Confusing Functional Syntagmatic Relations With Formal Constituency

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 209):

Working from a functional paradigm we of course have to approach the relation of ‘sign languages’ to one another differently. In essence this means adopting a paradigmatic perspective and formalising their meaning potential as far as possible in system networks specifying the relation of one sign (in Saussure’s sense of the term) to another. 

The crucial question we then need to ask is whether meanings combine with one another. …The paralinguistic systems we describe in this volume do combine ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings but apparently without involving syntagmatic relations (i.e. parts configuring as wholes).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the Saussurean sign includes both content ('signified') and expression ('signifier'), whereas system networks specify relations within one or the other, e.g. lexicogrammar or phonology. For some of Martin's misunderstandings of Saussure, see:

• Misunderstanding What Saussure Was "Struggling Against"
• Mistaking Saussure's Rejected Model For Saussure's 'Sign' [1]
• Mistaking Saussure's Rejected Model For Saussure's 'Sign' [2]
• Misunderstanding The Saussurean Sign
• The "Non-Privileging" Of Either Level Of Symbolic Abstraction
• Misunderstanding Saussure's Coins Example
• Misunderstanding The Bonding Of Signified And Signifier And The Relation Of Form To Substance
• Seriously Misunderstanding The Sign In Relation To Linguistics And Semiotics

[2] To be clear, this confuses structural relations along the syntagmatic axis (e.g. Pretonic ^ Tonic) with the part-whole relations of the rank scale (e.g. feet (parts) as constituents of a tone group (whole)).

Simultaneous Emotion

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 123-4):

A further consideration in analysing and interpreting facial expressions is the potential for one feature of facial affect to transition very quickly into another in an animated expression. An instance in example (4) expresses both [surprise] and [spirit:up]. 

From a systemic functional perspective, rather than describing this as a blending or merging of emotions it is considered as the co-instantiation of two different emotions with each realised through particular parts of the face (e.g. eyes, eyebrows, mouth) and often in very quick succession. In (4) the raised curved eyebrows realise [surprise] and the upturned lips realise [spirit:up]. 

A facial expression of [surprise], interpreted as a perturbance (Martin, 2017a) typically has the briefest duration and often transitions quickly to the expression of another emotion, one which responds to the specific trigger of the perturbance.

Blogger Comments:

[1] From a systemic functional perspective, this blurs the axial distinction between simultaneous systems ('both', 'co-instantiation', 'and') and syntagmatic order ('transition', 'succession'). Moreover, if two emotions can be realised in the same facial expression, the system network needs to be redrawn to represent simultaneous (conjunct) systems. This the authors have not done.

[2] On the one hand, the claim that a facial expression of surprise typically has the briefest duration is an instance of the logical fallacy known as ipse dixit: a bare assertion unsupported by evidence, and is belied by synonyms for 'surprised' such as 'stupefied' and 'dumbfounded'. On the other hand, surprise is the emotion that is the response to what triggered it as a perturbance.

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [4]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 104, 105):

Where an entity is present in the paralinguistic realisation of an occurrence figure this entity may change, [transformative] versus [non-transformative] in either size, [increase] versus [decrease] or [shape]. These options are outlined in Figure 4.5. If it remains a constant size or shape, it may impact another entity in the gestural space, [impacting] versus [non-impacting].

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' and 'paralinguistic figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.5 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (entitied occurrence figure) with both discourse semantic features (entitied, non-entitied) and expression plane features (transformative, size, increase, decrease, shape, non-transformative, impacting, non-impacting).

Moreover, realisation statements like 'insert entity' specify a constraint on structural configuration — cf. insert Agent — but no structural configuration for occurrence figures has been identified.

Syntagmatic Units Of Content And Notional Definitions Of Metafunctions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8-9):

Kress and van Leeuwen’s breakthrough depended on their paradigmatic perspective on how images make meaning – formalised as system networks and tables in Kress and van Leeuwen (1990: 49, 61, 86, 108). This relational approach enabled them to bypass the pseudo-problems arising when scholars searched for syntagmatic units in semiotic systems that realise systems in structure very differently from the way language does. As critiqued in Martin (2011b), very little of the work inspired by Kress and van Leeuwen has proceeded along similar lines – unfortunately relying instead on notional definitions of ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning to explore modalities of communication other than language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, syntagmatic units are units of form, and so are restricted to the strata of lexicogrammar and phonology in language. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) have argued, language is unique in having a content plane stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar, so other semiotic systems are organised into content and expression planes only. Consequently, the difficulty that scholars faced in finding syntagmatic units on the content plane of other, epilinguistic, semiotic systems was due to the fact that there are no forms to be found there.

[2] For some of the problems with Martin's work in epilinguistic semiotic systems, see

here (Working With Discourse 2007), and
here (Deploying Functional Grammar 2010).

[3] To be clear, in linguistics, 'notional' means

denoting or relating to an approach to grammar which is dependent on the definition of terminology (e.g. ‘a verb is a doing word’) as opposed to identification of structures and processes.

In SFL Theory, the metafunctions are not identified 'from below' by their structures, but 'from above' by their meanings (i.e. 'notionally'). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language… . The textual metafunction … is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared.

Metafunctions As Generalisations About Bundles Of Oppositions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8):

Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1990) groundbreaking publication and its better-known reworking (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996) are both organised around the spectrum of meaning SFL calls metafunctions (Kress and van Leeuwen’s interaction, representation and composition). It is crucial to keep in mind that metafunctions are generalisations about bundles of oppositions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section, those unfamiliar with SFL Theory, since it fails to acknowledge Halliday as the intellectual source of 'metafunction', his first publication on the subject being Language Structure and Language Function in 1970.

[2] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section, those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. To be clear, the metafunctions are highly generalised functions of the linguistic system that extend over all of the local dimensions of the content plane, not just the paradigmatic order of axis. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The content plane of a natural language is functionally diverse: it extends over a spectrum of three distinct modes of meaning, ideational, interpersonal and textual. These highly generalised functions of the linguistic system are referred to in our theory as metafunctions. The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others. The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. But this does not mean processing some preexisting body of information; rather it is the ongoing creation of a semiotic realm of reality.

Metafunctional Oppositions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8):

In this respect SFL is very different from models of language which distinguish form and meaning, treat meaning as representational (semantics) and then ask questions about how representational meanings are used (pragmatics). SFL’s paradigmatic perspective on meaning suggests on the other hand that [metafunctional oppositions] are not stacked up in layers – from form to meaning to use. Rather the sets of oppositions are seen as complementary kinds of meaning, generalised as metafunctions and manifested simultaneously in everything we speak, write or sign.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. Firstly, contrary to the implication above, SFL does distinguish form from meaning, modelling form as rank scales on the strata of lexicogrammar and phonology. Lexicogrammar is theorised as forms realising meanings.

Secondly, contrary to the implication above, SFL does treat meaning as "representational", as demonstrated by the Chapter title Clause As Representation in IFG (Halliday ± Matthiessen 1985, 1994, 2004, 2014). This is the ideational meaning that SFL complements with interpersonal meaning (Clause As Exchange) and textual meaning (Clause As Message).

Thirdly, contrary to the implication above, SFL does "ask questions" about how all meanings are used, including ideational meanings. This is modelled as subpotentials of the semantic system, registers, which realise specific situation types. In the case of ideational semantics, this is termed a domain model (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 563).

With regard to pragmatics, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 12) identify its two distinctive aspects and how they relate to SFL Theory:

There is no separate component of "pragmatics" within our interpretative frame. Since it emerged as a distinct field of scholarly activity, pragmatics has by and large been associated with two aspects of language. 

On the one hand, it has dealt with those aspects of the meaning of a text which depend on specific instances — particulars of the situation and of the interactants, and inferences drawn from these. But just as, in grammatics, we do not distinguish between the grammar of the system and the grammar of the instance — a systemic theory is a theory of both, and necessarily (therefore) of the relationship between them — so in semantics we would not want to separate the system from its instantiation in text. In this aspect, pragmatics appears as another name for the semantics of instances. 

And on the other hand, pragmatics has served as an alternative term for the interpersonal and textual domains of semantics. Here the distinction that is being labelled is one of metafunction, not of instantiation; but it seems undesirable to obscure the relationship between ideational meaning on the one hand and interpersonal and textual meaning on the other hand by locating them within different disciplines.

[2] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. Metafunctional oppositions are "stacked up" in layers, but these layers are the strata of lexicogrammar, semantics and context. Moreover, it is not SFL's paradigmatic perspective that suggests this, since axis is a local dimension of language, whereas stratification is a global dimension. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Metafunction As A Parameter That Organises Paradigmatic Relations

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 6):

Over the past five decades of research (Martin, 2016), SFL has generalised a number of key parameters concerning the way paradigmatic relations are organised in language. One is metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. These key parameters were not "generalised" over five decades of research, and Martin played no role in their formulation. SFL Theory was devised entirely by Halliday, with the first statement on the theory appearing in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar in 1969, and the first statement on the metafunctions appearing in Language Structure and Language Function in 1970.

[2] This misunderstands the architecture of language proposed by Halliday. It is not that metafunction organises paradigmatic relations, but that paradigmatic relations, like syntagmatic relations, are orders of a local semiotic dimension, axis, over which the global semiotic dimension of metafunction extends. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

"System Depends On And Is Motivated By Structure"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5, 6):

These grammatical oppositions are formalised in Figure 1.2. …

We will not go into detail about this kind of formalisation here; detailed accounts can be found in Matthiessen and Halliday (2009) and Martin et al. (2013a). We introduce the system network in Figure 1.2 at this point to clarify what it means to say that SFL involves a relational theory of meaning (rather than a representational one). This means that SFL treats language (and semiosis) as a resource for meaning (rather than a set of rules about what one can say or not). What matters are the relationships among choices, as they are formalised in system networks. The basic organising principle for descriptions is thus paradigmatic, rather than syntagmatic. Note however that for a paradigmatic choice to be meaningful, it must have structural consequences; system depends on and is motivated by structure (Martin et al., 2020).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, having just presented clause structures that differ in terms of their realisation of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION (see previous post), the authors misrepresent these as the grammatical oppositions of MOOD.

[2] This is potentially misleading for the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. The system network was introduced by Halliday in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar (1969) to represent Firth's notion of system.

[3] To be clear, SFL is a dimensional theory of meaning. Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Martin, on the other hand, misunderstands SFL as modelling language in terms of "interacting modules". For example,  Martin (1992: 488):

The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components?

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Semiotic systems that do not have "structural consequences" include paralanguage and traffic lights.

[5] This is very seriously misleading indeed, because it is the exact opposite of SFL methodology. SFL does not give priority to structure in such matters, since this would be giving priority to the view 'from below' instead of the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness…

This methodological error is the dominant recurring motif in Martin (2013), as demonstrated here. Moreover, Martin's notion that structure is necessary to meaning derives from the 'syntacticist' tradition of Formal linguistics. Halliday (2007 [1978]: 186):

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a great deal of meaning in a one-word sentence. Whether one claims that there is also structure is likely to depend on whether one subscribes to the syntacticist notion that structure is necessary to meaning.

Stratification, System And Axis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5):

In this section we introduce the three main theoretical parameters which have shaped our model of paralanguage: axis (the complementarity of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations), metafunction (kinds of meaning) and stratification (levels of semiosis). 

Systemic functional linguistics, as the name of the theory implies, distinguishes itself from other linguistic theories by foregrounding systems as the foundational organising principle for description. Drawing on Saussure’s notion of valeur, it conceives of language (and semiosis in general) as a network of systems (Martin, 2016; Martin et al., 2013a). Each system involves choices (usually two or three) which have structural consequences shaping anything we mean. The relationship between system and structure is referred to technically as axis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here the authors are reminding the reader that Cléirigh's model of body language is the authors' model of paralanguage.

[2] This misunderstands stratification. Strata are levels of symbolic abstraction in semiotic systems. A common feature of the work of Martin and his students is the failure to understand stratification. See, for example, from Martin (1992): 

Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification

Misconstruing Stratification

Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification

Misconstruing Strata And Metafunctions As Modules

Misunderstanding Stratification

Misunderstanding The Principles Of Metafunction And Stratification

Not Understanding Interstratal Realisation

Misconstruing Strata As Modules

Misunderstanding Stratification And Realisation

[3] To be clear, in devising SFL Theory, Halliday adopted Firth's notion of system and introduced the system network as a way of modelling it. Halliday (2003 [1995]: 433, 434):

The name 'systemic' derives from the term 'system', in its technical sense as defined by Firth (1957c); …

A system is a set of options together with a condition of entry, such that if the entry condition is satisfied one option, and one only, must be chosen; for example, in English grammar, [system] 'mood', [entry condition] finite clause, [options] indicative/imperative. The option selected in one system then serves as the entry condition to another; e.g. [entry condition] indicative, [options] declarative/interrogative; hence all systems deriving from a common point of origin (e.g. [clause]) are agnate and together form a 'system network'.

[4] Here the authors mislead the reader by citing the work of Martin, instead of Halliday, as the source of Halliday's theorising. (The authors (p3) intend this section for readers unfamiliar with SFL Theory.) Plagiarism is defined as the practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and passing them off as one's own.

[5] This misunderstands the SFL notion of axis. Axis is not 'the relationship between system and structure'. Axis is a local dimension of language, whose orders are the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic, the dimensions of which are system and structure, respectively. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32, 20):

This misunderstanding of axis as 'the relationship between system and structure' appears in Martin (2013), where realisation statements on the paradigmatic axis are misinterpreted as expressions of 'axial relations'. See, for example:

Misunderstanding The Dimension Of Axis As A Relation
The Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Axis In This Monograph
Misrepresenting Axis As the Origin Of Metafunction And Rank