Drawing, Music And Dance As Creolised Paralanguage And The Authors' Model Of Intermodality

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 210):

In the interest of balance, one might up the ante here. How many modalities other than language can be conceived as creolised paralanguage? Is paralanguage drawing in the air or turning this around – is drawing or painting actually inscribed ideational paralanguage? Would analysis of concert conducting be a useful stepping stone for imagining music as creolised interpersonal and textual paralanguage? Is dance creolised paralanguage along similar lines? 

As flagged in Section 7.2, in an era when presentations on multimodality so often ignore language (for fear of ‘logocentrism’) and regularly focus on one modality other than language rather than intermodality, these seem usefully challenging questions to pose.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the hypothesis of 'creolised paralanguage' postulates that people who do not share a common paralanguage come together and create a simplified pidgin paralanguage, which then becomes the native paralanguage of a once paralinguistically diverse community.

[2] To be clear, the authors have just conceived language that is signed as creolised paralanguage, but not language that is spoken. Here they give the impression of not regarding Sign as language.

[3] Here the authors are taking credit for an observation made by Matthiessen fifteen years earlier, as quoted in the notes on Cléirigh's model that the authors are working from:

The kinological systems are analogous to the articulatory systems of phonology, though they realise meaning rather than wording, and include gestures that involve drawing in the air — ‘where drawing and gesturing merge’ (Matthiessen 2007: 8).

[4] To be clear, the notion of music as creolised paralanguage would postulate that people who do not share a common music come together and create a simplified pidgin music, which then becomes the native music of a once music-diverse community.

[5] To be clear, the notion of dance as creolised paralanguage would postulate that people who do not share a common dance come together and create a simplified pidgin dance, which then becomes the native dance of a once dance-diverse community.

[6] Here the authors are congratulating themselves for doing what others do not do: modelling intermodality, the relations between instances of different semiotic systems. However, it may be instructive to consider just how the authors' model it.

To be clear, the authors model intermodality in terms of convergence. All that means is that the two modes are similar or different, and the authors are not much interested in difference, which is where a rich range of types of relations potentially lies. That is, all the different terms they use for convergence:

• sonovergence
• semovergence
• concurrence
• resonance
• synchronicity

disguise the fact that they merely label the relation between modes as one of similarity. That's all.

[7] Responding to these challenging questions is perhaps more instructive than the questions are useful.

The Linguistic Coordination Of A Convergence Of Language With Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207):

From the perspective of instantiation (the system to text relation in SFL), this raises the central challenge of intermodal studies, namely, the ineffable process whereby systems from different modalities end up seamlessly instantiated as coherent text. As in film (van Leeuwen, 1985, 2005), textual meaning has a critical role to play, as the ‘beat’ of feet and tone groups (TONALITY, TONICITY, SALIENCE and RHYTHM) coordinates the convergence of linguistic and paralinguistic resources (the focus of Chapter 6).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, instantiation is the relation between potential and instance at a given level of symbolic abstraction, of a given semiotic system. For example, instantiation is the relation between the system of phonology as potential, and an instance of that system in a text; or the relation between a system of paralinguistic content, and an instance of that system accompanying an instance of linguistic content.

[2] To be clear, the ineffability of grammatical categories means that they only mean themselves. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 303, 306):

The meaning of a typical grammatical category … has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. … they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorisation of our experience.

[3] To be clear, the expression plane systems that realise the grammatical system of the information unit are language, not paralanguage, whether vocal or gestural. So there is no coordination of a convergence of linguistic and paralinguistic resources.

[4] Trivially, SALIENCE is a lexicogrammatical distinction realised by distinctions in RHYTHM, its phonological counterpart. 

[5] To be clear, Chapter 6 presents a system of DEIXIS which classifies referents, and a system (though no network) that merely correlates speaker location with categories from writing pedagogy.

Problems With The Semovergence Of Discourse Semantics And Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207, 208):

And, as outlined in Table 7.2, semovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems concur with one another (ideational meaning), resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, 'semovergence' derives from the authors' original misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that "converges with" (realises) the content of language. This view was assumed in Chapter 1, which was previously published as Martin & Zappavigna (2019), and was partially maintained in Chapter 4, where ideational networks confused content with expression, but abandoned by Chapters 5 and 6, where interpersonal and textual networks distinguished content from expression.

[2] To be clear, the authors' model of semovergent paralanguage substitutes the discourse semantics of Martin for the semantics of Halliday in Cléirigh's model of epilinguistic body language, but maintains Cléirigh's terms 'articulatory' and 'mimetic'. Cf.

Of the authors' paralinguistic discourse semantic systems,

• IDEATION is a rebranding of the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rather than the discourse semantics of Martin (1992);
• APPRAISAL is a linguistic system misapplied to protolanguage;
• IDENTIFICATION is a system of DEIXIS that classifies referents; and
• PERIODICITY is a system without a network that merely correlates the location of a speaker with what he says, without regard to how each identifies the other (realisation).

Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Model As The Authors' Innovation

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207):

As reviewed in Section 7.1, our project involves developing paralanguage as a semiotic system alongside language. We adopted our model of the relation of paralanguage to language from earlier work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013). As outlined in Table 7.1, sonovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed. The origin of the notions of gestures being in tune with TONE, and in sync with TONICITY and RHYTHM is Cléirigh's model (2009), which predates, by four years, the "earlier" work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013):

The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps with Martin, the author of this chapter, the driving force.

Blatantly Claiming Credit For Cléirigh's Work

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199):

We used metafunction to distinguish between paralanguage systems converging with ideational, interpersonal or textual meaning (Figure 7.3).

Seen in these terms, sonovergent paralanguage resonates with interpersonal meaning and syncs with textual meaning; there is no sonovergent concurrence with ideational meaning. Semovergent paralanguage on the other hand resonates with interpersonal meaning, coordinates with textual meaning and concurs with ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed, because these distinctions were already present in Cléirigh's model, below, and were not the work of the authors. The plagiarism in this work is more blatant when Martin is the author, as in this chapter.

Linguistic ("sonovergent"):

Epilinguistic ("semovergent"):

Importantly, "sonovergent paralanguage" is the linguistic realisation of grammatical systems, and "semovergent paralanguage", being epilinguistic, has no grammar, but has meaning that derives from the fact that its users have a grammar.

What The Authors Say They Did vs What The Authors Actually Did

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198, 199, 240n):

We then moved to build a general model of paralanguage, drawing on the concept of stratification (levels of abstraction) and metafunction (kinds of meaning) in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) theory.¹ We used stratification to distinguish between paralanguage that converges with the prosodic phonology (intonation and rhythm) of spoken language and paralanguage that converges with its discourse semantics (IDEATION, APPRAISAL, IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY) – sonovergent versus semovergent paralanguage, respectively (Figure 7.2).

¹ In this respect our model contrasts with the syntax, semantics and pragmatics framework assumed in most related studies. We do not oppose form to meaning (syntax vs semantics); and we do not conflate resources enacting social relations with those composing information flow (as pragmatics).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed. The authors actually began with Cléirigh's general model of body language that was already organised in terms of stratification and metafunction. The plagiarism in this book is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, what the authors actually did was rebrand Cléirigh's 'linguistic' body language as 'sonovergent' paralanguage and Cléirigh's 'epilinguistic' body language as 'semovergent' paralanguage. This created many of the inconsistencies that invalidate the authors' entire model of paralanguage. To explain:

The distinction in Cléirigh's model is between body language that functions as protolanguage ('protolinguistic'), body language that functions as language ('linguistic'), and body language made possible by the evolution and development of language ('epilinguistic'). That is, the types are distinguished in terms of semogenesis: phylogenesis and ontogenesis.

Despite semogenesis being the criterion for these types, the authors renamed the types as if they differed in terms of the linguistic strata they converged with. This generated many confusions. The notion of convergence arose in the first place because the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system. This led two of the authors, Martin & Zappavigna (2019), to conclude that paralanguage is an expression system of language — evidence here — thereby invalidating the notion of convergence. 

In this publication, the misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system persists in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 (ideational semovergent paralanguage). In contrast, Chapter 5 (interpersonal semovergent paralanguage) and Chapter 6 (textual semovergent paralanguage) understand paralanguage as both content and expression, thereby making the notion of 'semovergence' with language redundant.

And as previously observed, because 'sonovergent paralanguage' serves the same functions as prosodic phonology, it is language, not paralanguage, and so realises grammatical systems (INFORMATION and KEY) rather than "converging" with vocal tract systems.

[3] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. Of course SFL opposes 'form to meaning': phonology is form, semantics is meaning, and lexicogrammar is form interpreted in terms of its function in realising meaning.

Interpersonal Semovergence Co-instantiated With Textual Sonovergence

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 183, 184):

Interpersonal meaning is additionally co-instantiated in the orientation of the hand. In images 1 and 5 of (17'') the supine (open) orientation of the hand beats invites negotiation of the relevant propositions. More technically it enacts heteroglossic expansion as opening space for negotiation (see Chapter 5; Martin and White, 2005; Hao and Hood, 2019). The alternative, a prone hand with a downward orientation of the palm, would have enacted heteroglossic contraction, closing down space for negotiation. These variations are illustrative of the way textual meaning in both language and paralanguage coordinates ideational and interpersonal prominence in unfolding discourse.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the orientation of the hand to realise heteroglossic ENGAGEMENT is semovergent paralanguage, in the authors' terms, whereas the beating of the hand is sonovergent paralanguage, so here the "co-instantiation" is of different types of paralanguage, each of which is differently convergent with language. On Cléirigh's original model, the function of the hand orientation is epilinguistic (made possible by language), whereas the function of the hand beating is linguistic (language).

[2] To be clear, because the beating of the hands is linguistic (systematically related to the grammar), not paralinguistic (not systematically related to the grammar), these examples illustrate the use of language to give textual prominence to the meanings of language.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of The Resonance Of Affect And Force

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 156, 157):

In Coraline’s first encounter with Wybie, a boy of her own age from the same neighbourhood, he accuses her of being a water witch to which she responds: //3 ^ and if / I’m a / water / witch //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. The focus in (30) is on the second tone group of this utterance, that is, //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. … 

The first image in (30) captures Coraline forcefully stomping her right foot and punching down with her arms and clenched hands in an expression of PARALINGUISTIC AFFECT – [anger] with [strong] FORCE. The voice quality on where realises VOICE AFFECT as [anger] – through high intensity, tension and roughness (shown as the grey area in the spectrogram in (30)). Coraline’s face is not visible in the first image; but a prosody of FACIAL AFFECT [anger] is additionally realised more or less intensively in the remaining three images – as the eyebrows are drawn down and together. These expressions of PARALINGUISTIC FORCE in realisations of [anger] resonate with and amplify one another.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the depiction of body language on an animated clay puppet is not body language, but an epilinguistic construal of body language, because the representation of body language on an animated clay puppet requires the prior development of language in the animator; it is not something that a dog or cat, for example, could do.

In considering the body language that is thus epilinguistically depicted:

[1] As previously explained, the beating of the foot and arms realises textual salience, and is linguistic, like the beats of speech. Here the authors again misconstrue this textual salience as interpersonal force (and as epilinguistic instead of linguistic).

[2] As previously explained, the bodily expression of emotion is protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, because it does not require the prior evolution and development of language, as demonstrated by Darwin's work on the expression of emotions in other animal species. Here, however, the authors misconstrue the expression of emotion as requiring the prior evolution and development of language (epilinguistic) and locate it within the interpersonal metafunction, regardless of whether or not it is used to evaluate.

[3] To be clear, as the above demonstrates, the "resonance" here is between the protolinguistic expression of emotion (which other animals can do) and the linguistic expression of salience (which other animals cannot do).

Problems With The System Of Paralinguistic Engagement

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 144):

From a social semiotic approach, Hood (2011) considers how embodied paralanguage resonates with linguistic ENGAGEMENT resources (see Figure 5.13).

 

For example, a prone (palm down) hand gesture realises [contraction] and functions to close down space for the negotiation of propositions or proposals. A supine (palm up) hand gesture realises [expansion] and functions to open up space for negotiation. Hao and Hood (2019) and Hood and Zhang (2020) also discuss an oscillating movement of the hand as softening focus in relation to the fulfilment or actualisation of a propositional figure, while additionally realising [heteroglossic: expansion]. Heteroglossic [expansion] and [contraction] are frequently realised through the positioning of the hands but can also be expressed through a more general open or closed posture of the body torso or the positioning of the head. An open face (tilted upwards) realising [expansion] will also display relaxed rather than compressed facial muscles.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear ,the system in Figure 5.13 models paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

[2] Importantly, this use of body language requires the prior evolution of language — it is not found in pre-linguistic species — and so is epilinguistic, in terms of Cléirigh's model. This contrasts with the prior discussion in this chapter of the bodily expression of emotion, which is found in pre-linguistic species, and so is protolinguistic, in terms of Cléirigh's model.

Accepting The Biological Nature Of Vocal And Facial Expressions Of Emotion

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 139):

If we accept that natural (i.e. not performed) vocal and facial expressions of emotion are biological in nature (Darwin, 1872; Barlow, 2002), this would suggest resonance across the systems of FACIAL AFFECT and VOICE AFFECT (in the absence of intentional divergence such as in expressions of sarcasm).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the biological nature of vocal and facial expressions of emotion, whether natural or performed, lies in the fact that the organs of organisms are their material basis. Moreover, the fact that the vocal and facial expressions of emotion are not restricted to humans (Darwin 1872) demonstrates that these semiotic systems do not require the prior evolution and development of language, and so are (personal) protolinguistic systems, rather than (interpersonal) AFFECT systems of language.

[2] For amusement, the following illustrates the divergence between the expressed content of protolanguage and the unexpressed content of language.

Problems With Irrealis vs Realis Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 119, 136, 137):

An important distinction in the AFFECT system in language (Table 5.1) is between realis (an emotional response triggered by a present or past happening) and [ir]realis (an emotional response triggered by what might happen). Where the response is irrealis positive this is glossed as ‘desire’ and where it is negative as ‘fear’. However, in the VOICE AFFECT system [fear] is a feature (not simply a gloss) and its realisations are restricted to qualities of voice. Nonetheless the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [fear] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced negative emotion as a response to what might happen, or in the case of (13) to whom the voices might belong. …

In contrast to voiced [fear], the intersemiotic convergence of voiced [anxiety] with the language and action of the unfolding storyline in Coraline can support an interpretation of the voiced emotion as a response to seeing the Ghost Children, that is, a realis happening.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this confuses interpersonal meaning (AFFECT) with experiential meaning (cause, happening). The distinction here is between mental processes of emotion ('realis') and mental processes of desideration ('irrealis').

However, the exclusive association of desire and fear with irrealis is invalid, since both can be triggered by a present or past happening, as demonstrated by He desired her from the moment he saw her and She feared the non-venomous snake the moment she saw it.

[2] Importantly, here the intersemiotic convergence is of the content of paralanguage with the content of language. This is inconsistent with the authors' model of ideational paralanguage, where it is the expression of paralanguage that converges with the content of language.

[3] To be clear, here the authors are anxious to justify their categorisation of 'fear' as irrealis (desiderative), in contrast to 'anxiety', which they categorise as realis (emotive). Their anxiety, however, is unjustified, because 'fear' can be realis, as in She feared the Ghost Children, as well as irrealis, as in She feared that the Ghost Children might harm her.

Foreshadowing Problems With Chapter 5 Analyses

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 115):

Analyses explore the paralinguistic systems of interpersonal sonovergence in which movements of parts of the body or face rise and fall in tune with the intonation contours of the prosodic phonology and interpersonal semovergence in which paralinguistic expressions converge with interpersonal meanings in spoken discourse. … System choices are illustrated in instances from Coraline and discussion focuses on intermodal convergences in expressions of emotion and the enactment of inter-character relations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, sonovergent paralanguage is neither sonovergent nor paralanguage. It is not sonovergent because the bodily expressions diverge from the phonological expressions, and it is not paralanguage because it is language, since the expressions realise the grammatical system of KEY. Again, this is why it is termed 'linguistic' in Cléirigh's model, which the authors in this book rebrand as their own.

[2] As previously explained, the notion of convergence misunderstands paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and the notion of semovergence entails that these expressions realise the content of language. However, since the expression of these meanings (emotions) does not require the evolution and development of language, these systems are protolinguistic, not epilinguistic, which means that the meanings that are expressed are not metafunctional (interpersonal) but microfunctional (personal).

[3] As previously observed, the data used by the authors is not the body language of humans, but representations of body language on clay puppets, as constructed by animators, using the emotion-face coding proposed by Ekman. The data are thus epilinguistic depictions of a protolinguistic system.

Why The Argument For Ideational Convergence (Concurrence) Is Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 94-5):

Here we draw on the concept of commitment ‘which refers to the amount of meaning instantiated as a text unfolds’ (Martin, 2011b: 255) as developed in Martinec (2008) and Martin (2010). 

Language and paralanguage can vary in terms of the amount of meaning that is specified by each semiotic mode. For instance, returning again to the example from the ‘Visit to the Dermatologist’ phase, and as noted in Chapter 1, some entities were committed in the language alone (e.g. the occurrence film in I didn’t film it) and not in the paralanguage. 

There can also be differences in how delicately meaning is committed in language and paralanguage. For example, the needle and the foot bump were more delicately committed in the paralanguage than in language, as far as qualities such as size and shape are concerned. 

So rather than separating gestures into a catalogue of types based on their purported resemblance to things in the world, the approach adopted in this chapter considers how gestures function as a resource which supports ideational meaning-making – focusing on how they concur with ideational discourse semantic selections.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this is the authors' argument for modelling paralanguage as convergent with ideational discourse semantics. It can be characterised as:

Premiss 1: Some meanings are made in language, but not in paralanguage.

Premiss 2: Paralanguage and language vary in the degree to which meanings are specified.

Conclusion: Paralanguage will be modelled as realising the ideational meaning of language.

There are two basic reasons why this argument is fallacious. The first is formal: the conclusion does not logically follow from the premisses, since the variation across modes is distinct from the question of whether one realises ("supports") the other. The second is informal: in the premisses and the conclusion, the authors misunderstand paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system ('gestures'). See further below.

[1] As previously explained (here), Martin's notion of commitment is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis. That is, it confuses systemic delicacy, in this case, with the degree to which a Thing (needle, bump) is expanded by Qualities (size, shape).

[2] As previously explained, it was not the needle that was gestured, but how a needle is held, and it was not simply the bump that was gestured, but the bubbling up of the bump (granuloma) after an injection.

[3] To be clear, both of these alternatives misunderstand paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system ('gestures'), and the second preferred alternative proposes that this expression-only system realises ('supports') the ideational meanings of language.

The first rejected alternative, the only other possibility recognised by the authors, proposes that this expression-only system be categorised in terms of the material order phenomena that the gestures visually resemble.

In Cléirigh's model, the gestures of body language simply realise the meanings of body language, whether used paralinguistically or on their own.

Misunderstanding Paralanguage As An Expression-Only Semiotic System

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 94):

In our social semiotic model, rather than classifying gestures into types, we are concerned with degrees of convergence between gestures and discourse semantic entities, occurrences, qualities – that is, degrees of ideational concurrence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here once again, the authors remind the reader that Cléirigh's model is now their model. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] Again, here the authors repeat their misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that realises ("converges with") the content of language. This misunderstanding invalidates their model, since content and expression are the basic requirement of all semiotic systems, which includes paralanguage.

Confusing Content (Entity Types) With Expression (Gestures)

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 93, 94):

All of these linguistic entity types can be realised concurrently in paralanguage as gestures. Paralinguistic entities are often realised through a flat hand suggesting the boundaries of an object (e.g. parallel hands implying the sides of a box) or through a curved hand suggesting something being held or moulded (e.g. a cupped hand implying the weight or shape of an object). We introduced three entities from the ‘Visit to the Dermatologist’ phase in Chapter 1. In this phase the paralanguage concurred with two entities in the language (needle and bump) (Table 4.2).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again the authors misunderstand paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that realises the content of an instance of language.

[2] To be clear, here the authors have misunderstood linguistic entities that are realised by paralinguistic body language as paralinguistic entities. That is, they have classified content in terms of how it is realised on the expression plane. This is analogous to classifying these discourse semantic units as phonological entities, since this is how they are realised on the expression plane of language.

It will be seen that this basic misunderstanding of stratification, which invalidates their model, leads the authors to present a semantic system network in which all the systems and features are of the expression plane (Figure 4.1).

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. Neither of the first two hand shapes realises the entity 'needle'. The first mimes the manner of holding a needle, and the second mimes the dermatologist's manner of injecting with a needle. Similarly, the third hand shape does not realise the entity 'bump', but the 'bubbling up' of the granuloma after the injection of the steroid.

This, again, is recycled from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from its review: Misinterpreting The Data.

The Contradictions Of 'Different Degrees Of Concurrence'

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 93):

Each phase involves figures and entities that have different degrees of concurrence between language and paralanguage: some are realised only in language, some co-realised in language and paralanguage and some are realised only in paralanguage (see the discussion of mime in Chapter 7). We begin by exploring how entities are multimodally realised in the vlog and then move on to consider figures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by 'concurrence' the authors mean the realisation of the ideational meaning of language in the expression-only system of paralinguistic body language.

[2] To be clear, if ideational meaning is only realised in the expression system of language, there is no concurrence and no paralanguage.

[3] To be clear, if meanings are realised only in body language, then the meanings are not those of the text as an instance of language, so there is no concurrence, since the meanings of the text are not realised in the expression-only system of paralinguistic body language. That is, here the authors incongruously propose a realisation relation between the content potential of language and an expression instance of paralinguistic body language.

[4] To be clear, the discussion of mime in Chapter 7 is recycled from Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 22-6) and discusses the miming of protolinguistic body language. See the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): Mime As Paralanguage.

Foreshadowing Misunderstandings In Chapter 4

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 91, 21):

Chapter 1 provided a brief overview of the ways in which paralanguage can converge semovergently with spoken language in terms of ideational meaning. The reader is reminded that we are not envisaging a one-to-one mapping of these discourse semantic systems to paralinguistic systems but are instead interested in degrees of concurrence between these systems (see Table 1.3).

Chapter 1 described how, in terms of articulation, ideational paralanguage is mimetic – meaning that it resembles a material thing or action (i.e. ‘draws’ a material reality). This chapter provides further details on the ways in which Figures and Elements are supported by paralanguage, and presents system networks modelling this meaning potential.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, the "convergence" and "mapping" here is the realisation relation between the content of language and the expression of body language used paralinguistically. Again, this demonstrates the authors' misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] To be clear, 'concurrence', 'resonance' and 'synchronicity' are three terms for the one idea, 'convergence', and this idea is a misunderstanding of the realisation relation between the language content and paralanguage expression, deriving from authors' misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system. By 'degrees of concurrence', then, the authors mean the degree to which the content of language is realised in paralinguistic expression.

[3] Cf. Cléirigh's original notes (2009) on epilinguistic body language (body epilanguage):

These are body language systems which, like pictorial systems, are made possible by the transition into language, but which are not systematically related to the lexicogrammar of language.  When used in the absence of spoken language, this type of body language is called mime, and it is mimetic in this sense.

The kinological systems are analogous to the articulatory systems of phonology, though they realise meaning rather than wording, and include gestures that involve drawing in the air — ‘where drawing and gesturing merge’ (Matthiessen 2007: 8).

[4] To be clear, 'support' here means realisation. In this chapter, the authors plan to describe how the figures and elements in the semantics of language are realised in their expression-only system of paralanguage. This will lead them to present, as Figure 4.1,  a semantic system network, paralinguistic entity, in which all the systems and features are of the expression plane.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62):

Another group of behaviours from Zappavigna and Martin’s (2018) ‘body protolanguage’ category involves relative uprightness of body posture, frontal or oblique facial and body orientation and the leaning forward or backwards of the torso in relation to the addressee. These expressive movements of the body are similarly independent from any ideational meanings with which they may combine and, similarly to facial movements, may also combine with other interpersonal strands of meaning, whether linguistic (e.g. a variety of spoken mood forms) or paralinguistic (e.g. smiling or widening the eyes). There is thus neither fusion of ideational/interpersonal meaning in relation to ‘content’ nor multimodal fusion in the form of expression. The characteristics of protolanguage as a developmental semiotic are not therefore in evidence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviours' and 'expressive/facial movements' here again betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[3] To be clear, these postures and orientations also occur in other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets. When they are meaningful, they are protolinguistic on the basis that they do not require the evolutionary or developmental emergence of language.

[4] To be clear, on Cléirigh's model, these are simply examples of protolinguistic body language accompanying the ideational or interpersonal meanings of language; that is, of protolinguistic body language being used paralinguistically. 

The authors' confusion here derives from their misunderstanding that such body language expressions realise the metafunctional meanings of the linguistic instance rather than the microfunctional meanings of the protolinguistic instance. This misunderstanding, in turn, derives from the authors' notion of convergence, in which paralanguage expression is said to converge with language content. This misunderstanding, in turn, derives from the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system — a misunderstanding that invalidates their model of paralanguage.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions are irrelevant to a characterisation of protolanguage, since they do not evolve or develop until the emergence of language. The microfunctions are predecessors of the metafunctions, not a fusion of them. On the other hand, as Halliday's previously cited data (Halliday 2004 [1975]: 36) demonstrate, multimodality is not a necessary condition of protolanguage.

[6] To be clear, the characteristics of protolanguage as a developmental semiotic are merely characteristics of protolanguage in relation to the ontogenesis of language. Protolinguistic body language is concerned with protolanguage in its own right, not as a means to a linguistic end. 

Questioning The Notion Of Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60):

This model usefully distinguishes paralinguistic behaviour that can only accompany speech (being closely tied to the interpersonal and textual systems of spoken language) from all the rest. This is our category of sonovergent paralanguage, where paralinguistic expression moves with speech prosodies. The remaining paralinguistic behaviour is divided in Table 2.4 between protolinguistic and semovergent categories, both of which may (but need not) accompany speech. The question, then, is whether it is helpful to separate out some of this expressive behaviour as protolinguistic – which would be to suggest that the adult semiotic communicative system simultaneously deploys language and (paralinguistic) protolanguage.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's 'linguistic body language' as 'sonovergent paralanguage' demonstrates two serious misunderstandings of Cléirigh's model. On the one hand, linguistic body language is not sonovergent, because its gestural expression is divergent from phonology. And on the other hand, it is not paralanguage because it is language (Halliday 1989: 30): like prosodic phonology, it realises the grammatical systems of INFORMATION (textual) and KEY (interpersonal).

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'paralinguistic behaviour' and 'expressive behaviour' confirm the observation made in the previous post that the authors have misunderstood paralanguage to be an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, there is no question that adults simultaneously deploy language and protolanguage.  Halliday (2002[1996]: 389):

Certain features of the human protolanguage, our primary semiotic, persist into adult life; for example expressions of pain, anger, astonishment or fear (rephonologised as “interjections”, like ouch!, oy!, wow! …).

Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425):

Interjections are certainly quite different from adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions; they tend to be protolinguistic remnants in adult languages.

Moreover, the theoretical advantage of separating protolinguistic body language from the other types is that it distinguishes the body language common to all social semiotic species from the body languages that are unique to humans and require the prior evolution and development of language.

The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 42):

These gestures differ from the semovergent ones illustrated thus far in critical ways (cf. McNeill, 2012: 7–10). For one thing they commit very specific meanings and can be readily recognised without accompanying co-text (linguistic or paralinguistic). As part of this specificity they can enact moves in exchange structure on their own, for example, statements and requests, alongside greetings and leave-takings (hand waving), calls (beckoning gestures), agreement (nodding head), disagreement (shaking head), challenges (upright palm facing forward for ‘stop’) and so on. For another they are the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions gesture. And in this regard they are often commented on as culturally specific (e.g. the difference between an Anglo supine hand beckoning gesture and its Filipino prone hand equivalent). In both respects emblems contrast with common-sense dismissals of the paralanguage as idiosyncratic (although none of us has any trouble successfully interpreting another speaker’s sonovergent and semovergent systems). From the perspective of the sign languages of the deaf, emblems most strongly resemble signs; they are expression form gestures explicitly encoding meaning. Similarly, from the perspective of character-based writing systems (such as those of Chinese), emblems most strongly resemble characters (but gestured rather than scribed). 

This indicates that from an SFL perspective emblems are better treated as part of language than as a dimension of paralanguage.

 Blogger Comments:

This is recycled almost verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language.

To be clear, here the authors outline their argument for classifying what Kendon terms 'emblems' as language rather than semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language).

[1] Incidentally, here the authors exemplify the use the word one as a constituent of a conjunctive Adjunct; see the preceding post on the vlogger gesturing the meaning 'one'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, unknown to the authors, the conventionalisation of the meaning of specific gestures in a community corresponds to the move of the sign (content/expression pair) from the instance pole to the system pole of the cline of instantiation.  However, since this can occur in the development of semiotic systems in general — e.g. protolanguage, emoji, pictorial signage — it does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't "commit" meanings, they realise them, since realisation is the relation between expression and content.  'Commitment', on the other hand, in Martin's own terms, is concerned with  instantiation, the relation between potential and instance, though, as previously explained here, the notion derives from Martin's misunderstanding of systemic delicacy.

[4] To be clear, here the authors have switched attention from tone groups to exchange structures in an attempt to fudge their argument.  In their own terms, these moves would constitute examples of interpersonal semovergent paralanguage, since the meaning of these gestures "resonates" or "converges" with the meanings of Martin's interpersonal discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION.  Accordingly, this does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[5] The authors' "argument" here is that because these gestures are regarded as prototypical gestures, they are therefore part of language.

[6] To be clear, on the one hand, some emblems are culturally-specific and some are not.  So culture specificity cannot be used as an argument about emblems as a type.  On the other hand, in any case, the culture-specificity of semiotic systems is not confined to language, as demonstrated, for example, by differences in the protolanguages of separated populations of the same species.

[7] To be clear, Halliday (1989: 30-1) distinguishes paralanguage from indexical features, the latter being those that are peculiar to the individual ("idiosyncratic").  So the authors' argument here is that  emblems are language because they are not indexical features.

[8] As this blog demonstrates, the authors do have trouble in interpreting both the meaning of the vlogger gestures and the type of body language involved.

[9] To be clear, the authors' argument here is that emblems are part of language because their expressions resemble the expressions of language (Sign and Chinese), and that, in the case of one of these, at least, the expressions "explicitly encode" meaning.

On the one hand, if this is true, it applies to all languages, not just Sign and Chinese.  On the other hand, the reason it is not true is that the expressions of Sign and Chinese, encode the wording that encodes meaning, whereas the expressions of emblems only encode meaning.  That is, Sign and Chinese, being languages, are tri-stratal, whereas emblems, not being language, are bi-stratal.  Once again, the authors' argument does not support their claim that emblems are part of language.

[10] As the above clarifications demonstrate, not one of the arguments offered by the authors supports their hypothesis that emblems are part of language.