Misunderstanding Semiosis As Somasis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 124):

Our focus is on the semiosis of facial expression realising emotion in human interaction, but it is important to note that the face can also manifest non-emotional (somatic) states. A frown, for example, might manifest concentrated thinking (Fasel and Luettin, 2003: 260) or physiological states of pain or fatigue (see Chapter 1). Instances of somatic facial expression can of course index purposeful feelings, which remains a challenge for analysts as discussed in Chapter 1. The approach taken in this book is that behaviours can be treated as paralinguistic (i.e. semiotic) depending on whether or not they are negotiated as meaningful in interaction.

Blogger Comments:

This is a very serious misunderstanding. If a facial configuration means ('manifests', indexes') something other than itself, then it is the signifier of a signified, and so semiotic, not "somatic". At the social level, in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of complex systems, some facial configurations select a positive value (e.g. 'approach') in the other, whereas some select a negative value (e.g. 'avoid').

The Designed Representations Of Body Language On Clay Puppets

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 116):

In stop-motion animations such as Coraline story characters are portrayed by puppets. Their movements, body language and facial expressions are designed by animators to match the pre-recorded speech of voice actors. The animations are developed frame-by-frame as animators make very small changes to the puppet’s face or body. Each change is captured as a ‘stop-motion’ or static frame before being collated and camera recorded to create movements in film (Laika Studios, 2017). In films, the characterisation of the main characters conveys the thematic message; accordingly, every facial or body movement of the main puppet characters (including the way they walk) is designed to express meaning – and so everything they do can be interpreted as semiotic rather than somatic behaviour (see Chapter 1; Mohamed and Nor, 2015; van Leeuwen, 2005). That said, the body movements of secondary characters arguably include both semiotic and somatic behaviour in order to progress the storyline. In this chapter we concentrate on the meaningful behaviour of the main characters.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, epilinguistic representations on clay puppets designed by animators are not instances of the body language of a member of socio-semiotic species.

[2] To be clear, the facial postures and movements of all the puppets designed by the animators represent both social and semiotic systems, in terms of Halliday's linear taxonomy of evolutionary complexity.

Confusing Content With Expression, Semiosis With Somasis, And Paralanguage With Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 97):

DEPICTION considers whether the paralinguistic entity has a defined contour that is visually ‘drawn’ in space (by, e.g. drawing the outline of an entity with a pointed finger in the air) or ‘sculpted’ (by, e.g. cupping a hand as in the example in (3)). The features sculpted and drawn correspond to two of Müller’s (1998) four modes of expression used in representational gestures: drawing (tracing the silhouette of an object in the air with a finger or hand) and moulding (sculpting or shaping the form of an object with the hands). 

Müller’s (1998) two other modes, imitating/acting (‘acting out’ an action) and representing/portraying (where the hands represent an object, e.g. a ‘V’ shape made with middle fingers to represent scissors) are dealt with in Chapter 1 in terms of somasis and emblems, respectively.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the term 'paralinguistic entity' confuses discourse semantics (entity) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. To be clear, gestures are expressions that realise semantic entities; they are not the entities — just as phonemes that realise semantic entities are not the entities.

[2] To be clear, the system of DEPICTION confuses content (entity) with its expression (drawn, sculpted).

[3] To be clear, here the authors misunderstand semiosis as nonsemiosis (somasis). A gesture that imitates (mimes) an action represents that action, and as such, is semiotic, since it means something other than the gesture itself.

[4] As seen in Chapter 1, the authors treat emblems as part of language, rather than paralanguage, so here they are claiming that a hand shape that means 'scissors' is language. To be clear, even in their own model, this hand shape semovergently realises the entity 'scissors'. Here again the authors have become confused by taking the view 'from below' (expression) rather than the view 'from above' (content). That is, because the V-shape meaning 'scissors' resembles the V-shape meaning 'two', they have classified it in the same way: as an emblem.

Confusing Epilinguistic Pictures With Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

As we have seen, much of what is assigned to body protolanguage involves the expression of emotions. Here we meet again the challenge of discriminating somasis and semiosis. Nonetheless, in the analysis of visual depiction, Painter et al. (2013) propose VISUAL AFFECT as an interpersonal meaning system complementing that of verbal AFFECT within the linguistic domain of APPRAISAL. 

The details of the system remain unspecified by them, but Martinec (2001) provides networks of meaning options for basic emotions with realisations specified in terms of facial movements. These systems are again treated by him as belonging within the interpersonal metafunction and thus able to be put into play alongside meanings originating from within the other metafunctions. For our own work in this domain, see Chapter 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As we have seen in previous posts, this false claim derives from the authors misconstruing Halliday's microfunctions of protolanguage as types of emotions. See

• The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"
• The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

In Cléirigh's model, following Halliday ((e.g. 2004 [1998]: 18), since emotions are personal states, they are restricted to the personal microfunction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. If body movements and postures mean something other than themselves, emotions, they are semiotic, not merely "somatic" (the authors' confusion of biological and social orders of complexity).

As previously explained, this challenge to the authors only arises from their taking the view 'from below' (body movements and postures) instead of the SFL view 'from above' (the meanings expressed), and this error derives from misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system..

[3] As previously explained, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. This means that its meaning is metafunctionally organised. Painter et al simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in instances of an epilinguistic system. Importantly, the visual depiction of emotions is irrelevant to the issue of protolinguistic body language, since it is not concerned with the meanings that can be made by an organism of a social semiotic species in whom language has not developed. See the earlier post

• Misrepresenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

For a more detailed consideration of the epilinguistic depiction of protolinguistic body language, see the review of Chapter 5 of this publication on interpersonal paralanguage.

[4] As previously explained, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

∞

Most importantly, just as an image of a pipe is not a pipe, an image of body language is not body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Either Somatic Or Interpersonal

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

What is common to most of the meanings assigned by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) to ‘protolinguistic’ microfunctions is that, if not simply somatic, they are interpersonal in nature – but not accommodated by a linguistic model that includes only SPEECH FUNCTION, MOOD and MODALITY in that metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] As previously explained, in Cléirigh's model, protolinguistic body language, by definition, excludes non-semiotic ("somatic") behaviour, and the authors' misunderstanding in this regard derives from taking the view 'from below' (body movement) instead of the view 'from above' (meaning). And, as also previously explained, in terms of orders of complexity, the authors' model of somasis confuses the biological order with the social order, and includes what Halliday (2004: 18) models as protolanguage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As explained in the previous post, this false claim derives from the authors misrepresenting epilinguistic pictorial systems, which do include interpersonal meaning, as protolinguistic body language, which does not.

[4] To be clear, a model of an evolutionarily prior system, protolinguistic body language, is not required to "accommodate" a model of an evolutionarily later system, a linguistic model, any more than a description of therapod dinosaurs must accommodate a description of the birds that evolved from them.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

To explore this, some examples of adult paralinguistic behaviour classified by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) as protolinguistic will be briefly discussed. One group comprises various facial expressions such as smiling, raising, lowering or widening the eyes, opening the mouth and the presence or absence of eye contact with the addressee, all features of ‘social communion’ that predate even protolanguage (see Figure 2.1).  

As has been discussed, during the transition phase there is evidence that facial affect can be separated from other strands of interpersonal expression (e.g. looking happy while saying oh dear) and in the adult semiotic system affective facial expressions can clearly combine freely with any ideational meaning. In these respects, such expression forms are unlike protolinguistic signs, and the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether that instance is somatic or semiotic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviour' and 'expression(s)' here betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstanding arises from again giving priority to the view 'from below', facial expression, instead of the view 'from above', meaning. The meanings of facial expressions cannot predate protolanguage, since protolanguage is the initial semiotic system. Before protolanguage, such facial expressions have a social function only: the selection of value in the other, not a semiotic function: the expression of symbolic value for the other.

[4] Here the authors provide evidence against their own argument. To be clear, a child looking happy while saying oh dear, and an adult combining facial expressions with language are both instances of the paralinguistic use of protolinguistic body language. They are paralinguistic because they are used alongside language, and they are protolinguistic because they are semiotic systems that do require the prior evolution and development of language.

[5] This is misleading. The difference here is only that, in these instances, the protolinguistic signs are being used paralinguistically, rather than pre-linguistically.

[6] To be clear, the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether the instance is social (carries value) or protolinguistic (carries symbolic value). As previously explained, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two distinct orders of complexity: the biological and the social.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Non-Semiotic ("Somatic")

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60-1):

The first point to be made is that some of the phenomena counted as protolinguistic in Zappavigna and Martin (2018) may in fact be somatic rather than semiotic. For example, forms of fidgeting, scratching a cheek or crossing feet may simply be a matter of relieving some bodily discomfort, rather than having symbolic import. It is necessary to have criteria for discriminating somatic and semiotic expression in such cases (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4–1.5), but their ambiguity is not grounds for classing them as protolinguistic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the first of the authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. However, it is an argument against what the authors mistake to be included in the category rather than an argument against the grounds for the category itself.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language is restricted to semiosis, by definition. The criterion for discriminating the semiotic from the non-semiotic is simply that if a gesture or posture means something other than itself, then it is semiotic. If fidgeting, for example, does not mean something other than itself, then it is not semiotic, and so cannot be an expression of protolinguistic body language. If, however, the fidgeting of a young offender facing a tribunal — as in the data — means that he is nervous and 'itching to leave', then it is semiotic, and because such semiosis does not require the prior evolution and development of language, it is protolinguistic.

Importantly, the authors' mistaken notion of there being ambiguity in the interpretation of such cases derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', contrā the SFL method of giving priority to the view 'from above'. That is, the authors ask what the gestures mean, instead of asking how meanings are realised in gesture. This, in turn, derives from the authors misunderstanding body language as an expression-only semiotic system, as previously explained.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two different orders of complexity: biological (behaviour) and social (communion). 

The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 54):

While modelling protolanguage from the perspective of affect does not lend itself as readily to tracking the development of the system as protodialogue (involving calls, greetings, offers, refusals, acknowledgements, playful exchanges) and imaginative play, it has the advantage of emphasising the continuity with the earlier, emotion-charged forms of social communion and of allowing for a clearer focus on the origins of the verbal ATTITUDE system in the adult semantics of APPRAISAL (Martin and White, 2005).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, a model of protolanguage from the perspective of emotion ("affect") is a model of the sensing that might accompany protolanguage — like a model of sensing that might accompany language — not a model of the meaning that is actually expressed. As previously explained, it is not a question of whether protolanguage is "emotion-charged", but of whether it is emotions that constitute the content of what is expressed.

[2] To be clear, it is Halliday's linear taxonomy of complexity that provides a means of understanding the developmental move from pre-semiotic social communion to protolanguage. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

… a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" … . A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is social; it is biological with the added component of value. Again, the value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors.

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver. It is when this value becomes symbolic value that the social system acquires the added component of meaning that makes it a semiotic system: protolanguage.

[3] To be clear, the 'clearer focus' that is allowed by modelling protolanguage from the perspective of emotion ("affect") is the important distinction between the protolanguage systems that are common to all social semiotic species and the language systems that are unique to humans.

Moreover, the ATTITUDE system of AFFECT is concerned with the interpersonal assessment by reference to emotion, not with emotion as experiential meaning. As Halliday (2008: 179-80) explains, as a system of interpersonal assessment, the system of ATTITUDE arises from the systemisation of POLARITY and MODALITY:

In terms of children’s early language development, the interpersonal metafunction provides the prototype of how meanings come to be grammaticalised. The two systems that were first grammaticalised by one small child (Nigel, aged 0;10) were:

POLARITY: positive / negative
MODALITY: VALUE: low / high

followed shortly by the two forms of “appreciation” in conjunction with the feature “positive”:

APPRECIATION (positive): impact (“that’s interesting”) / quality (“that tastes nice”)

Note that these were not yet mother tongue; they were protolanguage, realised by sounds and gestures. But they were systemic, or at least proto-systemic; and they provided the model for the linguistic systems of appraisal, where each lexical item realises the intersection of an appraisal feature with polarity and/or modality.

Somasis: Confusing Biological And Social Orders Of Complexity

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 47-8):

By two or three months of age, then, the infant’s expressive but pre-symbolic behaviour can be modelled, as shown in Figure 2.1, as either ‘biological behaviour’ or ‘social communion’. The former may have meaning for the adult but is unaddressed, while the latter involves shared address but no content. Both are regarded here as examples of ‘somasis’, that is, human vocal and bodily behaviour that is not being deployed for meaning-making.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, bodily behaviour that does not realise meaning is irrelevant to a model of semiotic systems. It has only become an issue here because the authors take the view 'from below', expression, in contradistinction to the SFL perspective 'from above', content.

[2] To be clear, classifying 'social' as 'biological' confuses different orders of complexity. On Halliday's model, which the authors have previously cited, but misunderstood, a social system is of a different order of complexity, because it is a biological system with the added component of value. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 508, 509):

Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. …

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is, as the name implies, social, not biological ('somatic'). That is, it is biological with the added component of value. The value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that have been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors. This can be seen, for example, in the peacock's courtship display, where the fanning of a peacock's tail selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of a peahen. 

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver.

The Semovergent Paralanguage Of PERIODICITY

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 39-40):

As noted in Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2.3, however, the vlogger does end the phase with a contrasting high then lowered pitch. The higher pitch penultimate tone group begins rhythmically speaking with a handclap foot and then a foot comprising the ‘filler’ / um /.

This is followed by the low pitch tone group; the vlogger is winding down. Following this there is a suspension of both language and paralanguage as her eyes shut and her head slumps forward (88).

The preceding phase to the one we are using to explore sonovergence here ends in a similar way (lowered pitch, with eyes shut, head down). So shutting down language and paralanguage and handing over to somasis is clearly a strategy for punctuating longer waves of discourse. It is at these points that the vlogger cuts from one filmic segment to the next (as she thinks of something more to say).

Blogger Comments:

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Semovergent Paralanguage Of PERIODICITY.

[1] As previously explained here, in this instance, the authors mistook a (misanalysed) sequence of tones (language) as voice quality (paralanguage).  On Cléirigh's original model, any gestures consistent with the tone choices are instances of linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage), not epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage), the concern of the present discussion.

[2] Here again, as above, the authors mistake a tone choice for paralanguage, and mistake the "sonovergent" gestures that are "in tune" with the pitch movement as "semovergent".

[3] The unarguable claim here is that ending discourse ('shutting down language and paralanguage and handing over to somasis') is one way ('strategy') of ending discourse ('punctuating longer waves of discourse').

∞

More to the point, the authors are here claiming to present paralinguistic examples of "longer waves of discourse".  In Martin & Rose (2007: 187-218), these are modelled in terms of:

• macro-Theme (introductory paragraph),
• hyper-Theme (topic sentence),
• hyper-New (paragraph summary), and
• macro-New (text summary).

To be clear, the authors have not identified any of the above in the text, and have not identified any semovergent paralanguage "in sync" with them.  Instead, the authors have merely mistaken intonation as paralanguage, and interpreted the unmarked tone for declaratives, tone 1 (and accompanying gestures) as "punctuating" a longer (unnamed) wave of discourse, while ignoring all the other instances of tone 1 (and accompanying gestures) at "non-punctuating" points in the discourse.

Again, the authors have tried to fit the data to their theory, instead of using theory to account for data.

Prosodic Phonology Demarcating Somatic From Semiotic Behaviour

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 26-8):

The contribution of sonovergent paralanguage to the vlog is interrupted in tone group 19 of Appendix B3, suspended for tone groups 20–24 and resumes for tone group 25 (examples (61)–(65)) – to allow for a somatic phase during which the vlogger uses her left hand to scratch her right arm. This phase unfolds as follows:

(61) //3 lighter than it / was a few / days ago

(62) //1 ^ but / yeah it’s

(63) //1 such a / bummer and then I

(64) //2 went to / Target

(65) //3 ^ like / two days / later and there was a //

The vlogger stops looking at her followers and begins scratching in the final foot of (61'). The scratching and absence of gaze continues for two tone groups ((62')–(63')). Gaze resumes in the final foot of (64'). And the vlogger then resumes gesturing in (65'). 

It is interesting to note that the vlogger does not scratch in sync with the RHYTHM, TONICITY and TONALITY of the text; the scratching lasts for two and a half tone groups and does not match the timing of salient and tonic syllables. But the paralanguage remains in sync, stopping precisely at the tonic syllable of (61') (/ days ago //), resuming with a smile precisely at the tonic syllable of (64') (/ Target //) and resuming with gesture precisely at the beginning of (65'). This indicates that synchronicity with prosodic phonology can function as a demarcating criterion for distinguishing somatic from semiotic behaviour.

Blogger Comments:

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): Interpreting Averted Gaze As Non-Semiotic.

[1] To be clear, 'sonovergent paralanguage' is the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's linguistic body language.

[2] Here the authors interpret the breaking of eye-contact with the addressee as non-semiotic behaviour (somasis). The problem with this is that breaking eye-contact with the addressee is just as meaningful (semiotic) as maintaining eye-contact.  In Cléirigh's original model, these are features of protolinguistic body language, the opposition being a human variant of the type of body language also recognisable in other species.

[3] This is hardly surprising, given that scratching an itch is not linguistic body language. In Peircean semiotics, a scratch might be interpreted as an indexical sign, indicating an itch or nervousness.

[4] To be clear, in Cléirigh's original model, a smile is another example of protolinguistic body language, interpreted as a threat in some social species. 

[5]  To be clear, the claim here is that the mere fact that gestures are speech-timed distinguishes them from non-semiotic behaviour.  The reason this is untrue is that, in Cléirigh's original model, only one of the three types of body language, linguistic body language, is speech-timed.  Consequently, 'synchronicity' merely distinguishes linguistic body language from everything else, whether semiotic (protolinguistic or epilinguistic body language) or non-semiotic ('somasis')

Zappavigna & Martin's ‘Linguistic, ‘Epilinguistic, And Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 22, 232-3):

Table 1.3 also provides us with a model for dealing with two dimensions of the relation between language and paralanguage, treated by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) as ‘linguistic body language’ and ‘epilinguistic body language’.²¹

²¹ Zappavigna and Martin’s (2018) dimension of protolinguistic body language has been subsumed in our current model as subtypes of somasis and interpersonal semovergent paralanguage. This avoids the problem of using the term ‘protolinguistic’ for a paralinguistic system making meaning alongside language (protolanguage, as initial emergent semiosis, by definition cannot accompany language), and it makes room for paralinguistic systems enabled by the discourse semantic system of APPRAISAL (see Chapter 2 for further discussion of this point).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here the authors misrepresent Cléirigh's model — protolinguistic, linguistic and epilinguistic body language — as the work of Zappavigna and Martin (2018). Plagiarism is defined as the practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and passing them off as one's own. Without Cléirigh's model of body language, the authors have no model, that is, nothing to rebrand as their model of paralanguage.

[2] This misunderstands Cléirigh's model. Protolinguistic body language cannot be subsumed as subtypes of somasis. On the one hand, protolinguistic body language is semiotic, whereas somasis is non-semiotic. On the other hand, protolinguistic body language does not require the ontogenesis of language, and is found in other socio-semiotic species, whereas epilinguistic body language ('semovergent paralanguage') does require the ontogenesis of language, and is not found in other socio-semiotic species.

[3] On the one hand, this is misleading because it is untrue. Protolanguage does accompany language, as exemplified by interjections in exclamations. Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425):

Interjections are certainly quite different from adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions; they tend to be protolinguistic remnants in adult languages.

On the other hand, it seriously misunderstands the model that the authors are plagiarising. On Cléirigh's model, protolinguistic, linguistic and epilinguistic systems accumulate in the lifetime of a human meaner, and the question then becomes 'How are the meanings of these different semiotic systems expressed in the gestures and postures of body language?'

[4] To be clear, there is no need to 'make room' for paralinguistic systems enabled by APPRAISAL, since these are, by definition, epilinguistic, and so 'semovergent' in the authors' terms. However, this raises the question of whether the paralinguistic systems that the authors identify are enabled by APPRAISAL, or are they to be found also in other protolinguistic species. And if found also in other protolinguistic species, it raises the question of whether the systems are, in Halliday's model of complexity, semiotic (symbolic value) or social (non-symbolic value), as in the exchange of value in eusocial insect colonies.

Using Halliday's Linear Taxonomy Of Complexity To Classify Somatic Behaviours

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 19-20):

As far as somasis is concerned we have found it useful to draw on Halliday’s (1996) proposals for an evolutionary typology of systems. He recognises four orders of complexity, with semiotic systems evolving out of social systems, social systems out of biological ones and biological ones out of physical ones. 

We have adapted this framework in our classification of somatic behaviour, distinguishing physical activity, biological behaviour and social communion.

Physical activity covers material action involving some change in the relationship of one physical entity to another (walking, running, jumping, throwing, breaking, cutting, digging, pulling etc.). 

Biological behaviour can be divided into changes that restore comfort (sneezing, coughing, scratching, laughing, adjusting garments or hair etc.) and those that index discomfort (nail biting, fiddling, fidgeting, wriggling, blushing, shivering, crying etc.). 

Social communion can be divided into mutual perception (sharing gaze, pitch, proximity, touch, smell etc.) and reciprocal attachment (tickling, cradling, holding hands, hugging, stroking, hugging, kissing, mating etc.). These proposals are outlined in Figure 1.7.

… To put this another way, we are arguing that the behaviours outlined in Figure 1.7 can be treated as paralinguistic or not depending on whether or not they are negotiated as meaningful in interaction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, non-semiotic behaviour ("somasis") is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage, and it only arises as an issue because the authors give priority the the view 'from below': gestures, in contradistinction to the methodology of SFL Theory, which gives priority to the view 'from above': meaning.

[2] To be clear, Halliday's model is set out in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 508, 509):

Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. …

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

[3] To be clear, the authors' use of Halliday's model seriously misunderstands it. Halliday's model is concerned with orders of complexity, from atoms to organisms to social structures, where the later orders subsume the earlier orders. The authors' three types of behaviour, in contrast, are mutually exclusive categories of the behaviour of organisms.

[4] To be clear, if any of these behaviours are interpreted as meaning anything other than themselves, then they are interpreted semiotic. Moreover, for Halliday (2004: 18), contrā the authors, 'exchanging attention' is a gloss of the interactional microfunction, and so not only semiotic rather than somatic, but protolanguage.

[5] To be clear, there is no need to argue this, since this is just a definition of (interpersonal) semiosis.

∞

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). See also the comments at:

Confusing Levels Of Complexity With Types Of Behaviour
Interpreting Purportedly Non-Semiotic Behaviours As Semiotic

The Issue Of What Counts As Semiosis And What Does Not

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 18-9):

SFL research on language development in young children has proven a useful starting point for work on paralanguage in two respects. On the one hand, the emergence of the first signs (protolanguage) highlights the issue of what counts as semiosis and what does not. On the other hand, the realisation of these first signs is multimodal – linguistic and paralinguistic resources are not differentiated at this stage. …

The influence of SFL research on the ontogenesis of language on our model of paralanguage is explored in detail in Chapter 2.

One basic challenge that has to be faced when working on paralanguage is how to distinguish it from behaviour – separating semiosis from non-semiosis in other words. …

From this point on we will use the term ‘somasis’ for non-semiotic behaviour (such as sneezing, stretching, scratching an itch and so on) and ‘semiosis’ for systems of signs.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the perspective taken is 'from above': how are these meanings expressed? The issue of what does or does not count as semiosis only arises from taking the opposite perspective 'from below': is or is not this an expression of meaning? That is, the authors have misunderstood SFL methodology, according to which, non-semiotic behaviour is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage.

See also the original comments on this at Misunderstanding The Difference Between Semiosis And Non-Semiosis.

[2] Here yet again, the authors remind the reader that Cléirigh's model of body language is their model of paralanguage. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

To be clear, it is Cléirigh's model of body language that derives from taking an ontogenetic (and phylogenetic) perspective:

• protolinguistic systems are those that develop before language (and persist thereafter);
• linguistic systems are those that develop as language;
• epilinguistic systems are those that develop after language.

The authors rebrand linguistic body language as sonovergent paralanguage, despite it being neither sonovergent nor paralanguage, which invalidates their rebranding of Cléirigh's model.

The authors rebrand epilinguistic body language as semovergent paralanguage, despite it not being restricted to paralanguage, and include within it protolinguistic body language that is used by species without language, and so is not epilinguistic, and reject the notion of protolinguistic body language, consigning the remainder to non-semiosis, as will be seen.