Misrepresenting Matthiessen As Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Register

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207-8):

Modelling concurrence and resonance is more of a challenge. One response would be to quantify the semantic ‘weight’ of the contributions from alternative modalities in terms of degrees of commitment – where commitment refers, following Martin (2010), to the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy of selections from both optional and obligatory systems. Figueredo and Figueredo (2019) outline a quantitative model for measurements of this kind. This would offer us a gauge of how much meaning language and paralanguage were committing but not tell us much about the kinds of meaning involved. 

Another response, perhaps better suited to this shortcoming, would be to turn to a higher-order semiotic such as register (Matthiessen, 2007) or genre (Bateman, 2008) and assign it responsibility for the distribution of meaning across modalities. Models of this kind take advantage of work on the relation of hierarchically organised categories in language (i.e. system realised in structure, higher ranks realised by lower ones and more abstract strata realised through more concrete ones) to explore intermodality – in effect treating co-instantiation across modalities as if it were realisation within a modality.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis. That is, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do. But Martin also confuses 'delicacy' in the technical sense of a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' in the sense of a scale of decreasing generality in a hyponymic taxonomy experiential meanings. See the earlier post Why Martin's Notion Of Commitment Is Invalid.

[2] This is very misleading indeed, because it knowingly misrepresents Matthiessen as supporting Martin's misunderstanding of register as a higher-order semiotic. Matthiessen, of course, follows Halliday in modelling register as a language variation (instantiation), not as a system more abstract than language (stratification).

[3] This confuses constituency (rank scale) with symbolic abstraction (realisation). All ranks are of the same level of symbolic abstraction, so a higher rank is not realised by a lower rank.

[4] To be clear, here the authors advocate making the same type of theoretical error that Martin made in his misunderstanding of register. With register, Martin modelled different types of language in terms of a more abstract stratum, and here he proposes modelling different types of semiotic system in terms of a more abstract stratum.

Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Model As The Authors' Innovation

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207):

As reviewed in Section 7.1, our project involves developing paralanguage as a semiotic system alongside language. We adopted our model of the relation of paralanguage to language from earlier work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013). As outlined in Table 7.1, sonovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed. The origin of the notions of gestures being in tune with TONE, and in sync with TONICITY and RHYTHM is Cléirigh's model (2009), which predates, by four years, the "earlier" work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013):

The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps with Martin, the author of this chapter, the driving force.

Some Of The Problems With The Paralinguistic System Networks

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199-200):

Our final step, for this book, was to map the meaning potential of each of these five paralinguistic systems. Ideational resources were presented in Chapter 4, focusing on the construal of paralinguistic entities and paralinguistic figures (both static and dynamic). Interpersonal resources were presented in Chapter 5, focusing on the enactment of FACIAL AFFECT, VOICE QUALITY and a range of attendant social relations. Textual resources were presented in Chapter 6, focusing on PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. The affordances of each resource were formalised in system networks, outlining the range of meanings involved and their relation to one another (i.e. their valeur).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 4, the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and all eight of the system networks confused discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[2] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 5, the authors mistook depictions on animated clay puppets for human paralanguage, modelled the bodily expression of emotion in terms of a linguistic system, AFFECT, despite the fact that other species express their emotions bodily demonstrates that these systems are protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, not interpersonal.

[3] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 6, the authors' system of DEIXIS models potential referents, not deixis, and the authors' model of PERIODICITY merely correlates a lecturer's location with what he is saying at the time, without demonstrating any realisation relation between his language and his location.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. No networks were provided for the system of PERIODICITY, and all eight of the ideational networks confused meaning with expression features.

Blatantly Claiming Credit For Cléirigh's Work

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199):

We used metafunction to distinguish between paralanguage systems converging with ideational, interpersonal or textual meaning (Figure 7.3).

Seen in these terms, sonovergent paralanguage resonates with interpersonal meaning and syncs with textual meaning; there is no sonovergent concurrence with ideational meaning. Semovergent paralanguage on the other hand resonates with interpersonal meaning, coordinates with textual meaning and concurs with ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed, because these distinctions were already present in Cléirigh's model, below, and were not the work of the authors. The plagiarism in this work is more blatant when Martin is the author, as in this chapter.

Linguistic ("sonovergent"):

Epilinguistic ("semovergent"):

Importantly, "sonovergent paralanguage" is the linguistic realisation of grammatical systems, and "semovergent paralanguage", being epilinguistic, has no grammar, but has meaning that derives from the fact that its users have a grammar.

On The Truth Of The Authors' Claim That They Didn't Relate Paralanguage To Grammatical Structure

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198-9):

With the exception of mime (discussed later in the chapter) and some pointing deixis (discussed in Chapter 6), paralanguage converges with the intonation and rhythm of spoken language in our data. This argues for a linguistically informed model of prosodic phonology as a prerequisite for the analysis of paralanguage. It also provides one useful criterion for distinguishing somasis from semiosis (since somatic behaviour is not coordinated with prosodic phonology). 

Note that in relating paralanguage to discourse semantics rather than lexicogrammar, we are suggesting that the grammatical structure of a spoken language (specifically, the nature of its syntagms) is not relevant to its paralanguage. In this respect paralanguage resembles the ‘language-neutral’ sign language of the North American Plains Indians, but not the sign languages of Australia’s indigenous communities (Kendon, 2004: 299–303), at least for their more proficient signers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously, paralanguage that "converges" with intonation and rhythm is not paralanguage, but language that realises the grammatical systems of KEY and INFORMATION by bodily means other than the vocal tract.

[2] To be clear, semiosis makes meaning, "somasis" does not.

[3] This is misleading, because the authors have related "sonovergent" paralanguage, explicitly or implicitly, to the grammatical systems of KEY, INFORMATION and THEME. On the other hand, the body language that the authors call "semovergent" is epilinguistic, and so has no grammar. 

To be clear, the reason why the authors related paralanguage to discourse semantics is that discourse semantics is Martin's model (of cohesion as semantics), though the ideational 'discourse' semantics used was, in truth, the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rebranded by Martin's former student, Hao.

[4] Here the authors misrepresent the Sign language of the North American Plains Indians as not having a content plane that is stratified into semantics and grammar, the distinguishing feature of language.

What The Authors Say They Did vs What The Authors Actually Did

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198, 199, 240n):

We then moved to build a general model of paralanguage, drawing on the concept of stratification (levels of abstraction) and metafunction (kinds of meaning) in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) theory.¹ We used stratification to distinguish between paralanguage that converges with the prosodic phonology (intonation and rhythm) of spoken language and paralanguage that converges with its discourse semantics (IDEATION, APPRAISAL, IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY) – sonovergent versus semovergent paralanguage, respectively (Figure 7.2).

¹ In this respect our model contrasts with the syntax, semantics and pragmatics framework assumed in most related studies. We do not oppose form to meaning (syntax vs semantics); and we do not conflate resources enacting social relations with those composing information flow (as pragmatics).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed. The authors actually began with Cléirigh's general model of body language that was already organised in terms of stratification and metafunction. The plagiarism in this book is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, what the authors actually did was rebrand Cléirigh's 'linguistic' body language as 'sonovergent' paralanguage and Cléirigh's 'epilinguistic' body language as 'semovergent' paralanguage. This created many of the inconsistencies that invalidate the authors' entire model of paralanguage. To explain:

The distinction in Cléirigh's model is between body language that functions as protolanguage ('protolinguistic'), body language that functions as language ('linguistic'), and body language made possible by the evolution and development of language ('epilinguistic'). That is, the types are distinguished in terms of semogenesis: phylogenesis and ontogenesis.

Despite semogenesis being the criterion for these types, the authors renamed the types as if they differed in terms of the linguistic strata they converged with. This generated many confusions. The notion of convergence arose in the first place because the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system. This led two of the authors, Martin & Zappavigna (2019), to conclude that paralanguage is an expression system of language — evidence here — thereby invalidating the notion of convergence. 

In this publication, the misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system persists in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 (ideational semovergent paralanguage). In contrast, Chapter 5 (interpersonal semovergent paralanguage) and Chapter 6 (textual semovergent paralanguage) understand paralanguage as both content and expression, thereby making the notion of 'semovergence' with language redundant.

And as previously observed, because 'sonovergent paralanguage' serves the same functions as prosodic phonology, it is language, not paralanguage, and so realises grammatical systems (INFORMATION and KEY) rather than "converging" with vocal tract systems.

[3] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. Of course SFL opposes 'form to meaning': phonology is form, semantics is meaning, and lexicogrammar is form interpreted in terms of its function in realising meaning.

Why The Model Of Paralinguistic Periodicity Is Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 194):

In spoken English, prominence is composed through the TONALITY, TONICITY and RHYTHM systems of prosodic phonology. It is also composed in multiple layers of predictive prominence in discourse, from clause-level Theme to hyper-Theme to layer upon layer of macro-Theme, and in layers of aggregating prominence from clause-level New to hyper-New and so on.

In the face-to-face discourse of live lectures we have noted the potential for expressions of prominence at multiple layers in discourse to synchronise aurally with prosodic phonology and visually with PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. Such intermodal convergences amplify the prominence of the meanings involved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in spoken English, the phonological resources for assigning prominence are TONICITY and RHYTHM. TONALITY is the system for selecting the distribution of tone groups.

[2] To be clear, the grammatical resources for assigning prominence are "clause-level" Theme and "information unit-level" New. As previously demonstrated, the authors' avoidance of the information unit allowed them to make an unwarranted connection between grammatical Theme and discourse semantic hyper-Theme and macro-Theme.

As previously pointed out, Martin's 'hyper-Theme', 'macro-Theme' and 'hyper-New' are rebrandings of terms from writing pedagogy: 'topic sentence', 'introductory paragraph' and 'paragraph summary' respectively.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. All the authors have done is describe the movement of a lecturer around his lecturing space and correlated his position in space with what he was saying at the time. They provided no evidence that the position assigns prominence, or that it realises the correlated discourse semantic category, such that the position identifies the meaning or the meaning identifies the position.

Significantly, the authors produced no system networks to theorise their system of PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY, their system of meaning named after a structure type.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Theme

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 181-2):

As outlined by Halliday (1967, 1970a), English grammar and phonology structure textual meaning as waves of information. One peak of prominence is realised grammatically through Theme at the beginning of an English clause. It functions as the point of departure for the message by encoding an angle on the field. A complementary peak of prominence, termed New, is realised phonologically in the unmarked case through the major pitch movement on the final salient syllable of a tone group – its Tonic segment (Halliday, 1970a; Martin and Rose, [2003] 2007: 189–92). A secondary peak of informational prominence is realised through a salient syllable, which in SFL notation begins each foot. As noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.6, a salient syllable can be made super-salient where there is a significant jump in pitch, usually upwards, which does not involve a choice of tone. Super-salience is indicated via a vertical arrow, ‘↑’, before the syllable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion of the textual meaning of a clause as a wave of prominence is first set out in Halliday (1985: 169).

[2] To be clear, the Theme functions as the point of departure for the clause as message. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 89):

The Theme is the element that serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that which locates and orients the clause within its context. The speaker chooses the Theme as his or her point of departure to guide the addressee in developing an interpretation of the message; by making part of the message prominent as Theme, the speaker enables the addressee to process the message.

Field, on the other hand, is the ideational dimension of context — two strata above lexicogrammar — which Martin (1992) misunderstands as register.

[3] To be clear, the New is peak of prominence of the information unit, which may or may not be co-extensive with the clause.

[4] This is misleading, because it credits Martin and Rose with theorising that is entirely Halliday's.

[5] To be clear, a salient syllable is a peak of phonological (rhythmic), not informational prominence. Here the authors confuse expression with content. Each salient syllable that is non-tonic realises what was not selected as the Focus of New information.

Crediting Martin With The Ideas Of Others

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 179):

In this section we introduce two additional paralinguistic systems – PARALINGUISTIC RHYTHM and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. PARALINGUISTIC RHYTHM deals with the sonovergent synchronicity of paralanguage with waves of sound in the prosodic phonology of speech. PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY deals with the semovergent coordination of paralanguage with waves of information in unfolding discourse. The metaphor of ‘waves’ references the peaks and troughs of textual prominence as texts unfold (Martin, 1992; Martin and Rose, [2003] 2007: 189).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the rhythm of body language serves the same function as the rhythm of speech, just through different body parts. Because of this, it is language, not paralanguage, which why it is termed 'linguistic' body language in Cléirigh's model. Consequently, because it is not paralanguage, it is also not 'sonovergent'.

[2] This is misleading because it misrepresents the source of these ideas as Martin ± Rose. In truth, Halliday (1985: 169) draws on Pike's (1959) triad of 'language as particle, wave and field’:

The textual meaning of the clause is expressed by what is put first (the Theme); by what is phonologically prominent (and tends to be put last – the New, signalled by information focus); and by conjunctions and relatives which if present must occur in initial position. Thus it forms a wave-like pattern of periodicity that is set up by peaks of prominence and boundary markers.

Misleading Claims About The Model Of Paralinguistic Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 178-9):

The discussion of textual semovergence to this point explores the cooperation of language and paralanguage as they keep track of people, things and places in the flow of discourse. PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is realised through an embodied vector which directs a viewer’s gaze to either [actual] or [virtual] phenomena. … As vectors, the expressions of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS direct students’ gaze, and thus their attention, to particular [actual] and [virtual] phenomena.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. As the review of this chapter has so far demonstrated, the authors have not illustrated that body language "keeps track" of 'people, things and places in the flow of discourse'. This is merely Martin's characterisation of his system of IDENTIFICATION. Interestingly, the body language data included instances of endophoric reference, which functions cohesively within body language, but the authors don't recognise the distinction between exophoric and endophoric reference in their system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS.

Moreover, as has also been demonstrated, the authors' system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is not a system of DEIXIS, because it does not make distinctions by reference to the here-&-now of the gesturer.

[2] To be clear, such a gesture would not signal that an identity is recoverable, and so would not serve a reference (identification) function. However, it was demonstrated that the DEIXIS feature 'virtual' only arises from the authors' misunderstandings. For example, of the' first two instances of virtual DEIXIS, the gesture in the first was not deictic in function, and the gesture in the second was not "unresolved".

Confusing Content (Entity Types) With Expression (Gestures)

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 93, 94):

All of these linguistic entity types can be realised concurrently in paralanguage as gestures. Paralinguistic entities are often realised through a flat hand suggesting the boundaries of an object (e.g. parallel hands implying the sides of a box) or through a curved hand suggesting something being held or moulded (e.g. a cupped hand implying the weight or shape of an object). We introduced three entities from the ‘Visit to the Dermatologist’ phase in Chapter 1. In this phase the paralanguage concurred with two entities in the language (needle and bump) (Table 4.2).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again the authors misunderstand paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that realises the content of an instance of language.

[2] To be clear, here the authors have misunderstood linguistic entities that are realised by paralinguistic body language as paralinguistic entities. That is, they have classified content in terms of how it is realised on the expression plane. This is analogous to classifying these discourse semantic units as phonological entities, since this is how they are realised on the expression plane of language.

It will be seen that this basic misunderstanding of stratification, which invalidates their model, leads the authors to present a semantic system network in which all the systems and features are of the expression plane (Figure 4.1).

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. Neither of the first two hand shapes realises the entity 'needle'. The first mimes the manner of holding a needle, and the second mimes the dermatologist's manner of injecting with a needle. Similarly, the third hand shape does not realise the entity 'bump', but the 'bubbling up' of the granuloma after the injection of the steroid.

This, again, is recycled from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from its review: Misinterpreting The Data.

Misrepresenting Halliday & Matthiessen's Semantics As Martin And Hao's Discourse Semantics

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 91, 92):

This chapter explores how ideational meaning is realised in paralanguage. Ideational meaning is concerned with how experience is represented: ‘what kinds of activities are undertaken, and how participants undertaking these activities are described and classified’ (Martin and Rose, [2003] 2007: 17). The linguistic systems of ideation and connexion, described in Martin (1992) and developed by Hao (2015), model ideational meaning at the level of discourse semantics as sequences of figures made up of elements of different kinds: entities (objects), occurrences (happenings/motion) and qualities (attributes/manner) (Table 4.1). As discussed in Chapter 1, we set aside connexion, since, as in filmic discourse, there is no way of making it explicit in paralanguage alone and linking relations among gestures have to be abduced (Bateman, 2007, 2014).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by this, the authors do not mean 'how the ideational meaning of paralinguistic body language is realised by its expression systems', but 'how the ideational meaning of language is realised by paralinguistic body language expression systems. As previously explained, this is because the authors misunderstand paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] This is very misleading indeed. The terms 'sequence', 'figure' and 'element', and their congruent realisations in lexicogrammar, derive from the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), not from the discourse semantics of Martin (1992). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 49):

In stark contrast, Martin (1992: 325) proposes only the 'message' and message part' for his ideational discourse semantic systems:

and relates his discourse semantic logical unit to clause functions (except circumstances) and his discourse semantic experiential unit to group and phrase rank functions and clause-rank circumstances (ibid.):

Hao was Martin's PhD student and she accordingly adopted his practice of rebranding the work of others as Martin's model. In Figure 4.1, based on Hao (2015), she cherry-picks from Halliday & Matthiessen's (1999) system of elements, rebranding their 'process' as her 'occurrence', and reinterpreting subtypes of participant, 'quality' and 'thing' as least delicate types, with the latter rebranded as her 'entity'. Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 67):

Note also that Table 4.1 also confuses form (clause complex, clause) with function (participant, process, circumstance), these latter being the functions of groups and phrases.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The enhancement relation of 'before', for example, can be realised by directed gestures that use a dimension of the gesturing space as the time dimension. 

[4] This is another misunderstanding that arises because the authors misunderstand paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system. The logical relations do not obtain between gestures on the expression plane; they obtain on the content plane, and gestures are a means of realising them on the expression plane.

Misunderstanding Phonological Systems As Interacting With The Sonovergent Systems Of Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 67, 68, 70):

Our main aim in this chapter is to provide a description of those phonological systems of language that interact with the sonovergent systems of paralanguage presented elsewhere in this book. …

Our approach to the functions of vocal semiotic systems, in their interactions with bodily semiotic systems, is developed from the perspective of the discourse semantics described in Martin and Rose ([2003] 2007) …

Our work takes a discourse semantic view on the semiotic functions of speech.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because phonological systems do not "interact" with the sonovergent systems of paralanguage — the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's 'linguistic' body language. This is because the sonovergent systems of paralanguage are not paralanguage, but language. They are principally the grammatical systems of INFORMATION and KEY realised by body parts other than (divergent from) the vocal tract.

[2] This is misleading, because, in this chapter, the authors' approach to the functions of vocal semiotic systems is not developed from the perspective of the discourse semantics. Moreover, in later chapters, the authors do not use the discourse semantic system of IDEATION in Martin & Rose (2003, 2007) but a version of the ideational semantics in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999). See here for a detailed review of Martin & Rose (2007).

Why The Authors' Argument Against Protolinguistic Body Language Is Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 63):

In sum, given that

there is no formal way to discriminate the proposed adult ‘protolinguistic’ body language from the semovergent category, 

no evidence that the proposed instances operate as protolinguistic signs and 

a common recognition that the meanings in question belong within the interpersonal domain, 

they are subsumed in this book within the semovergent category. Our position will be that

paralanguage, like verbal language, is organised metafunctionally and that

different metafunctional strands of both language and paralanguage can be instantiated simultaneously.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. Throughout this chapter, the authors have failed to grasp the basic criteria of Cléirigh's model. Protolinguistic body language is distinguished from epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") in not requiring the prior evolutionary or developmental emergence of language, which means that, unlike epilinguistic body language, it is also to be observed in other socio-semiotic species.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The evidence that they are signs is that these gestures and postures mean something other than themselves. That is, they are signifiers of signifieds, tokens of values, expressions of content. The evidence that are protolinguistic is that they do not require the prior evolutionary or developmental emergence of language, as demonstrated by their use in other species.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. As previously demonstated, this "common recognition" was by colleagues using the same approach, and was the study of pictures, not body language. Because pictures are an epilinguistic semiotic system, their meaning is organised metafunctionally, not microfunctionally, and these colleagues simply interpreted the meaning of the pictures in terms of the metafunctions.

[4] As demonstrated above, this is a serious category error, since it miscategorises a semiotic system that does not require the prior emergence of language as one that does. As such, invalidates the authors' model.

[5] To be clear, this position of the authors is invalid because only epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") is both metafunctional and paralanguage. As previously demonstrated, protolinguistic body language is not metafunctional, and linguistic body language ("sonovergent paralanguage") is not paralanguage but language.

[6] To be clear, unknown to the authors, this is simply the paralinguistic use of epilinguistic body language in Cléirigh's model.

Confusing Epilinguistic Pictures With Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

As we have seen, much of what is assigned to body protolanguage involves the expression of emotions. Here we meet again the challenge of discriminating somasis and semiosis. Nonetheless, in the analysis of visual depiction, Painter et al. (2013) propose VISUAL AFFECT as an interpersonal meaning system complementing that of verbal AFFECT within the linguistic domain of APPRAISAL. 

The details of the system remain unspecified by them, but Martinec (2001) provides networks of meaning options for basic emotions with realisations specified in terms of facial movements. These systems are again treated by him as belonging within the interpersonal metafunction and thus able to be put into play alongside meanings originating from within the other metafunctions. For our own work in this domain, see Chapter 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As we have seen in previous posts, this false claim derives from the authors misconstruing Halliday's microfunctions of protolanguage as types of emotions. See

• The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"
• The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

In Cléirigh's model, following Halliday ((e.g. 2004 [1998]: 18), since emotions are personal states, they are restricted to the personal microfunction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. If body movements and postures mean something other than themselves, emotions, they are semiotic, not merely "somatic" (the authors' confusion of biological and social orders of complexity).

As previously explained, this challenge to the authors only arises from their taking the view 'from below' (body movements and postures) instead of the SFL view 'from above' (the meanings expressed), and this error derives from misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system..

[3] As previously explained, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. This means that its meaning is metafunctionally organised. Painter et al simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in instances of an epilinguistic system. Importantly, the visual depiction of emotions is irrelevant to the issue of protolinguistic body language, since it is not concerned with the meanings that can be made by an organism of a social semiotic species in whom language has not developed. See the earlier post

• Misrepresenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

For a more detailed consideration of the epilinguistic depiction of protolinguistic body language, see the review of Chapter 5 of this publication on interpersonal paralanguage.

[4] As previously explained, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

∞

Most importantly, just as an image of a pipe is not a pipe, an image of body language is not body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Either Somatic Or Interpersonal

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

What is common to most of the meanings assigned by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) to ‘protolinguistic’ microfunctions is that, if not simply somatic, they are interpersonal in nature – but not accommodated by a linguistic model that includes only SPEECH FUNCTION, MOOD and MODALITY in that metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] As previously explained, in Cléirigh's model, protolinguistic body language, by definition, excludes non-semiotic ("somatic") behaviour, and the authors' misunderstanding in this regard derives from taking the view 'from below' (body movement) instead of the view 'from above' (meaning). And, as also previously explained, in terms of orders of complexity, the authors' model of somasis confuses the biological order with the social order, and includes what Halliday (2004: 18) models as protolanguage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As explained in the previous post, this false claim derives from the authors misrepresenting epilinguistic pictorial systems, which do include interpersonal meaning, as protolinguistic body language, which does not.

[4] To be clear, a model of an evolutionarily prior system, protolinguistic body language, is not required to "accommodate" a model of an evolutionarily later system, a linguistic model, any more than a description of therapod dinosaurs must accommodate a description of the birds that evolved from them.

Misrepesenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62):

If we turn now to other SFL theorists, particularly those who have considered the visual depiction of human communicative interaction, we can see some common threads. There is a general agreement about the meanings of the way the body is oriented in relation to an addressee. 

For example, Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) system of INVOLVEMENT within their ‘visual grammar’ explains the meaning as relative detachment or involvement of the viewer with the content of the image. The meaning is realised by horizontal angle, with an oblique angle signifying greater detachment than a front-on angle. 

Painter et al. (2013) extend this to analysis of the depicted interacting characters in picture books to propose a system of ORIENTATION with different orientations between characters (face to face, side by side, back to back) comparably realising different degrees of engagement, solidarity or detachment. 

Martinec (2001) similarly has a comparable system of ANGLE (operating alongside one of SOCIAL DISTANCE) again with similar realisations.  

In all of this work the meaning systems are placed within the interpersonal metafunction and are thus seen as available alongside textual and/or ideational paralanguage systems and all three metafunctions of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since these are not independent theorists. Painter et al, at least, theorise on the basis of Kress and van Leeuwen's work, at least.

[2] Importantly, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. So here the authors are using an epilinguistic system as evidence that a protolinguistic system is epilinguistic.

[3] To be clear, Kress and van Leeuwen are concerned with a human's interpretation of an image, and Painter et al are concerned with relations within an image. Both are irrelevant to the issue at hand, since neither is concerned with the body language of an organism of a social semiotic species.

[4] To be clear, because visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system, its meaning is metafunctionally organised. These colleagues have simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in such epilinguistic systems.

[5] To be clear, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

To explore this, some examples of adult paralinguistic behaviour classified by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) as protolinguistic will be briefly discussed. One group comprises various facial expressions such as smiling, raising, lowering or widening the eyes, opening the mouth and the presence or absence of eye contact with the addressee, all features of ‘social communion’ that predate even protolanguage (see Figure 2.1).  

As has been discussed, during the transition phase there is evidence that facial affect can be separated from other strands of interpersonal expression (e.g. looking happy while saying oh dear) and in the adult semiotic system affective facial expressions can clearly combine freely with any ideational meaning. In these respects, such expression forms are unlike protolinguistic signs, and the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether that instance is somatic or semiotic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviour' and 'expression(s)' here betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstanding arises from again giving priority to the view 'from below', facial expression, instead of the view 'from above', meaning. The meanings of facial expressions cannot predate protolanguage, since protolanguage is the initial semiotic system. Before protolanguage, such facial expressions have a social function only: the selection of value in the other, not a semiotic function: the expression of symbolic value for the other.

[4] Here the authors provide evidence against their own argument. To be clear, a child looking happy while saying oh dear, and an adult combining facial expressions with language are both instances of the paralinguistic use of protolinguistic body language. They are paralinguistic because they are used alongside language, and they are protolinguistic because they are semiotic systems that do require the prior evolution and development of language.

[5] This is misleading. The difference here is only that, in these instances, the protolinguistic signs are being used paralinguistically, rather than pre-linguistically.

[6] To be clear, the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether the instance is social (carries value) or protolinguistic (carries symbolic value). As previously explained, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two distinct orders of complexity: the biological and the social.

Misrepresenting The Microfunctions As Criterial Of Protolinguistic Body Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

Nor is it possible to argue that certain forms of adult paralanguage are organised in terms of microfunctions simply because it is possible to interpret them this way. As explained earlier, there is no formal way to determine the microfunction of an infant expression – it is an interpretation from context. Therefore, given that any adult communication could be assigned to a microfunction on contextual grounds, since adult language has limitless uses, this does not in itself count as evidence for microfunctional organisation. It would therefore be more appropriate for the term ‘protolanguage’ to be used only if it can be shown that the defining characteristics of protolinguistic communication are apparent, that is, if the expression form is an irreducible multimodal complex and if the meaning is similarly an inseparable bundle of ideational and interpersonal meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents the micofunctions that are used to model protolanguage as criterial of the category. To be clear, protolinguistic body language is simply body language that does not require the prior evolution or development of language, and as such, can be found in all other species with a social semiotic system. The microfunctions are not criterial in determining the category 'protolinguistic', they are merely Halliday's means of modelling paralanguage.

So here again the authors are arguing against their own misunderstanding of Cléirigh's model, instead of against Cléirigh's model itself. In terms of logical fallacies, this is an example of the

Straw man fallacy – refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognising or acknowledging the distinction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. For example, protolinguistic interjections like yuck! and ouch! are not expressed by "an irreducible multimodal complex". Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Moreover, Halliday's publications provide a wealth of examples of expressions that are not multimodal. For example, Halliday (2004 [1975]: 36):

In other species, the expression may be unimodal or multimodal. For example, in rainbow lorikeets, a 'prohibitive' regulatory function, which could be glossed as 'you just try it!) is expressed as rough growl with low rising tone (tone 3), whereas a 'threatening' regulatory function, which might be glossed as 'you're asking for it!', is expressed by the arching of the back, a lowering of the face and eye ridges, a fierce glare, and multiple wing-flaps while standing on 'tippy-toes' as if the bird was about to make a flying attack. Other examples can be found here.

[3] To be clear, this characterises human protolanguage in terms of the semiotic system it will evolve and develop into, metafunctional language, instead of in its own terms as microfunctional protolanguage. In evolutionary terms, this is analogous to characterising the features of therapod dinosaurs in terms of the features of birds.

Halliday (2004 [1975]: 52) provides a summary of the development from microfunction to metafunction:

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Non-Semiotic ("Somatic")

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60-1):

The first point to be made is that some of the phenomena counted as protolinguistic in Zappavigna and Martin (2018) may in fact be somatic rather than semiotic. For example, forms of fidgeting, scratching a cheek or crossing feet may simply be a matter of relieving some bodily discomfort, rather than having symbolic import. It is necessary to have criteria for discriminating somatic and semiotic expression in such cases (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4–1.5), but their ambiguity is not grounds for classing them as protolinguistic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the first of the authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. However, it is an argument against what the authors mistake to be included in the category rather than an argument against the grounds for the category itself.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language is restricted to semiosis, by definition. The criterion for discriminating the semiotic from the non-semiotic is simply that if a gesture or posture means something other than itself, then it is semiotic. If fidgeting, for example, does not mean something other than itself, then it is not semiotic, and so cannot be an expression of protolinguistic body language. If, however, the fidgeting of a young offender facing a tribunal — as in the data — means that he is nervous and 'itching to leave', then it is semiotic, and because such semiosis does not require the prior evolution and development of language, it is protolinguistic.

Importantly, the authors' mistaken notion of there being ambiguity in the interpretation of such cases derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', contrā the SFL method of giving priority to the view 'from above'. That is, the authors ask what the gestures mean, instead of asking how meanings are realised in gesture. This, in turn, derives from the authors misunderstanding body language as an expression-only semiotic system, as previously explained.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two different orders of complexity: biological (behaviour) and social (communion).