Problems With The Semovergence Of Discourse Semantics And Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207, 208):

And, as outlined in Table 7.2, semovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems concur with one another (ideational meaning), resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, 'semovergence' derives from the authors' original misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that "converges with" (realises) the content of language. This view was assumed in Chapter 1, which was previously published as Martin & Zappavigna (2019), and was partially maintained in Chapter 4, where ideational networks confused content with expression, but abandoned by Chapters 5 and 6, where interpersonal and textual networks distinguished content from expression.

[2] To be clear, the authors' model of semovergent paralanguage substitutes the discourse semantics of Martin for the semantics of Halliday in Cléirigh's model of epilinguistic body language, but maintains Cléirigh's terms 'articulatory' and 'mimetic'. Cf.

Of the authors' paralinguistic discourse semantic systems,

• IDEATION is a rebranding of the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rather than the discourse semantics of Martin (1992);
• APPRAISAL is a linguistic system misapplied to protolanguage;
• IDENTIFICATION is a system of DEIXIS that classifies referents; and
• PERIODICITY is a system without a network that merely correlates the location of a speaker with what he says, without regard to how each identifies the other (realisation).

Some Of The Problems With The Paralinguistic System Networks

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199-200):

Our final step, for this book, was to map the meaning potential of each of these five paralinguistic systems. Ideational resources were presented in Chapter 4, focusing on the construal of paralinguistic entities and paralinguistic figures (both static and dynamic). Interpersonal resources were presented in Chapter 5, focusing on the enactment of FACIAL AFFECT, VOICE QUALITY and a range of attendant social relations. Textual resources were presented in Chapter 6, focusing on PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. The affordances of each resource were formalised in system networks, outlining the range of meanings involved and their relation to one another (i.e. their valeur).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 4, the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and all eight of the system networks confused discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[2] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 5, the authors mistook depictions on animated clay puppets for human paralanguage, modelled the bodily expression of emotion in terms of a linguistic system, AFFECT, despite the fact that other species express their emotions bodily demonstrates that these systems are protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, not interpersonal.

[3] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 6, the authors' system of DEIXIS models potential referents, not deixis, and the authors' model of PERIODICITY merely correlates a lecturer's location with what he is saying at the time, without demonstrating any realisation relation between his language and his location.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. No networks were provided for the system of PERIODICITY, and all eight of the ideational networks confused meaning with expression features.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of Hand Shape

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 183-4):

In (17'') we present a sequence of images and descriptions of the lecturer’s paralanguage. …

In terms of size, the beat synchronous with the first tonic on (Foucault) and the last (form of power) extends the furthest, with the stroke of the latter extending maximally downwards from shoulder height. The final beat is also extended in duration as it is held beyond the completion of the tone group.

Variation in the shape of the beating hand is noted in image 4 and magnified in (17''') to reveal the co-instantiation of a depicted paralinguistic entity. In this instance the gestural beat synchronises with self; the pronoun refers anaphorically to the semiotic entity form of knowledge. The paralinguistic beat thus assigns textual prominence to an ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this display does not present the text as spoken:

[2] To be clear, this distinction in the amplitude of the beat serves the same function as the distinction between tonic salient syllables and non-tonic salient syllables.

[3] To be clear, the location of the holding of the gesture suggests the function of the holding is demarcative.

[4] Clearly, the hand shape is not recognisable as meaning '(it)self' or 'form of knowledge', so it cannot be said to be realising this ideational meaning. 

[5] To be clear, it is the beat of linguistic gesture, not the hand shape, that gives rhythmic salience, highlighting what could have been chosen as realising the focus of New information, but was not. However, the fact that an emphatic pronoun was not given tonic prominence in this analysis, gives reason to doubt the accuracy of the analysis.

Reference Endophoric To Body Language [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 168):

In example (4), a biochemistry lecturer instructs students to take note of and remember a key technical term, saying and that’s a word you should encode. Synchronous with word he points to his mouth (locating the source of words), and synchronous with encode he points to his head (as the location of memory).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these are instances of using body language to make endophoric reference. Here material elements of outer experience (mouth, temple) ideationally construe semiotic elements of inner experience (word, encode), and the pointing gesture signals that those meanings are recoverable from those construals by body language.

Misrepresenting Paralinguistic Deixis And The Problem With Presuming Reference

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 162-3):

The management of information flow in discourse is supported by the system of textual semovergence we refer to as PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS. Here the focus is on how paralanguage supports the introduction of people, things and places into texts and keeps track of them once there (Martin, 1992: 95). This section begins with a brief overview of the linguistic system of IDENTIFICATION. … 

The IDENTIFICATION system in English discourse semantics draws a basic distinction between presenting reference, which introduces entities in discourse, and presuming reference, which tracks them once there. …

The types of entities (Hao, 2020a) introduced by presenting reference include people (anyone), concrete thing entities (a stripy shirt, a beautiful green scarf) and semiotic entities (some of the key things, what kind of sense, what feeling, an idea). The linguistic resources deployed include non-specific determiners (e.g. a, an, some), an indefinite nominal group (anyone) and several instances of a ‘wh’ entity (what). …

Proper names also function as presuming reference.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this 'presuming reference' is Martin's rebranding of anaphoric reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976). It will be seen in later posts that the reference in the system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is exophoric, not endophoric, and so does not "support" keeping track of people, things and places 'once there' in the text.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'presenting reference' (Martin 1992) confuses referents with reference items (his, that etc.). It arises from confusing 'reference' as textual meaning with 'reference' as the ideational meaning of lexical items. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 33):

[3] To be clear, none of these resources indicate a recoverable identity elsewhere, so none of them function as reference items.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of Paralinguistic Force

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 146):

In (23), Coraline is arguing with her mother about why she has locked a tiny door. Convergent with dreams aren’t dangerous, her left hand depicts the proposition (dreams aren’t dangerous) as a semiotic entity (see Chapter 4) at the same time as her left arm is extended out front of her body. The expression realises PARALINGUISTIC FORCE as [quantify:size:extent]. In this instance FORCE is expressed in the embodied paralanguage but not in convergent spoken language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a bare assertion since it is unsupported by argument: the ipse dixit fallacy. Moreover, it is demonstrably false. In terms of practicability, the reader is invited to use one hand to represent dreams aren’t dangerous as an entity. In terms of theory, if this were possible, it would be an instance of grammatical metaphor — a figure realised as an element (Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 250) — in a semiotic system without a grammar: a contradiction in terms.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that the extending of an arm to represent the extent of an entity is an instance of GRADUATION, the scaling of an interpersonal APPRAISAL (Martin & White 2005: 135). This is demonstrably false. Firstly, the representation of the extent of an entity is an ideational construal, not an interpersonal appraisal. Secondly, the only entity here is dreams, and this mental 'process thing' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 244) is clearly not represented by the hand, and the extent of the arm does not represent the extent (duration) of dreams. Thirdly, the evaluation here is made through the quality dangerous, so any upscaling of the evaluation must be an upscaling of dangerous not of dreams, and this the extending of the arm does not represent.

Moreover, this image contradicts the authors' model of PARALINGUISTIC ENGAGEMENT, because here a supine hand is used to represent the [monogloss] of dreams aren’t dangerous, whereas on the authors' model a supine hand represents not only [heterogloss], but [heterogloss: expansion], which is 'allowing space for other voices' (p143).

Problems With The Notion Of "Coupling" An Evaluative Meaning With An Ideational Trigger

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 140):

From a systemic functional perspective the co-instantiation of an evaluative meaning with an ideational one constitutes a kind of ‘coupling’, one that can be applied to expressions of AFFECT with accompanying ideational triggers. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (2008: 179) characterises the APPRAISAL system of ATTITUDE as follows:

This is a grammatical system that is realised by a selection of lexical items.

That is, AFFECT is realised by lexical item, and the "coupling" is with some wording of its co-text, both of which function both interpersonally and ideationally, at least.

[2] To be clear, 'ideational trigger' is the textual/interpersonal/ideational wording that is "coupled" with the lexical item that expresses the attitude. Since a 'trigger' is a cause of a process, the term only applies in the case of impinging mental clauses (Adele pleases her) where the Phenomenon is the Agent. In emanating mental clauses (She likes Adele), the Phenomenon is not the Agent ('trigger') but the Range that 'delimits the boundaries of the sensing' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 347).

Problems With Irrealis vs Realis Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 119, 136, 137):

An important distinction in the AFFECT system in language (Table 5.1) is between realis (an emotional response triggered by a present or past happening) and [ir]realis (an emotional response triggered by what might happen). Where the response is irrealis positive this is glossed as ‘desire’ and where it is negative as ‘fear’. However, in the VOICE AFFECT system [fear] is a feature (not simply a gloss) and its realisations are restricted to qualities of voice. Nonetheless the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [fear] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced negative emotion as a response to what might happen, or in the case of (13) to whom the voices might belong. …

In contrast to voiced [fear], the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [anxiety] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced emotion as a response to seeing the Ghost Children, that is, a realis happening.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this confuses interpersonal meaning (AFFECT) with experiential meaning (cause, happening). The distinction here is between mental processes of emotion ('realis') and mental processes of desideration ('irrealis').

However, the exclusive association of desire and fear with irrealis is invalid, since both can be triggered by a present or past happening, as demonstrated by He desired her from the moment he saw her and She feared the non-venomous snake the moment she saw it.

[2] Importantly, here the intersemiotic convergence is of the content of paralanguage with the content of language. This is inconsistent with the authors' model of ideational paralanguage, where it is the expression of paralanguage that converges with the content of language.

[3] To be clear, here the authors are anxious to justify their categorisation of 'fear' as irrealis (desiderative), in contrast to 'anxiety', which they categorise as realis (emotive). Their anxiety, however, is unjustified, because 'fear' can be realis, as in She feared the Ghost Children, as well as irrealis, as in She feared that the Ghost Children might harm her.

Inconsistency In The Authors' Analysis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 128):

Just as an expression of FACIAL AFFECT supports the identification of the trigger, so available ideational information supports the interpretation of FACIAL AFFECT. A sequence of triggers is interpreted as prompting the sequence of emotions in (8). 

We interpret Coraline’s expression of [fear] in image 1 of example (8) as triggered by the potential consequences of accumulated information sourced visually in the falling rock and auditorily in the cry of pain and the loud, angry ‘meow’.  

We interpret the expression of [surprise] in image 2 as triggered visually by Coraline’s first sight of the cat.  

The trigger for [anger] in image 3 is interpreted not as a response to seeing the cat but to an internal realisation that it was the cat who had instigated her fear.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the authors' interpretations here are inconsistent with their own previous account:

A pained cry is heard. Extremely alarmed by this, she runs as fast as possible, sensing something is pursuing her. Startled by a loud ‘meow’ from behind, she turns to look. Seeing that it is only a cat, her facial expression of [fear] swiftly changes to [surprise], but then to [anger], as in the three images in (8).

That is:

• hearing a cry of pain triggered her fear;
• hearing a loud meow triggered her surprise; and
• seeing a cat, rather than a threat, triggered her anger.

Misapplying A Confusion Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning To A Representation Of Protolanguage [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 127-8):

A further example in (8) shows how information acquired from past events can trigger a response in FACIAL AFFECT. The instance involves Coraline’s first encounter with the Cat in the orientation stage of the film’s narrative. The episode begins with Coraline exploring the neighbourhood along a steep hillside path. A rock falls onto her path from on high. She calls out but gets no response, then throws the rock in the direction from which it fell. A pained cry is heard. Extremely alarmed by this, she runs as fast as possible, sensing something is pursuing her. Startled by a loud ‘meow’ from behind, she turns to look. Seeing that it is only a cat, her facial expression of [fear] swiftly changes to [surprise], but then to [anger], as in the three images in (8).

Blogger Comments:

[1] That is:

• a Phenomenon of auditory perception (pained cry) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (alarm);
• a Phenomenon of auditory perception (a loud meow) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (surprise); and
• a Phenomenon of visual perception (a cat) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (anger).

Again this confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

[2] To be clear, here the expression of emotion does not accompany speech, so it is not functioning as paralanguage, and is not semovergent.

Misapplying A Confusion Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning To A Representation Of Protolanguage [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 127):

In (7), the trigger for facial expressions of emotion is apparently sourced internally. 

In the resolution stage of the narrative storyline in the film, Coraline meets the Cat, a good friend whom she has not seen since she threw him at the Other Mother in attempting her escape from the Other World.

In image 1 in (7) Coraline expresses both mild [surprise] and [spirit:up]. There is no immediately convergent speech, and the trigger is not interpretable at this point by the viewer. 

However, in image 2 more visual information is made available. The Cat is now revealed as standing outside Coraline’s bedroom window, and his presence retrospectively explains the trigger for her facial [surprise] and [spirit:up] in image 1. 

In image 2, convergent with her spoken language, Coraline’s expression of FACIAL AFFECT changes from [spirit:up] to [spirit:down]. Again there is no apparent trigger in the visually available information. The resonant spoken language I’m really sorry I threw you out at the Other Mother suggests that the trigger at this point is sourced internally through her reflection on past events. The broader co-text of the story supports this interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] That is, a cognitive Phenomenon is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion. This confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

[2] To be clear, in SFL terms, this is an expression of the personal microfunction of protolanguage, epilinguistically represented on a clay puppet.

[3] To be clear, if the expression of emotion does not accompany speech, then it is not functioning as paralanguage, and is not semovergent.

[4] That is, a Phenomenon of visual perception is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion. This again confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

The Notion Of Ideational Triggers For Affect Reconsidered

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 126-7):

AFFECT in verbal and visual texts is always triggered by ideational phenomena. These can be entities or occurrences of any kind. Ideational triggers for expressions of FACIAL AFFECT in Coraline may be sourced via a diversity of perceptual channels that are interpreted as available to the character in particular instances. A taxonomy of types of perceptual channel is presented in Figure 5.5.

The triggering information may be sourced externally through an auditory perceptual channel (as sound or silence) or a visual, olfactory, gustatory or tactile one (Feng and O’Halloran, 2013). Alternatively, it can be sourced internally through reflection, memory or imagination. In interpreting the trigger for a particular facial expression of emotion in multimodal discourse such as that in Coraline more than one perceptual channel is likely to play a part.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, with the notion of ideational triggers for emotion, the authors have left the interpersonal domain of appraisal by emotional attitude and entered the ideational domain of cause and effect (reason and result). The ideational trigger, here, is the Phenomenon/Agent of an impinging mental Process of emotion (Music pleases me). This notion, however, ignores the distinction with the Phenomenon/Range of an emanating mental Process of emotion (I like music).

[2] To be clear, the taxonomy of types of perceptual channel corresponds to a taxonomy of types perceptual Phenomenon/Agent ('triggering information') of an impinging mental Process of emotion.

[3] To be clear, internal triggering information corresponds to a cognitive Phenomenon/Agent of an impinging mental Process of emotion.

Why All The Authors' Ideational Semovergent Systems Are Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 112-3):

This chapter has described how semovergent systems construe ideational meaning and has explored entities and figures as resources for embodied ideational meaning across language and paralanguage. These systems have been formalised in system networks that can be used by an analyst as they consider how gestures interact through a relationship of concurrence or divergence with the ideational meanings made in spoken discourse. …

A robust analytical framework for investigating ideational meaning offers a key resource for understanding human experience in social life. The ideational paralinguistic systems presented in this chapter have important potential in applied linguistics where adopting a multimodal approach to studying communication involving multiple modalities is becoming increasingly important. … We look forward to seeing how the systems explored in this chapter are taken up in disciplines such as the humanities and in studies of different semiotic modes (including face-to-face communication and communication in digital environments).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, the authors' notion of semovergent systems, where gestures realise ("interact through a relationship of concurrence") the ideational meanings of language, derives from their misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] As previously observed, all eight of the system networks in this chapter confuse discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[3] As the review of this chapter has demonstrated, the framework presented here is not even theoretically valid, let alone "robust".

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [7]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 111):

A system network bringing together the various choices we have covered in the previous sections is provided in Figure 4.8.

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the term 'paralinguistic figure' confuses discourse semantics (figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.8 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (figure) with both discourse semantic features (e.g. state figure, occurrence figure) and expression plane systems (e.g. RECURRENCE, FLOW, DIRECTION).

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [6]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 109-10):

The final two dimensions to consider when analysing an occurrence figure are flow and direction – as outlined in Figure 4.7.

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the authors' notion of an 'occurrence figure' confuses discourse semantics (figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.7 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (occurrence figure) with expression plane systems of gestural motion (FLOW, DIRECTION).

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [5]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 107-8):

Another dimension of occurrence figures has to do with whether or not they incorporate gestures that repeat – [iterated] versus [isolated], and if so, in what manner – [ordered] versus [unordered], and if [ordered], then [to-and-fro] or [stepped]. These options are outlined in Figure 4.6.

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the authors' notion of an 'occurrence figure' confuses discourse semantics (figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.6 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (occurrence figure) with the expression plane features (iterated, ordered, to-and-fro, stepped, unordered, isolated) of an expression plane system of gestural motion (RECURRENCE).

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [4]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 104, 105):

Where an entity is present in the paralinguistic realisation of an occurrence figure this entity may change, [transformative] versus [non-transformative] in either size, [increase] versus [decrease] or [shape]. These options are outlined in Figure 4.5. If it remains a constant size or shape, it may impact another entity in the gestural space, [impacting] versus [non-impacting].

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' and 'paralinguistic figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.5 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (entitied occurrence figure) with both discourse semantic features (entitied, non-entitied) and expression plane features (transformative, size, increase, decrease, shape, non-transformative, impacting, non-impacting).

Moreover, realisation statements like 'insert entity' specify a constraint on structural configuration — cf. insert Agent — but no structural configuration for occurrence figures has been identified.

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [3]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 104, 105):

Paralinguistic occurrence figures incorporate motion to construe a happening or activity. Unlike paralinguistic state figures which always visually incorporate a paralinguistic entity, a paralinguistic occurrence figure can occur both with or without committing a definable entity. There are three other dimensions along which such figures vary: whether or not the motion repeats (iterated/isolated), the speed of the motion (constant/adjusted) and the direction of the motion (omni/linear) – as shown in the system network in Figure 4.4.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' and 'paralinguistic figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.4 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (occurrence figure) with expression plane systems of gestural motion (RECURRENCE, FLOW, DIRECTION).

[2] To be clear, this use of 'committing' misunderstands the authors' own notion of commitment. The authors' notion of commitment is misunderstood as the degree of delicacy selected in the process of instantiation. Here the term is used, not for delicacy, but for the relation between a figure and one of its constituents (entity).

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 102):

State figures involve either single paralinguistic entities that are simply manifested or more than one entity that enters into an association with another one (the [presentational] vs [relational] options in Figure 4.3). These paralinguistic entities are not involved in a paralinguistic occurrence. For relational state figures, the association may be represented via variations in either the relative size or relative position of the entities, or both, within the gestural space.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' and 'paralinguistic (occurrence) figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.3 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (state figure) with an expression plane system of features (size, position).

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 101-2):

The system network in Figure 4.2 outlines the paralinguistic figures which can concur with these kinds of meanings. It distinguishes between paralinguistic occurrence figures, in which a paralinguistic entity is involved in an activity, and paralinguistic state figures, where a paralinguistic entity is manifested. Each type of paralinguistic figure can be positioned in space, relative to the neutral position adopted by a speaker where most of their gestures occur (in front of the speaker’s solar plexus with elbows slightly bent). Paralinguistic state figures necessarily involve an entity; paralinguistic occurrence figures necessarily involve motion (as specified by the realisation statements following the downward slanting arrows in the network).

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' 'paralinguistic figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.2 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (figure) with expression plane systems and features (positioned, neutral). This confusion is compounded by including one discourse semantic feature (state figure) realised by the insertion of a constituent discourse semantic feature (entity), and the other discourse semantic feature (occurrence figure) realised by an expression plane feature (motion).