Misunderstanding Emblems As An Expression Form Of Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 203, 204):

In reviewing our proposals for sonovergent and semovergent systems, it is important to keep in mind that we are treating emblems as part of the expression form of language and not as paralanguage (Figure 7.4) – and thus excluded thumbs-up or thumbs-down (as praise or censure), index finger touching lips (for ‘quiet please’), hand cupped over ear (for ‘I can’t hear’) and so on from our description. Our reasoning was presented in Chapter 1, Section 1.6. This was the basis of our argument that semovergent paralanguage cannot be used to support NEGOTIATION by distinguishing move types in dialogic exchanges (although sonovergent paralanguage can of course support tone choice in relation to these moves).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, emblems involve both content and expression, and so are not merely an expression form. Moreover, they are not language because their content plane is not stratified into semantics and grammar. Instead, the use emblems requires the prior evolution and development of language, as demonstrated by the fact that other species do not use them, and so are classified as 'epilinguistic' in Cléirigh's model, which does indeed make them 'semovergent' in the authors' model. See also the previous post: Emblems As Language Expressions.

[2] Figure 7.4 misrepresents all language content as 'form'. To be clear, the only form on the content plane is the formal constituency of grammar: clause, phrase, group, word, morpheme.

[3] See the previous post: The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language.

[4] To be clear, the authors (p202) have themselves presented an instance of a move type, a gestured command, but failed to recognise it as a SPEECH FUNCTION:

She then mimes his ideational paralanguage as he twice gestures for her to leave (including a deictic pointing gesture).

Mime As Semovergent Paralanguage That Does Not Accompany Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 200-1, 202-3):

An important exception to these principles is what is commonly referred to as mime. In terms of our model mime is semovergent paralanguage that does not accompany language, an apparent contradiction in terms. To explore this further we will return to a miming segment in our vlogger’s ‘Parking Lot’ phase. …

In this sequence, there is a miming segment where tone groups might have been, as the vlogger mimes the paralanguage of her parking spot assailant. She first mimes his exasperation. 

She then mimes his ideational paralanguage as he twice gestures for her to leave (including a deictic pointing gesture).

The third time his motion gesture is mimed in fact concurs with language.

As we can see, the two miming segments are heavily co-textualised by language that makes explicit what is going on. The orientation to the narrative introduces the recurrent problem of someone following the vlogger in a parking lot and waiting for her to leave. The miming segments are introduced with an incomplete tone group //3 cars be- / hind him and he was like // [mimics man’s gesture and expression] //, with a missing Tonic segment. The vlogger then mimes the expected information before making it linguistically explicit in a tone group converging with the third iteration of the gesture.  

Setting aside the mime performances of mime artists (the ‘art of silence’ Marcel Marceau referred to), we can predict that co-textualisation of this kind is a generalisable pattern as far as semovergent paralanguage (in the absence of language) is concerned. What the moment of mime does not provide as far as language is concerned, the immediately preceding and following co-text does. The convergent nature of semovergent paralanguage as a recurrent pattern is clear.

Blogger Comments:

With the exception of the correction of 'pantomime' to 'mime', all but the first paragraph is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26). See the original review at Mime As Paralanguage.

[1] Importantly, this is an instance of using body language to depict body language. In Cléirigh's original model, the miming body language is epilinguistic, since it is a depiction that is only made possible by the ontogenesis of language, as evinced by the inability of other animals to do it.

The body language of the motorist, on the other hand, is at first protolinguistic (personal microfunction: exasperation) and then epilinguistic (SPEECH FUNCTION: gesturing a command for her to leave).

[2] As the authors demonstrate, this type of mime does indeed accompany language, thereby invalidating their model of mime as semovergent paralanguage that does not accompany language.

[3] Significantly, the authors do not actually identify the system of linguistic meaning that the mime is said to converge with in their model, being only concerned to relate this semovergent paralanguage to phonology, as if it were sonovergent instead. The authors frequently state categorically that paralanguage cannot "converge" with NEGOTIATION (p29, 34, 38, 203), which the gesture of a command, above, clearly contradicts.

Misunderstanding Textual Prominence

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 183, 184):

A paralinguistic beat can also give prominence to interpersonal meaning. The hand beat in image 5 of (17'') not only syncs with the final tonic segment form, but its low-falling trajectory is interpersonally ‘in tune with’ the major pitch contour of a falling tone 1 (see Chapters 3 and 5) – prominence is thus added to the meaning of this tone (here, providing information). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because the hand beat serves the same linguistic tonicity, it gives prominence to whatever metafunctional meaning it highlights as the New element of an information unit.

[2] To be clear, form is the tonic syllable, not the tonic segment. The tonic segment begins with the tonic foot and includes all subsequent feet in the tone group.

[3] To be clear, the direction of a beating gesture does not distinguish tones. For example, there is no rising beat for tone 2, no level beat for tone 3, no fall-rise beat for tone 4, and no rise-fall beat for tone 5. A downward movement is the default direction, regardless of the tone.

[4] This confuses the textual function of TONICITY with the interpersonal function of TONE. The choice of tonic prominence realises the choice of New information, whereas the choice of tone realises the choice of KEY for a given choice of MOOD. The choice of tonic gives prominence to an element of structure, not to the choice of tone.

[5] This confuses SPEECH FUNCTION (semantics) with KEY (lexicogrammar). 'Giving information' (statement) is SPEECH FUNCTION, and it is realised in the grammar by MOOD. The system of TONE, on the other hand, realises the system of KEY for a given MOOD.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of A Discourse Move

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 156, 157-8):

In Coraline’s first encounter with Wybie, a boy of her own age from the same neighbourhood, he accuses her of being a water witch to which she responds: //3 ^ and if / I’m a / water / witch //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. The focus in (30) is on the second tone group of this utterance, that is, //1 ^ then / where’s the secret / well //. … 

In the spoken language of this tone group there is apparently no resonant inscribed or invoked linguistic AFFECT. However, before we assume a divergent semovergent relation, there is more to be considered in the verbal and imagic co-text. 

The spoken language in (30) configures a question through a wh- interrogative on a falling tone 1 (signalling ‘certainty’). Taken in conjunction with the PARALINGUISTIC expressions [anger], this discourse move (then where’s the secret well) can be interpreted as a rhetorical question, one that challenges Wybie’s judgemental accusation that she is a water witch. From the perspective of affiliation and the negotiation of bonds (Section 5.3.4), Coraline is forcefully rejecting the coupling proposed by Wybie.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'certainty' realised by tone 1 is 'polarity known'. Halliday (1994: 302):

[2] This misunderstands both the text and the notion of a rhetorical question. A rhetorical question is one that does not demand information from an addressee. The question then where’s the secret well is not rhetorical, because demands from the addressee the information that would validate the proposition that she is a water witch.

Negotiation: Meaning Beyond The Clause

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 15):

In terms of meaning beyond the clause NEGOTIATION allows us to relate moves in conversation, including moves comprising several clauses (as in the following request and compliance sequence):

(42)

Tell us why you left the parking lot.

⇓⇑

- I had just got in my car, got my phone and as I was doing that some guy was sitting there and there was cars behind him and he was like [mimics man’s gesture and expression] like waving me out.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, NEGOTIATION "allows us" linguists to group moves in conversation — in terms of initiation and response.

As previously noted, NEGOTIATION is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION. The system and types of response are provided in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136-7):

Importantly, there is no interpersonal meaning 'beyond the clause' in this constructed example. That is, the interpersonal meaning of the initiating move, a command, realised by a clause, does not extend beyond into the responding move, an undertaking, realised by a clause complex. Any meaning 'beyond the clause' is realised by the textual system of cohesion.

Negotiation: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 15):

In terms of grammatical metaphor NEGOTIATION allows us to realise moves directly, or metaphorically through so-called indirect speech acts:

(39)
What’s his name? (congruent interrogative clause requesting information)
- Andy. 

(40)
Tell me his name. (metaphorical imperative clause requesting information)
- Andy. 

(41)
His name is…? (metaphorical declarative clause requesting information)
- Andy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands grammatical metaphor. To be clear, NEGOTIATION (Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION) does not enable ("allow") moves to be realised congruently ("directly") or metaphorically by the grammatical system of MOOD. That is, SPEECH FUNCTION is not the Agent of realisation but the Medium or Range of the realisation.

[2] To be clear, the technical term here is demand, not request. A request is typically a command: a demand for goods-&-services.

[3] To be clear, this metaphorical clause realises a demand for a service: a process of saying (tell).

[4] To be clear, this metaphorical clause deploys cohesion: the ellipsis of the Identified/New after presenting the Identifier as Theme.

Negotiation: Lexicogrammatical Diversification

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 14-5):

The key interpersonal systems are NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL. NEGOTIATION comprises resources for enacting social relations in dialogue. In terms of diversification it allows us, for example, to realise greeting moves through a range of more and less lexicalised structures:

(33) Hi everybody.
(34) Good morning.
(35) How’s it going?
(36) What a surprise!
(37) Lovely to see you!
(38) Didn’t know you were back in town.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, NEGOTIATION — Martin's rebranding of Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION — doesn't "allow" us to realise greetings grammatically, since higher strata do not "allow" lower strata; meaning does not "allow" wording in any sociosemiotic species. The realisation relation between strata is one type of elaborating identity: symbolic abstraction.

To be clear, greetings are a minor speech function which may be realised by nominal groups, minor clauses (with no mood structure) or major clauses. It is only when a greeting is realised by a major clause that it is constructed as a proposition or proposal, and so as negotiable. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 127, 195-6).

Stratification And Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 10):

Phonology and lexicogrammar are treated as different levels of abstraction, with phonological oppositions realising lexicogrammatical ones. The Danish linguist Hjelmslev (1961) referred to these levels of languages as the expression plane and content plane, respectively.

In the model of stratification assumed here, Hjelmlsev’s content plane is itself modelled as a stratified system, with discourse semantics realised through lexicogrammar. This makes it possible to entertain the possibility that [hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back ] was in fact negotiated in conversation as a request for goods and services rather that an offer of information. … What is significant here is that even though the first move is grammatically declarative, its speech function is negotiated as one we might normally associate with an imperative clause (a clause such as Get some of my hair dye from Target for me, will you?, for example).

(16)
So hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back.
— OK, I’ll go to Target for you.

The process whereby the content plane makes meaning on two levels, one symbolising the other, is referred to in SFL as grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1985). The grammatical metaphor in (16) is an interpersonal one, with declarative mood symbolising a command.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading because it is not true. Hjelmslev modelled semiotic systems in terms of content and expression planes. Halliday stratified Hjelmslev's content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar.

[2] To be clear, the 'model of stratification assumed here' is Halliday's, with Halliday's 'semantics' rebranded as Martin's 'discourse semantics'. For the theoretical shortcomings of Martin's discourse semantics, see here (English Text 1992) and here (Working With Discourse 2007).

[3] This deliberately misleads the intended readership of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. It is not Martin's derived model of stratification, but Halliday's original model that provided the system of SPEECH FUNCTION and its metaphorical realisation in the grammatical system of MOOD.

[4] To be clear, this text is from a monologue in which there is no conversation and no negotiation. The data can be viewed here.

[5] To be clear, in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, commodities, goods–&–services and information, are either demanded of given, not requested or offered. An offer is the giving of goods–&–services.

More importantly, this declarative clause is not a demand for goods–&–services, a command, but a giving of information, a statement, and so is not an instance of metaphor. The speaker states that she hopes to get back her preferred hair colour now that her preferred brand of hair dye is back in stock. She is not commanding anyone to do anything.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of grammatical metaphor. Symbolisation is simply the relation between strata. Grammatical metaphor is an incongruent symbolisation: when meaning and its symbolisation in wording do not agree.

"System Depends On And Is Motivated By Structure"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5, 6):

These grammatical oppositions are formalised in Figure 1.2. …

We will not go into detail about this kind of formalisation here; detailed accounts can be found in Matthiessen and Halliday (2009) and Martin et al. (2013a). We introduce the system network in Figure 1.2 at this point to clarify what it means to say that SFL involves a relational theory of meaning (rather than a representational one). This means that SFL treats language (and semiosis) as a resource for meaning (rather than a set of rules about what one can say or not). What matters are the relationships among choices, as they are formalised in system networks. The basic organising principle for descriptions is thus paradigmatic, rather than syntagmatic. Note however that for a paradigmatic choice to be meaningful, it must have structural consequences; system depends on and is motivated by structure (Martin et al., 2020).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, having just presented clause structures that differ in terms of their realisation of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION (see previous post), the authors misrepresent these as the grammatical oppositions of MOOD.

[2] This is potentially misleading for the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. The system network was introduced by Halliday in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar (1969) to represent Firth's notion of system.

[3] To be clear, SFL is a dimensional theory of meaning. Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Martin, on the other hand, misunderstands SFL as modelling language in terms of "interacting modules". For example,  Martin (1992: 488):

The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components?

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Semiotic systems that do not have "structural consequences" include paralanguage and traffic lights.

[5] This is very seriously misleading indeed, because it is the exact opposite of SFL methodology. SFL does not give priority to structure in such matters, since this would be giving priority to the view 'from below' instead of the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness…

This methodological error is the dominant recurring motif in Martin (2013), as demonstrated here. Moreover, Martin's notion that structure is necessary to meaning derives from the 'syntacticist' tradition of Formal linguistics. Halliday (2007 [1978]: 186):

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a great deal of meaning in a one-word sentence. Whether one claims that there is also structure is likely to depend on whether one subscribes to the syntacticist notion that structure is necessary to meaning.

Illustrating Speech Function

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5):

By way of illustration, consider the following examples – taking note in particular of the segments highlighted in bold and the effect they have on meaning:

(1) Because I would be talking to the people in the comments…

(2) Can we talk about it?

(3) What else can we talk about?

(4) Talk about it.

In the first example the sequence I would indicates that the clause is giving information. In the second and third the sequence Can we indicates that the clauses are asking for information. In the third What else specifies the kind of information being asked for. And in the fourth example the absence of these indicators and the tenseless verb talk (which comes first in its clause) indicate that we are asking someone to do something.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here — as in Martin (2013) — Martin's methodology is to give priority to the view 'from below', how meaning is expressed in structure. In SFL methodology, priority is given to the view 'from' above', the meaning that is expressed, which in this case is speech function, rather than how it is realised.

[2] To be clear, the wording I would is insufficient to indicate that the clause is giving information. For example, the same wording appears in a clause that is demanding goods-&-services: I would like your silence, please.

[3] To be clear, the wording Can we is insufficient to indicate that the clause is realising a demand for information. For example, the same wording appears in a clause that realises the giving of goods-&-services: Can we get the next round of drinks?.