysis is the uptake of what went on, or not, by meaners.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, an earlier step in their work involved taking Cléirigh's model and having multiple meetings in attempts to understand it.

[2] To be clear, the perspective taken by SFL theory is 'from above'; that is, it is concerned with questions of what meanings are distinguished and how they are expressed. From this perspective, gestures that do not realise meanings are irrelevant to a model of paralanguage. The need for a distinction between semiotic and "somatic" behaviour only arises from mistakenly taking the opposite perspective 'from below': the question of whether gestures express meanings.

[3] To be clear, the authors' focus in Chapter 2 was an argument against Cléirigh's 'protolinguistic' body language, the type that humans share with all other social semiotic species. The purpose of removing this type of body language was to allow for the interpretation of facial expressions of emotion in terms of one linguistic system of APPRAISAL, AFFECT, in Chapter 5, despite the fact that emotions are facially expressed in species without language.

[4] To be clear, this confuses two different roles of interlocutor: speaker ('sayer') and interpreter ('senser'). The fact that interlocutors can mentally construe material order phenomena as semiotic order metaphenomena is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage. In SFL Theory, a model of body language identifies the potential meanings that can be distinguished by speakers, with their bodies, while speaking.

Confusing Demarcation With Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 168-70):

Paralinguistically, a [virtual:semiosis] entity may be identified either retrospectively or prospectively through an unresolved embodied vector. In a number of instances in the data the selection [virtual:semiosis:retrospective] is realised through a gestural flick – a small, fleeting vertically directed vector expressed with an index finger or hand (body parts that facilitate speed of movement). The flick gesture synchronises with a silent beat (^) which marks a juncture (e.g. a phase or stage boundary) in the flow of meaning in a text. The deictic gesture identifies a preceding segment of text (a semiotic entity), one that bears a logical connection to the coming phase or stage of discourse. The subsequent text is frequently initiated with an internal connector such as so.

Example (5) shows one such instance from the data. … Following presentation of a phase of argument from the airline’s legal counsel, the plaintiff’s argument is introduced in (5). As the phonological transcription reveals, the vertical flick syncs with a silent beat (^) preceding the commencement of the last tone group, which begins with the internal connector so.

In (6) the first image captures the conclusion of Edmonds’s argument everything’s mucked up. Image 2 shows the vertical flick (circled), realised in sync with the culminative silent beat (^). It retrospectively identifies the preceding semiotic entity – in this case a stage of the storytelling in which both parties (British Airways and Edmonds) put their arguments to the court. The conclusion of that stage converges with the lecturer closing his eyes and dropping his head. In image 3 the lecturer reorients his body to his left in sync with the internal connector so as he commences a new stage of the lecture in which he discusses the logic of the preceding arguments.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the timing of the gesture with a pause between a quote and a non-quote might be taken as evidence that the function of the gesture is demarcation (punctuating text) rather than deixis (pointing with respect to the speaker).

[2] To be clear, the authors provide no evidence in support of this claim. It would seem that the authors have given priority to the view 'from below' rather than the view 'from above': that is, since the gesture resembles pointing, it must have a deictic function, therefore it must refer back to the previous text.

Confusing Content With Expression, Semiosis With Somasis, And Paralanguage With Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 97):

DEPICTION considers whether the paralinguistic entity has a defined contour that is visually ‘drawn’ in space (by, e.g. drawing the outline of an entity with a pointed finger in the air) or ‘sculpted’ (by, e.g. cupping a hand as in the example in (3)). The features sculpted and drawn correspond to two of Müller’s (1998) four modes of expression used in representational gestures: drawing (tracing the silhouette of an object in the air with a finger or hand) and moulding (sculpting or shaping the form of an object with the hands). 

Müller’s (1998) two other modes, imitating/acting (‘acting out’ an action) and representing/portraying (where the hands represent an object, e.g. a ‘V’ shape made with middle fingers to represent scissors) are dealt with in Chapter 1 in terms of somasis and emblems, respectively.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the term 'paralinguistic entity' confuses discourse semantics (entity) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. To be clear, gestures are expressions that realise semantic entities; they are not the entities — just as phonemes that realise semantic entities are not the entities.

[2] To be clear, the system of DEPICTION confuses content (entity) with its expression (drawn, sculpted).

[3] To be clear, here the authors misunderstand semiosis as nonsemiosis (somasis). A gesture that imitates (mimes) an action represents that action, and as such, is semiotic, since it means something other than the gesture itself.

[4] As seen in Chapter 1, the authors treat emblems as part of language, rather than paralanguage, so here they are claiming that a hand shape that means 'scissors' is language. To be clear, even in their own model, this hand shape semovergently realises the entity 'scissors'. Here again the authors have become confused by taking the view 'from below' (expression) rather than the view 'from above' (content). That is, because the V-shape meaning 'scissors' resembles the V-shape meaning 'two', they have classified it in the same way: as an emblem.

Confusing Epilinguistic Pictures With Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

As we have seen, much of what is assigned to body protolanguage involves the expression of emotions. Here we meet again the challenge of discriminating somasis and semiosis. Nonetheless, in the analysis of visual depiction, Painter et al. (2013) propose VISUAL AFFECT as an interpersonal meaning system complementing that of verbal AFFECT within the linguistic domain of APPRAISAL. 

The details of the system remain unspecified by them, but Martinec (2001) provides networks of meaning options for basic emotions with realisations specified in terms of facial movements. These systems are again treated by him as belonging within the interpersonal metafunction and thus able to be put into play alongside meanings originating from within the other metafunctions. For our own work in this domain, see Chapter 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As we have seen in previous posts, this false claim derives from the authors misconstruing Halliday's microfunctions of protolanguage as types of emotions. See

• The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"
• The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

In Cléirigh's model, following Halliday ((e.g. 2004 [1998]: 18), since emotions are personal states, they are restricted to the personal microfunction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. If body movements and postures mean something other than themselves, emotions, they are semiotic, not merely "somatic" (the authors' confusion of biological and social orders of complexity).

As previously explained, this challenge to the authors only arises from their taking the view 'from below' (body movements and postures) instead of the SFL view 'from above' (the meanings expressed), and this error derives from misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system..

[3] As previously explained, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. This means that its meaning is metafunctionally organised. Painter et al simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in instances of an epilinguistic system. Importantly, the visual depiction of emotions is irrelevant to the issue of protolinguistic body language, since it is not concerned with the meanings that can be made by an organism of a social semiotic species in whom language has not developed. See the earlier post

• Misrepresenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

For a more detailed consideration of the epilinguistic depiction of protolinguistic body language, see the review of Chapter 5 of this publication on interpersonal paralanguage.

[4] As previously explained, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

∞

Most importantly, just as an image of a pipe is not a pipe, an image of body language is not body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

To explore this, some examples of adult paralinguistic behaviour classified by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) as protolinguistic will be briefly discussed. One group comprises various facial expressions such as smiling, raising, lowering or widening the eyes, opening the mouth and the presence or absence of eye contact with the addressee, all features of ‘social communion’ that predate even protolanguage (see Figure 2.1).  

As has been discussed, during the transition phase there is evidence that facial affect can be separated from other strands of interpersonal expression (e.g. looking happy while saying oh dear) and in the adult semiotic system affective facial expressions can clearly combine freely with any ideational meaning. In these respects, such expression forms are unlike protolinguistic signs, and the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether that instance is somatic or semiotic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviour' and 'expression(s)' here betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstanding arises from again giving priority to the view 'from below', facial expression, instead of the view 'from above', meaning. The meanings of facial expressions cannot predate protolanguage, since protolanguage is the initial semiotic system. Before protolanguage, such facial expressions have a social function only: the selection of value in the other, not a semiotic function: the expression of symbolic value for the other.

[4] Here the authors provide evidence against their own argument. To be clear, a child looking happy while saying oh dear, and an adult combining facial expressions with language are both instances of the paralinguistic use of protolinguistic body language. They are paralinguistic because they are used alongside language, and they are protolinguistic because they are semiotic systems that do require the prior evolution and development of language.

[5] This is misleading. The difference here is only that, in these instances, the protolinguistic signs are being used paralinguistically, rather than pre-linguistically.

[6] To be clear, the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether the instance is social (carries value) or protolinguistic (carries symbolic value). As previously explained, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two distinct orders of complexity: the biological and the social.

Misrepresenting Epilinguistic ("Semovergent") Body Language As Protolinguistic

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

Secondly, it is clear that not all forms of adult facial or bodily gesture that first arise in the protolanguage are assigned to the ‘protolinguistic body language’ category by Zappavigna and Martin (2018). The pointing gesture, for example, has already been discussed as arising in early protolanguage but becomes generalised during the transition to function in concert with a variety of ideational and interpersonal forms of linguistic (or paralinguistic) expression. This gesture is accordingly accepted by Zappavigna and Martin as semovergent and part of the textual metafunction. 

In addition, forms of mime that first arise within the imaginative microfunction of protolanguage (e.g. raising an imaginary cup to the lips) are recognised in Table 2.4 as ideational and so also within the semovergent paralanguage category. It is not therefore the case that having a clear origin in protolanguage is regarded by Zappavigna and Martin as sufficient grounds for classing an adult gesture as a protolinguistic ‘leftover’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the second of authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. Where the first argument was a false claim about what is wrongly included in the category, this second argument is a false claim about what is wrongly excluded from the category.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. The protolinguistic category of body language includes all semiosis that does not require the evolution of language in the species and the development of language in the individual. See further below.

[3] To be clear, the reason why the pointing gesture is classified as epilinguistic by Cléirigh, and so as semovergent by his plagiarisers Zappavigna and Martin, is because its meaning as 'deictic identification' (p56) only emerges in the developmental transition to language, as the authors themselves acknowledge. The fact that it is not protolinguistic is demonstrated by the inability of other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus haematodus) to interpret a pointing gesture as referential.

[4] To be clear, the reason why mime is classified as epilinguistic by Cléirigh, and so as semovergent by his plagiarisers Zappavigna and Martin, is because it only emerges in the developmental transition to language, as the authors themselves acknowledge. The fact that it is not protolinguistic is demonstrated by its absence in other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus haematodus). 

But in any case, this 'let's pretend' function is of a very different nature to the expression of the ideational meanings of language in gesture for an addressee to understand, as in a game of Charades. As Halliday (2004 [1976]: 73) explains:

Finally we have the imaginative function, which is the function of language whereby the child creates an environment of his own. As well as moving into, taking over, and exploring the universe which he finds around him, the child also uses language for creating a universe of his own, a world initially of pure sound, but which gradually turns into one of story and make-believe and ‘let’s pretend’, and ultimately into the realm of poetry and imaginative writing. This we may call the ‘let’s pretend’ function of language.

[5] To be clear, as demonstrated above, the two examples of body language provided by the authors both arise only in the transition to language, and so do not qualify as protolinguistic body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Non-Semiotic ("Somatic")

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60-1):

The first point to be made is that some of the phenomena counted as protolinguistic in Zappavigna and Martin (2018) may in fact be somatic rather than semiotic. For example, forms of fidgeting, scratching a cheek or crossing feet may simply be a matter of relieving some bodily discomfort, rather than having symbolic import. It is necessary to have criteria for discriminating somatic and semiotic expression in such cases (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4–1.5), but their ambiguity is not grounds for classing them as protolinguistic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the first of the authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. However, it is an argument against what the authors mistake to be included in the category rather than an argument against the grounds for the category itself.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language is restricted to semiosis, by definition. The criterion for discriminating the semiotic from the non-semiotic is simply that if a gesture or posture means something other than itself, then it is semiotic. If fidgeting, for example, does not mean something other than itself, then it is not semiotic, and so cannot be an expression of protolinguistic body language. If, however, the fidgeting of a young offender facing a tribunal — as in the data — means that he is nervous and 'itching to leave', then it is semiotic, and because such semiosis does not require the prior evolution and development of language, it is protolinguistic.

Importantly, the authors' mistaken notion of there being ambiguity in the interpretation of such cases derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', contrā the SFL method of giving priority to the view 'from above'. That is, the authors ask what the gestures mean, instead of asking how meanings are realised in gesture. This, in turn, derives from the authors misunderstanding body language as an expression-only semiotic system, as previously explained.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two different orders of complexity: biological (behaviour) and social (communion). 

Somasis: Confusing Biological And Social Orders Of Complexity

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 47-8):

By two or three months of age, then, the infant’s expressive but pre-symbolic behaviour can be modelled, as shown in Figure 2.1, as either ‘biological behaviour’ or ‘social communion’. The former may have meaning for the adult but is unaddressed, while the latter involves shared address but no content. Both are regarded here as examples of ‘somasis’, that is, human vocal and bodily behaviour that is not being deployed for meaning-making.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, bodily behaviour that does not realise meaning is irrelevant to a model of semiotic systems. It has only become an issue here because the authors take the view 'from below', expression, in contradistinction to the SFL perspective 'from above', content.

[2] To be clear, classifying 'social' as 'biological' confuses different orders of complexity. On Halliday's model, which the authors have previously cited, but misunderstood, a social system is of a different order of complexity, because it is a biological system with the added component of value. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 508, 509):

Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. …

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is, as the name implies, social, not biological ('somatic'). That is, it is biological with the added component of value. The value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that have been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors. This can be seen, for example, in the peacock's courtship display, where the fanning of a peacock's tail selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of a peahen. 

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver.

Using Halliday's Linear Taxonomy Of Complexity To Classify Somatic Behaviours

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 19-20):

As far as somasis is concerned we have found it useful to draw on Halliday’s (1996) proposals for an evolutionary typology of systems. He recognises four orders of complexity, with semiotic systems evolving out of social systems, social systems out of biological ones and biological ones out of physical ones. 

We have adapted this framework in our classification of somatic behaviour, distinguishing physical activity, biological behaviour and social communion.

Physical activity covers material action involving some change in the relationship of one physical entity to another (walking, running, jumping, throwing, breaking, cutting, digging, pulling etc.). 

Biological behaviour can be divided into changes that restore comfort (sneezing, coughing, scratching, laughing, adjusting garments or hair etc.) and those that index discomfort (nail biting, fiddling, fidgeting, wriggling, blushing, shivering, crying etc.). 

Social communion can be divided into mutual perception (sharing gaze, pitch, proximity, touch, smell etc.) and reciprocal attachment (tickling, cradling, holding hands, hugging, stroking, hugging, kissing, mating etc.). These proposals are outlined in Figure 1.7.

… To put this another way, we are arguing that the behaviours outlined in Figure 1.7 can be treated as paralinguistic or not depending on whether or not they are negotiated as meaningful in interaction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, non-semiotic behaviour ("somasis") is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage, and it only arises as an issue because the authors give priority the the view 'from below': gestures, in contradistinction to the methodology of SFL Theory, which gives priority to the view 'from above': meaning.

[2] To be clear, Halliday's model is set out in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 508, 509):

Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. …

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

[3] To be clear, the authors' use of Halliday's model seriously misunderstands it. Halliday's model is concerned with orders of complexity, from atoms to organisms to social structures, where the later orders subsume the earlier orders. The authors' three types of behaviour, in contrast, are mutually exclusive categories of the behaviour of organisms.

[4] To be clear, if any of these behaviours are interpreted as meaning anything other than themselves, then they are interpreted semiotic. Moreover, for Halliday (2004: 18), contrā the authors, 'exchanging attention' is a gloss of the interactional microfunction, and so not only semiotic rather than somatic, but protolanguage.

[5] To be clear, there is no need to argue this, since this is just a definition of (interpersonal) semiosis.

∞

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). See also the comments at:

Confusing Levels Of Complexity With Types Of Behaviour
Interpreting Purportedly Non-Semiotic Behaviours As Semiotic

The Issue Of What Counts As Semiosis And What Does Not

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 18-9):

SFL research on language development in young children has proven a useful starting point for work on paralanguage in two respects. On the one hand, the emergence of the first signs (protolanguage) highlights the issue of what counts as semiosis and what does not. On the other hand, the realisation of these first signs is multimodal – linguistic and paralinguistic resources are not differentiated at this stage. …

The influence of SFL research on the ontogenesis of language on our model of paralanguage is explored in detail in Chapter 2.

One basic challenge that has to be faced when working on paralanguage is how to distinguish it from behaviour – separating semiosis from non-semiosis in other words. …

From this point on we will use the term ‘somasis’ for non-semiotic behaviour (such as sneezing, stretching, scratching an itch and so on) and ‘semiosis’ for systems of signs.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the perspective taken is 'from above': how are these meanings expressed? The issue of what does or does not count as semiosis only arises from taking the opposite perspective 'from below': is or is not this an expression of meaning? That is, the authors have misunderstood SFL methodology, according to which, non-semiotic behaviour is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage.

See also the original comments on this at Misunderstanding The Difference Between Semiosis And Non-Semiosis.

[2] Here yet again, the authors remind the reader that Cléirigh's model of body language is their model of paralanguage. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

To be clear, it is Cléirigh's model of body language that derives from taking an ontogenetic (and phylogenetic) perspective:

• protolinguistic systems are those that develop before language (and persist thereafter);
• linguistic systems are those that develop as language;
• epilinguistic systems are those that develop after language.

The authors rebrand linguistic body language as sonovergent paralanguage, despite it being neither sonovergent nor paralanguage, which invalidates their rebranding of Cléirigh's model.

The authors rebrand epilinguistic body language as semovergent paralanguage, despite it not being restricted to paralanguage, and include within it protolinguistic body language that is used by species without language, and so is not epilinguistic, and reject the notion of protolinguistic body language, consigning the remainder to non-semiosis, as will be seen.

Connexion: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 14):

In terms of grammatical metaphor CONNEXION allows us to formalise relations between figures realised congruently between clauses or metaphorically as single clauses:

(30) (congruent clause complex construing a causal sequence)

Because he was harassing her, she left the parking lot.

(31) (metaphorical cause in the clause)

His harassment led to her departure.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the disadvantage of using Martin's CONNEXION instead of Halliday & Matthiessen's ideational semantics in modelling grammatical metaphor is that Martin's CONNEXION can only account for metaphor involving expansion relations that are additive, comparative, temporal or causal — and these without regard for the more general categories of elaboration, extension and enhancement — and cannot account for grammatical metaphor involving projection, such as the following example, which moves from the congruent to the increasingly metaphorical (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 711):

(a) Most linguists today believe → that there is no good evidence ...
(b) the strongest belief of all is [[ that there is no trace ... ]]
(c) these firmly entrenched – and vigorously defended – beliefs

"System Depends On And Is Motivated By Structure"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5, 6):

These grammatical oppositions are formalised in Figure 1.2. …

We will not go into detail about this kind of formalisation here; detailed accounts can be found in Matthiessen and Halliday (2009) and Martin et al. (2013a). We introduce the system network in Figure 1.2 at this point to clarify what it means to say that SFL involves a relational theory of meaning (rather than a representational one). This means that SFL treats language (and semiosis) as a resource for meaning (rather than a set of rules about what one can say or not). What matters are the relationships among choices, as they are formalised in system networks. The basic organising principle for descriptions is thus paradigmatic, rather than syntagmatic. Note however that for a paradigmatic choice to be meaningful, it must have structural consequences; system depends on and is motivated by structure (Martin et al., 2020).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, having just presented clause structures that differ in terms of their realisation of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION (see previous post), the authors misrepresent these as the grammatical oppositions of MOOD.

[2] This is potentially misleading for the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. The system network was introduced by Halliday in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar (1969) to represent Firth's notion of system.

[3] To be clear, SFL is a dimensional theory of meaning. Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Martin, on the other hand, misunderstands SFL as modelling language in terms of "interacting modules". For example,  Martin (1992: 488):

The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components?

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Semiotic systems that do not have "structural consequences" include paralanguage and traffic lights.

[5] This is very seriously misleading indeed, because it is the exact opposite of SFL methodology. SFL does not give priority to structure in such matters, since this would be giving priority to the view 'from below' instead of the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness…

This methodological error is the dominant recurring motif in Martin (2013), as demonstrated here. Moreover, Martin's notion that structure is necessary to meaning derives from the 'syntacticist' tradition of Formal linguistics. Halliday (2007 [1978]: 186):

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a great deal of meaning in a one-word sentence. Whether one claims that there is also structure is likely to depend on whether one subscribes to the syntacticist notion that structure is necessary to meaning.

Illustrating Speech Function

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5):

By way of illustration, consider the following examples – taking note in particular of the segments highlighted in bold and the effect they have on meaning:

(1) Because I would be talking to the people in the comments…

(2) Can we talk about it?

(3) What else can we talk about?

(4) Talk about it.

In the first example the sequence I would indicates that the clause is giving information. In the second and third the sequence Can we indicates that the clauses are asking for information. In the third What else specifies the kind of information being asked for. And in the fourth example the absence of these indicators and the tenseless verb talk (which comes first in its clause) indicate that we are asking someone to do something.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here — as in Martin (2013) — Martin's methodology is to give priority to the view 'from below', how meaning is expressed in structure. In SFL methodology, priority is given to the view 'from' above', the meaning that is expressed, which in this case is speech function, rather than how it is realised.

[2] To be clear, the wording I would is insufficient to indicate that the clause is giving information. For example, the same wording appears in a clause that is demanding goods-&-services: I would like your silence, please.

[3] To be clear, the wording Can we is insufficient to indicate that the clause is realising a demand for information. For example, the same wording appears in a clause that realises the giving of goods-&-services: Can we get the next round of drinks?.