Some Of The Problems With The Paralinguistic System Networks

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199-200):

Our final step, for this book, was to map the meaning potential of each of these five paralinguistic systems. Ideational resources were presented in Chapter 4, focusing on the construal of paralinguistic entities and paralinguistic figures (both static and dynamic). Interpersonal resources were presented in Chapter 5, focusing on the enactment of FACIAL AFFECT, VOICE QUALITY and a range of attendant social relations. Textual resources were presented in Chapter 6, focusing on PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. The affordances of each resource were formalised in system networks, outlining the range of meanings involved and their relation to one another (i.e. their valeur).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 4, the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and all eight of the system networks confused discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[2] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 5, the authors mistook depictions on animated clay puppets for human paralanguage, modelled the bodily expression of emotion in terms of a linguistic system, AFFECT, despite the fact that other species express their emotions bodily demonstrates that these systems are protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, not interpersonal.

[3] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 6, the authors' system of DEIXIS models potential referents, not deixis, and the authors' model of PERIODICITY merely correlates a lecturer's location with what he is saying at the time, without demonstrating any realisation relation between his language and his location.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. No networks were provided for the system of PERIODICITY, and all eight of the ideational networks confused meaning with expression features.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of The Resonance Of Affect And Force

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 156, 157):

In Coraline’s first encounter with Wybie, a boy of her own age from the same neighbourhood, he accuses her of being a water witch to which she responds: //3 ^ and if / I’m a / water / witch //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. The focus in (30) is on the second tone group of this utterance, that is, //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. … 

The first image in (30) captures Coraline forcefully stomping her right foot and punching down with her arms and clenched hands in an expression of PARALINGUISTIC AFFECT – [anger] with [strong] FORCE. The voice quality on where realises VOICE AFFECT as [anger] – through high intensity, tension and roughness (shown as the grey area in the spectrogram in (30)). Coraline’s face is not visible in the first image; but a prosody of FACIAL AFFECT [anger] is additionally realised more or less intensively in the remaining three images – as the eyebrows are drawn down and together. These expressions of PARALINGUISTIC FORCE in realisations of [anger] resonate with and amplify one another.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the depiction of body language on an animated clay puppet is not body language, but an epilinguistic construal of body language, because the representation of body language on an animated clay puppet requires the prior development of language in the animator; it is not something that a dog or cat, for example, could do.

In considering the body language that is thus epilinguistically depicted:

[1] As previously explained, the beating of the foot and arms realises textual salience, and is linguistic, like the beats of speech. Here the authors again misconstrue this textual salience as interpersonal force (and as epilinguistic instead of linguistic).

[2] As previously explained, the bodily expression of emotion is protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, because it does not require the prior evolution and development of language, as demonstrated by Darwin's work on the expression of emotions in other animal species. Here, however, the authors misconstrue the expression of emotion as requiring the prior evolution and development of language (epilinguistic) and locate it within the interpersonal metafunction, regardless of whether or not it is used to evaluate.

[3] To be clear, as the above demonstrates, the "resonance" here is between the protolinguistic expression of emotion (which other animals can do) and the linguistic expression of salience (which other animals cannot do).

The Claim That The Face Does Not Express Desire

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 152, 156):

The possibility of different paralinguistic resources being instantiated simultaneously allows us to infer meanings not necessarily interpretable from an expression in a single paralinguistic mode. For example, FACIAL AFFECT has no distinct option for the expression of desire. However, when raised eyebrows and wide-opened eyes (realising FACIAL AFFECT as [surprise]) are expressed convergently with PARALINGUISTIC PROXIMITY as [personal] and PARALINGUISTIC ORIENTATION as [involved], the emotion of desire is strongly invoked. Two such instances are described in (29).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a serious omission in the authors' model. The bodily expression of desire is enshrined in Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar:

Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look

and at least one of the following facial expressions might reasonably be construed as expressing desire:

[2] To be clear, the authors' claim here is that a personal, involved expression of surprise "invokes" (i.e. evokes) an expression of desire. In contrast, none of the desiring faces above look at all surprised.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of Paralinguistic Focus

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 146-7):

In (24), PARALINGUISTIC FOCUS as [sharpen] is expressed in the narrowly targeted index-finger point that zooms in towards the Other Mother. This expression of sharpened FOCUS functions to identify the target (Other Mother) in a highly specifying manner (see Chapter 6). This together with the expression of negative judgement in the spoken language in stole serves to amplify the expression of [disdain] in FACIAL AFFECT.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, GRADUATION is the scaling of an interpersonal APPRAISAL (Martin & White 2005: 135). The evaluation here is made through the process stole, so any upscaling of the evaluation must be an upscaling of stole not of the evaluated you. So there is no sharpening of the FOCUS of evaluation here (nor a quantifying of the FORCE of evaluation expressed by the extended arm). The interpersonal function of the orientation of the index-finger of the clay puppet here is simply deictic: it points to the addressee you from the speaker I .

[2] To be clear, this is an instance of 'pointing the finger' which is to accuse or blame (someone) — a 'j'accuse' — a gesture which the authors might easily have classified, in their own terms, as an emblem, since they write (p38):

Gestures treated as playing a speech functional role in dialogue in other models are treated as emblems in our framework.

In terms of Cléirigh's original model, this is a genuine example of epilinguistic body language — not to be found in protolinguistic species — in which the gesture expresses an appraisal of judgement, an accusation of wrongdoing, which the authors claimed (pp118, 121) that body language can not do.

[3] To be clear, the judgement instantiated as body language is consistent with the judgement instantiated as language. Whether or not the face of the clay puppet here specifically represents disdain, a feeling of contempt for someone or something regarded as unworthy or inferior is arguable, at the very least.

Social Bonding Through Reciprocated Expressions Of Emotion

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 140-1): 

When such couplings are tendered in interaction with others and reciprocated they are said to constitute bonds, and it is through the sharing of multiple bonds that we build affiliating communities (Knight, 2013; Zappavigna, 2018, 2019).  Here we are concerned with how selected features of FACIAL AFFECT and VOICE AFFECT couple with their ideational triggers in the negotiation of bonds in the service of affiliation. Figure 5.11 presents options and realisations in a system of BONDING adapted from Zappavigna (2018, 2019) with realisations for PARALINGUISTIC AFFECT.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim here is simply that reciprocated evaluations bond interlocutors socially.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that reciprocated emotional evaluations, expressed by the face and voice, bond people socially.

The problem here is that facial and vocal expressions of emotion are not systems of the interpersonal metafunction of language, but are systems of pre-metafunctional protolanguage, as demonstrated by all the members of other socio-semiotic species whose facial and vocal configurations express emotion.

Given this, the claim is that reciprocated emotional responses to the same environmental stimulus bond people socially. One example of this would be when two strangers, both afraid of being eaten by same approaching crocodile, are bonded socially through their reciprocated facial expressions.

Problems With The Notion Of "Coupling" An Evaluative Meaning With An Ideational Trigger

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 140):

From a systemic functional perspective the co-instantiation of an evaluative meaning with an ideational one constitutes a kind of ‘coupling’, one that can be applied to expressions of AFFECT with accompanying ideational triggers. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (2008: 179) characterises the APPRAISAL system of ATTITUDE as follows:

This is a grammatical system that is realised by a selection of lexical items.

That is, AFFECT is realised by lexical item, and the "coupling" is with some wording of its co-text, both of which function both interpersonally and ideationally, at least.

[2] To be clear, 'ideational trigger' is the textual/interpersonal/ideational wording that is "coupled" with the lexical item that expresses the attitude. Since a 'trigger' is a cause of a process, the term only applies in the case of impinging mental clauses (Adele pleases her) where the Phenomenon is the Agent. In emanating mental clauses (She likes Adele), the Phenomenon is not the Agent ('trigger') but the Range that 'delimits the boundaries of the sensing' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 347).

Accepting The Biological Nature Of Vocal And Facial Expressions Of Emotion

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 139):

If we accept that natural (i.e. not performed) vocal and facial expressions of emotion are biological in nature (Darwin, 1872; Barlow, 2002), this would suggest resonance across the systems of FACIAL AFFECT and VOICE AFFECT (in the absence of intentional divergence such as in expressions of sarcasm).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the biological nature of vocal and facial expressions of emotion, whether natural or performed, lies in the fact that the organs of organisms are their material basis. Moreover, the fact that the vocal and facial expressions of emotion are not restricted to humans (Darwin 1872) demonstrates that these semiotic systems do not require the prior evolution and development of language, and so are (personal) protolinguistic systems, rather than (interpersonal) AFFECT systems of language.

[2] For amusement, the following illustrates the divergence between the expressed content of protolanguage and the unexpressed content of language.

Problems With Irrealis vs Realis Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 119, 136, 137):

An important distinction in the AFFECT system in language (Table 5.1) is between realis (an emotional response triggered by a present or past happening) and [ir]realis (an emotional response triggered by what might happen). Where the response is irrealis positive this is glossed as ‘desire’ and where it is negative as ‘fear’. However, in the VOICE AFFECT system [fear] is a feature (not simply a gloss) and its realisations are restricted to qualities of voice. Nonetheless the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [fear] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced negative emotion as a response to what might happen, or in the case of (13) to whom the voices might belong. …

In contrast to voiced [fear], the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [anxiety] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced emotion as a response to seeing the Ghost Children, that is, a realis happening.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this confuses interpersonal meaning (AFFECT) with experiential meaning (cause, happening). The distinction here is between mental processes of emotion ('realis') and mental processes of desideration ('irrealis').

However, the exclusive association of desire and fear with irrealis is invalid, since both can be triggered by a present or past happening, as demonstrated by He desired her from the moment he saw her and She feared the non-venomous snake the moment she saw it.

[2] Importantly, here the intersemiotic convergence is of the content of paralanguage with the content of language. This is inconsistent with the authors' model of ideational paralanguage, where it is the expression of paralanguage that converges with the content of language.

[3] To be clear, here the authors are anxious to justify their categorisation of 'fear' as irrealis (desiderative), in contrast to 'anxiety', which they categorise as realis (emotive). Their anxiety, however, is unjustified, because 'fear' can be realis, as in She feared the Ghost Children, as well as irrealis, as in She feared that the Ghost Children might harm her.

Problems With The System Of The 'Emotion' Threat

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 135):

The sets of voice qualities which differentiate VOICE AFFECT features of [fear], [anxiety] and [anger] are shown in Figure 5.9.

 

Blogger Comments:

The system in Figure 5.9 models paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

Further, in Figure 5.9, the authors again misrepresent 'threat' as an emotion, with its result (fear, anxiety) and reason (anger) as its subtypes.

Problems With The System Of The 'Emotion' Spirit

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 133):

VOICE AFFECT as [spirit:down] has opposing features of [misery] and [ennui]. The voice quality contours which realise these features are shown in Figure 5.8.

Blogger Comments:

The system in Figure 5.8 models paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

Problems With The System Of Voice Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 129, 131):

It is the particular ‘mixture’ of options [from the system of VOICE QUALITY] which realise one feature or another in the system of VOICE AFFECT (see Figure 5.7).

Blogger Comments:

The system in Figure 5.7 models paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

Further, in Figure 5.7, the authors again misrepresent 'threat' as an emotion, with its result (fear, anxiety) and reason (anger) as its subtypes. Moreover, within the emotion of threat, it groups one result (anxiety) with a reason (anger) instead of with a result (fear).

Inconsistency In The Authors' Analysis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 128):

Just as an expression of FACIAL AFFECT supports the identification of the trigger, so available ideational information supports the interpretation of FACIAL AFFECT. A sequence of triggers is interpreted as prompting the sequence of emotions in (8). 

We interpret Coraline’s expression of [fear] in image 1 of example (8) as triggered by the potential consequences of accumulated information sourced visually in the falling rock and auditorily in the cry of pain and the loud, angry ‘meow’.  

We interpret the expression of [surprise] in image 2 as triggered visually by Coraline’s first sight of the cat.  

The trigger for [anger] in image 3 is interpreted not as a response to seeing the cat but to an internal realisation that it was the cat who had instigated her fear.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the authors' interpretations here are inconsistent with their own previous account:

A pained cry is heard. Extremely alarmed by this, she runs as fast as possible, sensing something is pursuing her. Startled by a loud ‘meow’ from behind, she turns to look. Seeing that it is only a cat, her facial expression of [fear] swiftly changes to [surprise], but then to [anger], as in the three images in (8).

That is:

• hearing a cry of pain triggered her fear;
• hearing a loud meow triggered her surprise; and
• seeing a cat, rather than a threat, triggered her anger.

Misapplying A Confusion Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning To A Representation Of Protolanguage [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 127-8):

A further example in (8) shows how information acquired from past events can trigger a response in FACIAL AFFECT. The instance involves Coraline’s first encounter with the Cat in the orientation stage of the film’s narrative. The episode begins with Coraline exploring the neighbourhood along a steep hillside path. A rock falls onto her path from on high. She calls out but gets no response, then throws the rock in the direction from which it fell. A pained cry is heard. Extremely alarmed by this, she runs as fast as possible, sensing something is pursuing her. Startled by a loud ‘meow’ from behind, she turns to look. Seeing that it is only a cat, her facial expression of [fear] swiftly changes to [surprise], but then to [anger], as in the three images in (8).

Blogger Comments:

[1] That is:

• a Phenomenon of auditory perception (pained cry) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (alarm);
• a Phenomenon of auditory perception (a loud meow) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (surprise); and
• a Phenomenon of visual perception (a cat) is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion (anger).

Again this confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

[2] To be clear, here the expression of emotion does not accompany speech, so it is not functioning as paralanguage, and is not semovergent.

Misapplying A Confusion Of Ideational And Interpersonal Meaning To A Representation Of Protolanguage [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 127):

In (7), the trigger for facial expressions of emotion is apparently sourced internally. 

In the resolution stage of the narrative storyline in the film, Coraline meets the Cat, a good friend whom she has not seen since she threw him at the Other Mother in attempting her escape from the Other World.

In image 1 in (7) Coraline expresses both mild [surprise] and [spirit:up]. There is no immediately convergent speech, and the trigger is not interpretable at this point by the viewer. 

However, in image 2 more visual information is made available. The Cat is now revealed as standing outside Coraline’s bedroom window, and his presence retrospectively explains the trigger for her facial [surprise] and [spirit:up] in image 1. 

In image 2, convergent with her spoken language, Coraline’s expression of FACIAL AFFECT changes from [spirit:up] to [spirit:down]. Again there is no apparent trigger in the visually available information. The resonant spoken language I’m really sorry I threw you out at the Other Mother suggests that the trigger at this point is sourced internally through her reflection on past events. The broader co-text of the story supports this interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] That is, a cognitive Phenomenon is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion. This confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

[2] To be clear, in SFL terms, this is an expression of the personal microfunction of protolanguage, epilinguistically represented on a clay puppet.

[3] To be clear, if the expression of emotion does not accompany speech, then it is not functioning as paralanguage, and is not semovergent.

[4] That is, a Phenomenon of visual perception is the Agent (trigger) of the mental Process of emotion. This again confuses ideational with interpersonal meaning, and misapplies the confusion to an epilinguistic representation of pre-metafunctional protolanguage on a clay puppet.

The Notion Of Ideational Triggers For Affect Reconsidered

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 126-7):

AFFECT in verbal and visual texts is always triggered by ideational phenomena. These can be entities or occurrences of any kind. Ideational triggers for expressions of FACIAL AFFECT in Coraline may be sourced via a diversity of perceptual channels that are interpreted as available to the character in particular instances. A taxonomy of types of perceptual channel is presented in Figure 5.5.

The triggering information may be sourced externally through an auditory perceptual channel (as sound or silence) or a visual, olfactory, gustatory or tactile one (Feng and O’Halloran, 2013). Alternatively, it can be sourced internally through reflection, memory or imagination. In interpreting the trigger for a particular facial expression of emotion in multimodal discourse such as that in Coraline more than one perceptual channel is likely to play a part.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, with the notion of ideational triggers for emotion, the authors have left the interpersonal domain of appraisal by emotional attitude and entered the ideational domain of cause and effect (reason and result). The ideational trigger, here, is the Phenomenon/Agent of an impinging mental Process of emotion (Music pleases me). This notion, however, ignores the distinction with the Phenomenon/Range of an emanating mental Process of emotion (I like music).

[2] To be clear, the taxonomy of types of perceptual channel corresponds to a taxonomy of types perceptual Phenomenon/Agent ('triggering information') of an impinging mental Process of emotion.

[3] To be clear, internal triggering information corresponds to a cognitive Phenomenon/Agent of an impinging mental Process of emotion.

A Problematic Analysis Of Facial Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 125-6):

Expressions of relative FORCE in FACIAL AFFECT are additionally realised through the relative duration over which an expression is held. …

In example (6), Coraline, having sensed danger, tells her Other Parents that she wants to go to bed. Her intention is to escape from the Other world in her sleep. However, the Other Parents follow closely behind her, the Other Mother even offering to tuck her into bed. 

Coraline’s anxiety is not revealed in the spoken exchange with the Other Mother but rather in her expression of FACIAL AFFECT as [spirit:down] realised through eyebrows raised and drawn together and downcast eyes. The expression is extended in duration, sustained over the three tone groups of the exchange (marked as //…//…//…).

Blogger Comments:

As previously argued, from the perspective of SFL Theory, these graded epilinguistic images are of the personal microfunction of protolanguage depicted on clay puppets by animators using the emotion-face code devised by Ekman.

[1] To be clear, since the authors claim (p123-4) that expressions of surprise typically have the briefest duration, the claim here is that surprise is typically has weaker force than other emotions.

[2] To be clear, the Coraline character is here concealing her anxiety from the other characters, as the spoken language demonstrates, so as not to raise suspicion, so the interpretation of this facial configuration — in which the eyes are not downcast — expressing any anxiety at all, let alone stronger anxiety, would seem to be the opposite of what is true.

The Praat waveforms are irrelevant here, since they just represent the articulation of consonants and vowels.

The Depiction Of Muscle Tension On A Clay Puppet

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 125):

Illustrated in (5) are two instances of FACIAL AFFECT as [spirit:up]. Image 2 is graded up in PARALINGUISTIC FORCE through increased muscle tension in the face as evident in the curled up corners of the mouth.

Blogger Comments:

As previously argued, from the perspective of SFL Theory, these graded epilinguistic images are of the personal microfunction of protolanguage depicted on clay puppets by animators using the emotion-face code devised by Ekman. What varies is the intensity of the emotional state depicted on the puppet.

The Paralinguistic Force Of Facial Affect Reconsidered

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 124):

Linguistic GRADUATION comprises two principal subsystems – FORCE and FOCUS. FORCE can function to adjust the relative intensity or quantity of inscribed attitude or to invoke an attitudinal meaning by grading ideational phenomena. FOCUS has to do with adjusting the categorical boundaries of phenomena as more or less sharply or softly defined (Hood, 2010, 2021; Hood and Zhang, 2020). However, unlike its linguistic counterpart and unlike the PARALINGUISTIC GRADUATION of body gestures (Hao and Hood, 2019; Hood and Zhang, 2020), FACIAL AFFECT can only be graded in FORCE. Features of [strong] to [weak] are shown as positions on a cline in Figure 5.4, realised through variations in muscle tension and/or the duration for which an expression is held.

Blogger Comments:

As previously demonstrated, the facial expression of emotion is not an interpersonal system of language, so the linguistic systems of APPRAISAL, such as ATTITUDE and GRADUATION, do not apply. Instead, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the facial expression of emotion serves the personal microfunction of protolanguage, and so what is presented here as graduated force is more consistently understood as a graduation of emotional intensity within the personal microfunction.

Simultaneous Emotion

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 123-4):

A further consideration in analysing and interpreting facial expressions is the potential for one feature of facial affect to transition very quickly into another in an animated expression. An instance in example (4) expresses both [surprise] and [spirit:up]. 

From a systemic functional perspective, rather than describing this as a blending or merging of emotions it is considered as the co-instantiation of two different emotions with each realised through particular parts of the face (e.g. eyes, eyebrows, mouth) and often in very quick succession. In (4) the raised curved eyebrows realise [surprise] and the upturned lips realise [spirit:up]. 

A facial expression of [surprise], interpreted as a perturbance (Martin, 2017a) typically has the briefest duration and often transitions quickly to the expression of another emotion, one which responds to the specific trigger of the perturbance.

Blogger Comments:

[1] From a systemic functional perspective, this blurs the axial distinction between simultaneous systems ('both', 'co-instantiation', 'and') and syntagmatic order ('transition', 'succession'). Moreover, if two emotions can be realised in the same facial expression, the system network needs to be redrawn to represent simultaneous (conjunct) systems. This the authors have not done.

[2] On the one hand, the claim that a facial expression of surprise typically has the briefest duration is an instance of the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit: a bare assertion unsupported by evidence, and is belied by synonyms for 'surprised' such as 'stupefied' and 'dumbfounded'. On the other hand, surprise is the emotion that is the response to what triggered it as a perturbance.

Why Facial Affect Is More Limited Than Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 121):

As noted earlier, ATTITUDE in language can be expressed through systems of AFFECT, APPRECIATION or JUDGEMENT while paralinguistic expressions of ATTITUDE are restricted to FACIAL AFFECT (see, e.g. Tian, 2011). This means that the paralinguistic meaning potential for expressing emotion is relatively limited with respect to language. 

For example, an array of finely distinguished lexical instantiations of the feature [realis: happiness; mood; positive] (Table 5.1) are possible, as, for instance, in happy/joyful/delighted/thrilled and so on, such fine distinctions are not available in FACIAL AFFECT. 

In analyses of intermodal resonance in Coraline, fine distinctions in verbal instances (e.g. happy vs joyful) may be inferred for resonant facial expressions but cannot be attributed to specific variations in the facial expression. In other words a given expression of FACIAL AFFECT might couple with a diverse array of lexical realisations of [realis: happiness; mood; positive].

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this relative limitation with respect to language is simply explained by the fact that the facial expression of emotion is a protolinguistic semiotic system, which means it lacks a grammatical stratum.