Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of Paralinguistic Force

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 146):

In (23), Coraline is arguing with her mother about why she has locked a tiny door. Convergent with dreams aren’t dangerous, her left hand depicts the proposition (dreams aren’t dangerous) as a semiotic entity (see Chapter 4) at the same time as her left arm is extended out front of her body. The expression realises PARALINGUISTIC FORCE as [quantify:size:extent]. In this instance FORCE is expressed in the embodied paralanguage but not in convergent spoken language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a bare assertion since it is unsupported by argument: the ipse dixit fallacy. Moreover, it is demonstrably false. In terms of practicability, the reader is invited to use one hand to represent dreams aren’t dangerous as an entity. In terms of theory, if this were possible, it would be an instance of grammatical metaphor — a figure realised as an element (Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 250) — in a semiotic system without a grammar: a contradiction in terms.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that the extending of an arm to represent the extent of an entity is an instance of GRADUATION, the scaling of an interpersonal APPRAISAL (Martin & White 2005: 135). This is demonstrably false. Firstly, the representation of the extent of an entity is an ideational construal, not an interpersonal appraisal. Secondly, the only entity here is dreams, and this mental 'process thing' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 244) is clearly not represented by the hand, and the extent of the arm does not represent the extent (duration) of dreams. Thirdly, the evaluation here is made through the quality dangerous, so any upscaling of the evaluation must be an upscaling of dangerous not of dreams, and this the extending of the arm does not represent.

Moreover, this image contradicts the authors' model of PARALINGUISTIC ENGAGEMENT, because here a supine hand is used to represent the [monogloss] of dreams aren’t dangerous, whereas on the authors' model a supine hand represents not only [heterogloss], but [heterogloss: expansion], which is 'allowing space for other voices' (p143).

Appraisal: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 16):

In terms of grammatical metaphor APPRAISAL allows us to realise feelings as if they were things and deploy them accordingly.

(48) He was angry because she was sitting in her car. (congruent adjectival feeling)
(49) His anger prompted her departure. (metaphorical nominalised feeling)

Blogger Comments:

[1] As was the case for NEGOTIATION, it is not the interpersonal system of APPRAISAL that enables ("allows") grammatical metaphor. In any case, the grammatical metaphor here is ideational ("feelings as things"), not interpersonal.

[2] To be clear, adjectives, like nouns, are nominals. The reason this instance is congruent is that a semantic element, an emotive quality of projection (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 209-10), is realised grammatically as a nominal group serving as Attribute.

[3] To be clear, the reason this instance is metaphorical is that a semantic element, a process or quality of emotion, is realised grammatically by a noun serving as the Thing of a nominal group. This ideational metaphor, therefore, is not enabled by the interpersonal system of APPRAISAL.

Negotiation: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 15):

In terms of grammatical metaphor NEGOTIATION allows us to realise moves directly, or metaphorically through so-called indirect speech acts:

(39)
What’s his name? (congruent interrogative clause requesting information)
- Andy. 

(40)
Tell me his name. (metaphorical imperative clause requesting information)
- Andy. 

(41)
His name is…? (metaphorical declarative clause requesting information)
- Andy.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands grammatical metaphor. To be clear, NEGOTIATION (Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION) does not enable ("allow") moves to be realised congruently ("directly") or metaphorically by the grammatical system of MOOD. That is, SPEECH FUNCTION is not the Agent of realisation but the Medium or Range of the realisation.

[2] To be clear, the technical term here is demand, not request. A request is typically a command: a demand for goods-&-services.

[3] To be clear, this metaphorical clause realises a demand for a service: a process of saying (tell).

[4] To be clear, this metaphorical clause deploys cohesion: the ellipsis of the Identified/New after presenting the Identifier as Theme.

Connexion: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 14):

In terms of grammatical metaphor CONNEXION allows us to formalise relations between figures realised congruently between clauses or metaphorically as single clauses:

(30) (congruent clause complex construing a causal sequence)

Because he was harassing her, she left the parking lot.

(31) (metaphorical cause in the clause)

His harassment led to her departure.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the disadvantage of using Martin's CONNEXION instead of Halliday & Matthiessen's ideational semantics in modelling grammatical metaphor is that Martin's CONNEXION can only account for metaphor involving expansion relations that are additive, comparative, temporal or causal — and these without regard for the more general categories of elaboration, extension and enhancement — and cannot account for grammatical metaphor involving projection, such as the following example, which moves from the congruent to the increasingly metaphorical (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 711):

(a) Most linguists today believe → that there is no good evidence ...
(b) the strongest belief of all is [[ that there is no trace ... ]]
(c) these firmly entrenched – and vigorously defended – beliefs

Connexion: Lexicogrammatical Diversification

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 13-4):

CONNEXION comprises resources for relating discourse semantic figures (both occurrence figures and state figures) to one another in sequences (via additive, comparative, temporal and causal relations). In terms of lexicogrammatical diversification it allows us to connect figures to one another in a variety of ways:

(26) Due to him harassing her, she left the parking lot.

(27) Because he was harassing her, she left the parking lot.

(28) He harassed her, so she left the parking lot.

(29) He harassed her. Consequently she left the parking lot.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the use of the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) makes the use of Martin's CONNEXION redundant, since the former subsumes the latter by relating figures in sequences.

[2] To be clear, the reason why Martin's CONNEXION is only concerned with these particular expansion relations is because that was the state of development of Halliday's model of textual cohesive conjunction in Halliday & Hasan (1976) which Martin rebranded in Martin (1992) as his own model of logical discourse semantics. There is no projection in Martin's model of logical discourse semantics because projection is not used cohesively.

[3] To be clear, in (26) the first figure is realised metaphorically as a prepositional phrase. In (27) and (28), two figures are realised congruently as clause complexes, each clause structurally related through hypotaxis (27) or parataxis (28). In (29), the two figures are realised by two clauses that are not structurally related, but instead related textually through cohesive conjunction.

Ideation: Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 13):

In terms of grammatical metaphor IDEATION allows us to formalise the difference between an occurrence figure realised congruently in grammar as a clause or metaphorically as a nominal group (Hao, 2020b):

(23) (congruent realisation of an occurrence Figure)

Her granuloma was spreading.

(24) (metaphorical realisation of an occurrence Figure)

The spread of her granuloma was upsetting her.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), later rebranded in Hao (2020), the metaphor here lies in a happening figure being realised by a nominal group, in which the Process is realised as Thing, and the Actor as Qualifier, with the nominal group serving as the Phenomenon of a mental clause. In terms of the semantics, this sets up a Token-Value relation, such that the meaning of the metaphorical expression, an impinging Phenomenon, realises the meaning of the congruent expression, a happening.

Ideational Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 10-1):

Ideational grammatical metaphors can be interpreted along similar lines. In (19), for example, what is construed verbally in (17) and (18) is construed nominally as her desire for restoration of her hair colour and her visit to Target. The nominal groups in (19) thus encode occurrences as if they were entities.

(17) She wanted to get her hair colour back,
(18) so she headed to Target.
(19) Her desire for restoration of her hair colour prompted her visit to Target.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, (17) and (18) are congruent because a sequence (semantics) is realised by a clause complex (lexicogrammar), and each figure in the sequence (semantics) is realised by a clause (lexicogrammar).

In contrast, (19) is metaphorical because the sequence (semantics) is realised by a clause (lexicogrammar), and each figure in the sequence (semantics) is realised by a nominal group serving as participant (lexicogrammar), with the relation of cause between the figures in the sequence (semantics) realised by a verbal group serving as Process (lexicogrammar).

Stratification And Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 10):

Phonology and lexicogrammar are treated as different levels of abstraction, with phonological oppositions realising lexicogrammatical ones. The Danish linguist Hjelmslev (1961) referred to these levels of languages as the expression plane and content plane, respectively.

In the model of stratification assumed here, Hjelmlsev’s content plane is itself modelled as a stratified system, with discourse semantics realised through lexicogrammar. This makes it possible to entertain the possibility that [hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back ] was in fact negotiated in conversation as a request for goods and services rather that an offer of information. … What is significant here is that even though the first move is grammatically declarative, its speech function is negotiated as one we might normally associate with an imperative clause (a clause such as Get some of my hair dye from Target for me, will you?, for example).

(16)
So hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back.
— OK, I’ll go to Target for you.

The process whereby the content plane makes meaning on two levels, one symbolising the other, is referred to in SFL as grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1985). The grammatical metaphor in (16) is an interpersonal one, with declarative mood symbolising a command.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading because it is not true. Hjelmslev modelled semiotic systems in terms of content and expression planes. Halliday stratified Hjelmslev's content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar.

[2] To be clear, the 'model of stratification assumed here' is Halliday's, with Halliday's 'semantics' rebranded as Martin's 'discourse semantics'. For the theoretical shortcomings of Martin's discourse semantics, see here (English Text 1992) and here (Working With Discourse 2007).

[3] This deliberately misleads the intended readership of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. It is not Martin's derived model of stratification, but Halliday's original model that provided the system of SPEECH FUNCTION and its metaphorical realisation in the grammatical system of MOOD.

[4] To be clear, this text is from a monologue in which there is no conversation and no negotiation. The data can be viewed here.

[5] To be clear, in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, commodities, goods–&–services and information, are either demanded of given, not requested or offered. An offer is the giving of goods–&–services.

More importantly, this declarative clause is not a demand for goods–&–services, a command, but a giving of information, a statement, and so is not an instance of metaphor. The speaker states that she hopes to get back her preferred hair colour now that her preferred brand of hair dye is back in stock. She is not commanding anyone to do anything.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of grammatical metaphor. Symbolisation is simply the relation between strata. Grammatical metaphor is an incongruent symbolisation: when meaning and its symbolisation in wording do not agree.