Misrepresenting Matthiessen As Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Register

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207-8):

Modelling concurrence and resonance is more of a challenge. One response would be to quantify the semantic ‘weight’ of the contributions from alternative modalities in terms of degrees of commitment – where commitment refers, following Martin (2010), to the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy of selections from both optional and obligatory systems. Figueredo and Figueredo (2019) outline a quantitative model for measurements of this kind. This would offer us a gauge of how much meaning language and paralanguage were committing but not tell us much about the kinds of meaning involved. 

Another response, perhaps better suited to this shortcoming, would be to turn to a higher-order semiotic such as register (Matthiessen, 2007) or genre (Bateman, 2008) and assign it responsibility for the distribution of meaning across modalities. Models of this kind take advantage of work on the relation of hierarchically organised categories in language (i.e. system realised in structure, higher ranks realised by lower ones and more abstract strata realised through more concrete ones) to explore intermodality – in effect treating co-instantiation across modalities as if it were realisation within a modality.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis. That is, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do. But Martin also confuses 'delicacy' in the technical sense of a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' in the sense of a scale of decreasing generality in a hyponymic taxonomy experiential meanings. See the earlier post Why Martin's Notion Of Commitment Is Invalid.

[2] This is very misleading indeed, because it knowingly misrepresents Matthiessen as supporting Martin's misunderstanding of register as a higher-order semiotic. Matthiessen, of course, follows Halliday in modelling register as a language variation (instantiation), not as a system more abstract than language (stratification).

[3] This confuses constituency (rank scale) with symbolic abstraction (realisation). All ranks are of the same level of symbolic abstraction, so a higher rank is not realised by a lower rank.

[4] To be clear, here the authors advocate making the same type of theoretical error that Martin made in his misunderstanding of register. With register, Martin modelled different types of language in terms of a more abstract stratum, and here he proposes modelling different types of semiotic system in terms of a more abstract stratum.

Blatantly Claiming Credit For Cléirigh's Work

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199):

We used metafunction to distinguish between paralanguage systems converging with ideational, interpersonal or textual meaning (Figure 7.3).

Seen in these terms, sonovergent paralanguage resonates with interpersonal meaning and syncs with textual meaning; there is no sonovergent concurrence with ideational meaning. Semovergent paralanguage on the other hand resonates with interpersonal meaning, coordinates with textual meaning and concurs with ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed, because these distinctions were already present in Cléirigh's model, below, and were not the work of the authors. The plagiarism in this work is more blatant when Martin is the author, as in this chapter.

Linguistic ("sonovergent"):

Epilinguistic ("semovergent"):

Importantly, "sonovergent paralanguage" is the linguistic realisation of grammatical systems, and "semovergent paralanguage", being epilinguistic, has no grammar, but has meaning that derives from the fact that its users have a grammar.

On The Truth Of The Authors' Claim That They Didn't Relate Paralanguage To Grammatical Structure

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198-9):

With the exception of mime (discussed later in the chapter) and some pointing deixis (discussed in Chapter 6), paralanguage converges with the intonation and rhythm of spoken language in our data. This argues for a linguistically informed model of prosodic phonology as a prerequisite for the analysis of paralanguage. It also provides one useful criterion for distinguishing somasis from semiosis (since somatic behaviour is not coordinated with prosodic phonology). 

Note that in relating paralanguage to discourse semantics rather than lexicogrammar, we are suggesting that the grammatical structure of a spoken language (specifically, the nature of its syntagms) is not relevant to its paralanguage. In this respect paralanguage resembles the ‘language-neutral’ sign language of the North American Plains Indians, but not the sign languages of Australia’s indigenous communities (Kendon, 2004: 299–303), at least for their more proficient signers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously, paralanguage that "converges" with intonation and rhythm is not paralanguage, but language that realises the grammatical systems of KEY and INFORMATION by bodily means other than the vocal tract.

[2] To be clear, semiosis makes meaning, "somasis" does not.

[3] This is misleading, because the authors have related "sonovergent" paralanguage, explicitly or implicitly, to the grammatical systems of KEY, INFORMATION and THEME. On the other hand, the body language that the authors call "semovergent" is epilinguistic, and so has no grammar. 

To be clear, the reason why the authors related paralanguage to discourse semantics is that discourse semantics is Martin's model (of cohesion as semantics), though the ideational 'discourse' semantics used was, in truth, the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rebranded by Martin's former student, Hao.

[4] Here the authors misrepresent the Sign language of the North American Plains Indians as not having a content plane that is stratified into semantics and grammar, the distinguishing feature of language.

Why The Model Of Paralinguistic Periodicity Is Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 194):

In spoken English, prominence is composed through the TONALITY, TONICITY and RHYTHM systems of prosodic phonology. It is also composed in multiple layers of predictive prominence in discourse, from clause-level Theme to hyper-Theme to layer upon layer of macro-Theme, and in layers of aggregating prominence from clause-level New to hyper-New and so on.

In the face-to-face discourse of live lectures we have noted the potential for expressions of prominence at multiple layers in discourse to synchronise aurally with prosodic phonology and visually with PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. Such intermodal convergences amplify the prominence of the meanings involved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in spoken English, the phonological resources for assigning prominence are TONICITY and RHYTHM. TONALITY is the system for selecting the distribution of tone groups.

[2] To be clear, the grammatical resources for assigning prominence are "clause-level" Theme and "information unit-level" New. As previously demonstrated, the authors' avoidance of the information unit allowed them to make an unwarranted connection between grammatical Theme and discourse semantic hyper-Theme and macro-Theme.

As previously pointed out, Martin's 'hyper-Theme', 'macro-Theme' and 'hyper-New' are rebrandings of terms from writing pedagogy: 'topic sentence', 'introductory paragraph' and 'paragraph summary' respectively.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. All the authors have done is describe the movement of a lecturer around his lecturing space and correlated his position in space with what he was saying at the time. They provided no evidence that the position assigns prominence, or that it realises the correlated discourse semantic category, such that the position identifies the meaning or the meaning identifies the position.

Significantly, the authors produced no system networks to theorise their system of PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY, their system of meaning named after a structure type.

Problems With The Authors' Scope And Demarcation Analysis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 176-7):

In example (15) the PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS identifies time as [virtual:location] and selects for both SCOPE and DEMARCATION. 

In image 1 in (15), the ‘pinch’ point of left thumb and index finger selects for SCOPE as [narrow], as does the left index finger point in image 2. Both these vectors contrast with the right-hand vector in image 2 where an open palm with spread fingers and thumb configures SCOPE as relatively [broad]. The narrow pinch point in image 1 syncs sonovergently with today and semovergently with the meaning of the narrowly defined time reference. The relatively broad righthand point in image 2 syncs sonovergently with future and semovergently with the relatively open time reference. 

The PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS in (15) also selects for DEMARCATION as [delineation]. In the second image, the left index finger extends outwards from the body, sustaining its semovergence with today. The left index finger delineates a boundary line, a [virtual:location] from which time stretches into the future, the [virtual:location] identified to the right. Our data suggest that the selection of [virtual:semiotic], whether [prospective] or [retrospective], does not select for either relative SCOPE or DEMARCATION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, this is an example of using body language to make endophoric reference, with the left-right dimension of interpersonal space ideationally construing the past-future dimension of interpersonal time, and the pointing gesture signalling that the meanings 'present' and 'future' are recoverable from those construals by body language. Again, the vector is "resolved" and so the "deixis" is not virtual.

[2] To be be clear, selecting features from systems is the process of instantiation, and it is not a (more inclusive) system that does the selecting.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't instantiate ('select') content plane features, they realise them. That is, the authors here confuse interstratal realisation with system instantiation.

[4] To be clear, it is the expression (hand shape) that is broad or narrow, not the content. As previously explained, on the authors' model, this hand shape realises the ENGAGEMENT feature 'expansion'.

[5] To be clear, the timing of the gesture is linguistic and textual, because, like the tonic, it realises the focus of New information, in this case: today and future.

[6] To be clear, the gesture points to a spatial location that symbolises a temporal location. Any location can be construed as a boundary between other locations, but there is no evidence here that the gesture construes the location as a boundary. This is a case of making the data fit the theory instead of using the theory to account for the data.

Problems With The Deixis Feature 'Tracing'

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 176):

The feature [tracing] is realised through a dynamic vector which identifies a part or quality (e.g. shape) of an entity through movement. In (14), a biochemistry lecturer is describing the structure of a water molecule. He traces with his index finger a 90° angle on a projected image of the atoms which compose a water molecule. The tracing motion is shown in arrows in the three sequential images as his index finger moves from right to left and then down. This movement is retraced multiple times in sync with the duration of underlined wordings. The retracing is interrupted in sync with the verbal reset (I’m sorry).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the feature 'tracing' is not deictic, because it does not make distinctions by reference to the here-&-now of the speaker/gesturer. Moreover, it is not a feature of the content plane, since like its realisation statement 'insert motion', it characterises the expression that realises content.

[2] To be clear, this gesturing makes a sequence of references that are exophoric to paralanguage. The efficacy of this type of body language diminishes rapidly with distance between the gesture and the referent.

Misrepresenting The Relative Size Of Referents As Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 174):

The three images in (10) show variations in SCOPE of paralinguistic deixis through vectors expressed with hand or fingers. SCOPE varies from relatively [broad] via the palm of the hand in image 1, to relatively [narrow] via an index finger in image 2, to maximally [narrow] via a little finger in image 3.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these gestures make exophoric reference to metaphenomena in the environment of the paralanguage through physical contact. The identity that recoverable from the different finger gestures in the second and third images is a written word [narrow], whereas the identity that recoverable from the splayed hand gesture is a written paragraph [broad]. The efficacy of the latter gesture diminishes rapidly with distance between the gesture and the referent. Again, 'broad' and 'narrow' are features that distinguish the size of referents. They are not deictic in function because they do not make distinctions with regard to the here-&-now of the speaker/gesturer.

Problems With The 'Deictic' Systems Of Range: Scope And Demarcation

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 173, 169):

To the partial system network of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS presented in Figure 6.2 we now add a simultaneous system of RANGE in Figure 6.3. …

RANGE itself involves choices in two simultaneous systems, SCOPE and DEMARCATION. SCOPE concerns the relative mass (volume or quantity) of phenomena identified in an expression of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS. The slanted square bracket indicates a graded (rather than an either/or) system – a pointing gesture can be relatively [narrow] or [broad] in SCOPE.

The selection of SCOPE as relatively [narrow] or [broad] can support the identification of the quantity or volume of entities encompassed in a deictic gesture – for example, as a single entity among others or as an entire group of entities.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained for Figure 6.2, the upper network is not a system of DEIXIS, but a classification of referents in the environment of body language. Some of the referents are distinguished in terms of deixis (self vs other, 'home' vs 'away'), but most are not (actual vs virtual, semiosis vs location, retrospective vs prospective). Moreover, the network presents referents as realised by the gestures that point to them (cf. referent 'dog' realised by reference item 'this'), and in four cases, referents are realised by the insertion (+) of a pointing gesture into some unacknowledged structure. And in one case, the feature 'virtual', the referent is realised by the structural insertion of a gesture that does not point to it (+ unresolved vector).

Of the extensions to Figure 6.2 in Figure 6.3, the system of SCOPE is also not a system of DEIXIS, but a classification of referents — their scope — in the environment of body language (see also the following post). On the other hand, the system of DEMARCATION is not a system of DEIXIS, because deixis is concerned with distinctions in relation to the speaker, whereas demarcation is not. And the feature 'tracing' is said to be realised by the insertion (+) of motion into some unacknowledged structure.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of 'Actual' Paralinguistic Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 166, 167): 

Example (2) illustrates contrasting instances accompanying the verbal text you’re wearing a stripy shirt – explain this image to me. In each of the three frames a resolved vector is expressed with a hand or index finger point. …  In the first two frames the point is directed outwards selecting [other], first to a student and then to a projected image. In the third it is directed back to the lecturer, selecting [self].

Each of the entities identified through deictic paralanguage in (2) is also tracked exophorically in the spoken text – to a student (you), to a thing (this image) and to the lecturer herself (me). However, as revealed in the first two images in (2), the resolution of the paralinguistic vector does not sync sonovergently with the verbal expressions of identification (i.e. you and this) but rather with the underlined lexis realising relevant entities – specifically the stripy quality of a student’s clothing and the thing entity image. 

In the third image the PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is synchronous with the presuming pronoun me which identifies the entity (lecturer). In this instance me is not salient as might be expected. 

This is accounted for in that the synchronous deictic gesture in image 3 is part of a gestural flow that begins on ‘explain’ and culminates with the completion of the tone group – in this case a tail that follows the tonic. The gestural movement maps the flow of information from ‘about what’ to ‘to whom’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the selection of the features 'other' and 'self' is instantiation. The relation between a pointing gesture and these features is realisation.

[2] To be clear, these three pointing gestures are exophoric to the environment of paralanguage. The features 'other' and 'self', on the other hand, distinguish the referents in the environment of paralanguage (in terms of deixis), not the paralinguistic means of referring to them.

[3] To be clear, this confuses two distinct textual functions of body language: reference and salience. The function of the pointing gesture is reference, and this is a feature of epilinguistic body language, as demonstrated by the fact that members of other species, such as rainbow lorikeets, do not respond to them as meaningful. The function of the timing of the beat of a gesture with speech is salience, and it is a feature of linguistic body language because it serves the same function as the beats of speech rhythm.

The direction of the pointing gestures identifies the referents (you, image), whereas the timing of the beat of the gestures highlights elements as salient (stripy, image), both of which, despite the authors' phonological analysis, are likely to be tonic, with each realising a focus of New information.

[4] To be clear, if the pointing gesture is timed to beat with me, it highlights me as salient. This suggests that the phonological analysis mistakes a salient syllable for a non-salient one. A more congruent rhythm would be:

// 1 ‸ex/plain this / image to / me // 

[5] To be clear, this gallant attempt does not account for the supposed lack of salience, since a lack of salience has to be explained in terms the function of salience — to highlight a potential focus of information — which the authors' account does not do. 

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of A Discourse Move

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 156, 157-8):

In Coraline’s first encounter with Wybie, a boy of her own age from the same neighbourhood, he accuses her of being a water witch to which she responds: //3 ^ and if / I’m a / water / witch //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. The focus in (30) is on the second tone group of this utterance, that is, //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. … 

In the spoken language of this tone group there is apparently no resonant inscribed or invoked linguistic AFFECT. However, before we assume a divergent semovergent relation, there is more to be considered in the verbal and imagic co-text. 

The spoken language in (30) configures a question through a wh- interrogative on a falling tone 1 (signalling ‘certainty’). Taken in conjunction with the PARALINGUISTIC expressions [anger], this discourse move (then where’s the secret well) can be interpreted as a rhetorical question, one that challenges Wybie’s judgemental accusation that she is a water witch. From the perspective of affiliation and the negotiation of bonds (Section 5.3.4), Coraline is forcefully rejecting the coupling proposed by Wybie.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'certainty' realised by tone 1 is 'polarity known'. Halliday (1994: 302):

[2] This misunderstands both the text and the notion of a rhetorical question. A rhetorical question is one that does not demand information from an addressee. The question then where’s the secret well is not rhetorical, because demands from the addressee the information that would validate the proposition that she is a water witch.

Problems With The System Of Paralinguistic Power

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 150-1):

Social relations of relative POWER in images relate to the vertical angle of viewing in Kress and van Leeuwen (2006). In Painter et al. (2013) it relates to the vertical positioning of one character’s body in relation to another. In van Leeuwen (1999), POWER is also discussed as an aspect of interpersonal meaning afforded by the voice; the higher in pitch and the louder the voice is, the more dominant the speaker. The system of PARALINGUISTIC POWER in Figure 5.17 opposes features of equal and unequal on a cline and realised through the vertical positioning of bodies in relation to each other. The features of relative pitch and loudness are not identified as realisations in Figure 5.17.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim here is that the loud, high-pitched cry of a depicted child is dominant, whereas the soft, low pitch of the depicted child's adult male teacher is subordinated. This is also indirectly at odds with the fact that female newsreaders are trained to lower the pitch of their voice in presenting authoritative stories of events.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that a depicted head of a tall person is dominant, whereas a depicted head of a short person is subordinated, and a depicted teacher and student of the same height are equal in power.

[3] On the contrary.

[4] Like previous systems in this chapter, the system in Figure 5.17 models paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [4]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 104, 105):

Where an entity is present in the paralinguistic realisation of an occurrence figure this entity may change, [transformative] versus [non-transformative] in either size, [increase] versus [decrease] or [shape]. These options are outlined in Figure 4.5. If it remains a constant size or shape, it may impact another entity in the gestural space, [impacting] versus [non-impacting].

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' and 'paralinguistic figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.5 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (entitied occurrence figure) with both discourse semantic features (entitied, non-entitied) and expression plane features (transformative, size, increase, decrease, shape, non-transformative, impacting, non-impacting).

Moreover, realisation statements like 'insert entity' specify a constraint on structural configuration — cf. insert Agent — but no structural configuration for occurrence figures has been identified.

Confusing Discourse Semantics And Expression In A System Network [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 101-2):

The system network in Figure 4.2 outlines the paralinguistic figures which can concur with these kinds of meanings. It distinguishes between paralinguistic occurrence figures, in which a paralinguistic entity is involved in an activity, and paralinguistic state figures, where a paralinguistic entity is manifested. Each type of paralinguistic figure can be positioned in space, relative to the neutral position adopted by a speaker where most of their gestures occur (in front of the speaker’s solar plexus with elbows slightly bent). Paralinguistic state figures necessarily involve an entity; paralinguistic occurrence figures necessarily involve motion (as specified by the realisation statements following the downward slanting arrows in the network).

 Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the terms 'paralinguistic entity' 'paralinguistic figure' confuse discourse semantics (entity, figure) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. The system network in Figure 4.2 further demonstrates this confusion by presenting a discourse semantic network (figure) with expression plane systems and features (positioned, neutral). This confusion is compounded by including one discourse semantic feature (state figure) realised by the insertion of a constituent discourse semantic feature (entity), and the other discourse semantic feature (occurrence figure) realised by an expression plane feature (motion).

Confusing Semantic Entities With The Gestures That Realise Them

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 96-7):

Paralinguistic entities may also vary in terms of SIZE relative to the amount of gestural space taken up by the prosodic unfolding of gestures in a stretch of discourse. In other words they may be, for instance, bigger or smaller than other entities that have occurred up to a given point in the speaker’s discourse. For example, the ‘heaping bowl of Chex Mix’ gesture in (3) is large relative to the ‘applesauce squeeze’ gesture in (1) that it precedes.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, terms such as 'paralinguistic entity' confuse discourse semantics (entity) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system (size, gestural space, gestures, bigger, smaller). To be clear, the gestures are the expressions that realise the semantic entities; they are not the entities — just as the phonemes that realise semantic entities are not the entities.

Confusing Semantic Content With Its Paralinguistic Expression

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 96):

Alternatively, the paralinguistic entity may be shaped as either two- or three-dimensional, with rounded or straightened hands and fingers. For example, the vlogger gestures defined entities when referring to the bump formation of the granuloma on her foot (2).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, terms such as 'paralinguistic entity' confuse discourse semantics (entity) with paralanguage misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system (shape, gesture).

[2] To be clear, the terms 'shaped', 'gestures' and 'referring to' function here to express the realisation relation between paralinguistic expression and linguistic content:

• a linguistic entity may be realised as either two- or three-dimensional, with rounded or straightened hands and fingers;
• the vlogger's gestures realise defined entities;
• the vlogger's gestures realise the bump formation (but see [3] below).

[3] Again, this hand shape realises the 'bubbling up' of the granuloma after the injection of the steroid.

Misrepresenting Expression Stratum Systems As A Semantic Stratum Network

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 95-6):

In terms of how they are construed in paralanguage, entities vary across two main dimensions – SPECIFICITY and DEPICTION, as represented in the system network in Figure 4.1. SPECIFICITY deals with how much meaning is committed in terms of shape and size, while DEPICTION addresses how the entity is visually formed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here the authors misrepresent systems of expression stratum features as a semantic stratum network. This confusion follows directly from their previous misunderstanding of linguistic entities that are realised by paralinguistic expressions as paralinguistic entities, thereby classifying content in terms of how it is realised on the expression plane. This is analogous to classifying these discourse semantic units as phonological entities, since this is how they are realised on the expression plane of language. Cf.:

In terms of how they are "construed" in phonology, entities vary across two main dimensions – PLACE and MANNER (of articulation).

This error invalidates the authors' network — a network being a theory of the system (Halliday). 

[2] To be clear, the relation between meaning and expression/form is realisation.

Misunderstanding Paralanguage As An Expression-Only Semiotic System

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 94):

In our social semiotic model, rather than classifying gestures into types, we are concerned with degrees of convergence between gestures and discourse semantic entities, occurrences, qualities – that is, degrees of ideational concurrence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here once again, the authors remind the reader that Cléirigh's model is now their model. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] Again, here the authors repeat their misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that realises ("converges with") the content of language. This misunderstanding invalidates their model, since content and expression are the basic requirement of all semiotic systems, which includes paralanguage.

Misunderstanding Realisation

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 93):

Entities are the ideational discourse semantic units construing items in a field of experience. The primary types of entity are thing entities (a person, place, or object), activity entities (an activity or sequence of activities) and semiotic entities (verbiage or ideas).

In the Chatty Vlog, the ‘National Night Out’, ‘Hair Dye’, ‘Caring for Children (A)’, ‘Dermatology’ and ‘Parking Lot’ episodes tend to realise concrete thing entities from the fields of domestic/daily life and medicine (e.g. people, neighbours, kids, feet, syringe). 

By way of contrast, the ‘Social Media’ phase at the end of the vlog, where the vlogger reflects on her own social media posting practices and goals, tends to realise fewer thing entities and more semiotic entities relating to her social media text production (e.g. vlog, text message, clips, videos, comments). 

Activity entities are not common (one example being vacation in the Intro) in the vlog. Examples from other studies include entities that realise activity sequences such as method, pipette calibration, study and experiment (in scientific discourse; Hao, 2015, 2020b; Hao and Hood, 2019).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the discourse semantics of Martin (1992: 326), the only experiential unit proposed is the message part, which in the lexicogrammar 'is realised congruently as a lexical item'. The discourse semantic unit, entity, presented here, on the other hand, is that of Martin's former student, Hao, which, as will be seen, involves inconsistencies deriving from misunderstandings of the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[2] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands the notion of realisation in SFL Theory, since it presents a episode/phase of discourse realising a discourse semantic unit, entity. These are at the same level of symbolic abstraction, whereas realisation is the relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[3] Again, this seriously misunderstands the notion of realisation in SFL Theory, though in a more convoluted way. In Martin (1992) activity sequences are misunderstood as context rather than semantics (evidence here). So here the authors use 'realise' in a way that consistent with the misunderstandings in Martin (1992), since a semantic entity is a lower level of symbolic abstraction than a contextual activity sequence. 

However, this consistency with the misunderstandings in Martin (1992) is inconsistent with Martin's later work, Martin & Rose (2007: 100ff) where 'activity sequence' is relocated to the discourse semantic stratum in the experiential system of IDEATION. That is, in terms of Martin's more recent work, there is no realisation relation between entity and activity sequence because both are positioned at the same level of symbolic abstraction.

The Contradictions Of 'Different Degrees Of Concurrence'

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 93):

Each phase involves figures and entities that have different degrees of concurrence between language and paralanguage: some are realised only in language, some co-realised in language and paralanguage and some are realised only in paralanguage (see the discussion of mime in Chapter 7). We begin by exploring how entities are multimodally realised in the vlog and then move on to consider figures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by 'concurrence' the authors mean the realisation of the ideational meaning of language in the expression-only system of paralinguistic body language.

[2] To be clear, if ideational meaning is only realised in the expression system of language, there is no concurrence and no paralanguage.

[3] To be clear, if meanings are realised only in body language, then the meanings are not those of the text as an instance of language, so there is no concurrence, since the meanings of the text are not realised in the expression-only system of paralinguistic body language. That is, here the authors incongruously propose a realisation relation between the content potential of language and an expression instance of paralinguistic body language.

[4] To be clear, the discussion of mime in Chapter 7 is recycled from Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 22-6) and discusses the miming of protolinguistic body language. See the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): Mime As Paralanguage.

Foreshadowing Misunderstandings In Chapter 4

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 91, 21):

Chapter 1 provided a brief overview of the ways in which paralanguage can converge semovergently with spoken language in terms of ideational meaning. The reader is reminded that we are not envisaging a one-to-one mapping of these discourse semantic systems to paralinguistic systems but are instead interested in degrees of concurrence between these systems (see Table 1.3).

Chapter 1 described how, in terms of articulation, ideational paralanguage is mimetic – meaning that it resembles a material thing or action (i.e. ‘draws’ a material reality). This chapter provides further details on the ways in which Figures and Elements are supported by paralanguage, and presents system networks modelling this meaning potential.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, the "convergence" and "mapping" here is the realisation relation between the content of language and the expression of body language used paralinguistically. Again, this demonstrates the authors' misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] To be clear, 'concurrence', 'resonance' and 'synchronicity' are three terms for the one idea, 'convergence', and this idea is a misunderstanding of the realisation relation between the language content and paralanguage expression, deriving from authors' misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system. By 'degrees of concurrence', then, the authors mean the degree to which the content of language is realised in paralinguistic expression.

[3] Cf. Cléirigh's original notes (2009) on epilinguistic body language (body epilanguage):

These are body language systems which, like pictorial systems, are made possible by the transition into language, but which are not systematically related to the lexicogrammar of language.  When used in the absence of spoken language, this type of body language is called mime, and it is mimetic in this sense.

The kinological systems are analogous to the articulatory systems of phonology, though they realise meaning rather than wording, and include gestures that involve drawing in the air — ‘where drawing and gesturing merge’ (Matthiessen 2007: 8).

[4] To be clear, 'support' here means realisation. In this chapter, the authors plan to describe how the figures and elements in the semantics of language are realised in their expression-only system of paralanguage. This will lead them to present, as Figure 4.1,  a semantic system network, paralinguistic entity, in which all the systems and features are of the expression plane.