Misrepresenting Matthiessen As Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Register

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207-8):

Modelling concurrence and resonance is more of a challenge. One response would be to quantify the semantic ‘weight’ of the contributions from alternative modalities in terms of degrees of commitment – where commitment refers, following Martin (2010), to the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy of selections from both optional and obligatory systems. Figueredo and Figueredo (2019) outline a quantitative model for measurements of this kind. This would offer us a gauge of how much meaning language and paralanguage were committing but not tell us much about the kinds of meaning involved. 

Another response, perhaps better suited to this shortcoming, would be to turn to a higher-order semiotic such as register (Matthiessen, 2007) or genre (Bateman, 2008) and assign it responsibility for the distribution of meaning across modalities. Models of this kind take advantage of work on the relation of hierarchically organised categories in language (i.e. system realised in structure, higher ranks realised by lower ones and more abstract strata realised through more concrete ones) to explore intermodality – in effect treating co-instantiation across modalities as if it were realisation within a modality.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis. That is, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do. But Martin also confuses 'delicacy' in the technical sense of a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' in the sense of a scale of decreasing generality in a hyponymic taxonomy experiential meanings. See the earlier post Why Martin's Notion Of Commitment Is Invalid.

[2] This is very misleading indeed, because it knowingly misrepresents Matthiessen as supporting Martin's misunderstanding of register as a higher-order semiotic. Matthiessen, of course, follows Halliday in modelling register as a language variation (instantiation), not as a system more abstract than language (stratification).

[3] This confuses constituency (rank scale) with symbolic abstraction (realisation). All ranks are of the same level of symbolic abstraction, so a higher rank is not realised by a lower rank.

[4] To be clear, here the authors advocate making the same type of theoretical error that Martin made in his misunderstanding of register. With register, Martin modelled different types of language in terms of a more abstract stratum, and here he proposes modelling different types of semiotic system in terms of a more abstract stratum.

Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Model As The Authors' Innovation

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207):

As reviewed in Section 7.1, our project involves developing paralanguage as a semiotic system alongside language. We adopted our model of the relation of paralanguage to language from earlier work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013). As outlined in Table 7.1, sonovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed. The origin of the notions of gestures being in tune with TONE, and in sync with TONICITY and RHYTHM is Cléirigh's model (2009), which predates, by four years, the "earlier" work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013):

The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps with Martin, the author of this chapter, the driving force.

Blatantly Claiming Credit For Cléirigh's Work

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199):

We used metafunction to distinguish between paralanguage systems converging with ideational, interpersonal or textual meaning (Figure 7.3).

Seen in these terms, sonovergent paralanguage resonates with interpersonal meaning and syncs with textual meaning; there is no sonovergent concurrence with ideational meaning. Semovergent paralanguage on the other hand resonates with interpersonal meaning, coordinates with textual meaning and concurs with ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed, because these distinctions were already present in Cléirigh's model, below, and were not the work of the authors. The plagiarism in this work is more blatant when Martin is the author, as in this chapter.

Linguistic ("sonovergent"):

Epilinguistic ("semovergent"):

Importantly, "sonovergent paralanguage" is the linguistic realisation of grammatical systems, and "semovergent paralanguage", being epilinguistic, has no grammar, but has meaning that derives from the fact that its users have a grammar.

On The Truth Of The Authors' Claim That They Didn't Relate Paralanguage To Grammatical Structure

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198-9):

With the exception of mime (discussed later in the chapter) and some pointing deixis (discussed in Chapter 6), paralanguage converges with the intonation and rhythm of spoken language in our data. This argues for a linguistically informed model of prosodic phonology as a prerequisite for the analysis of paralanguage. It also provides one useful criterion for distinguishing somasis from semiosis (since somatic behaviour is not coordinated with prosodic phonology). 

Note that in relating paralanguage to discourse semantics rather than lexicogrammar, we are suggesting that the grammatical structure of a spoken language (specifically, the nature of its syntagms) is not relevant to its paralanguage. In this respect paralanguage resembles the ‘language-neutral’ sign language of the North American Plains Indians, but not the sign languages of Australia’s indigenous communities (Kendon, 2004: 299–303), at least for their more proficient signers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously, paralanguage that "converges" with intonation and rhythm is not paralanguage, but language that realises the grammatical systems of KEY and INFORMATION by bodily means other than the vocal tract.

[2] To be clear, semiosis makes meaning, "somasis" does not.

[3] This is misleading, because the authors have related "sonovergent" paralanguage, explicitly or implicitly, to the grammatical systems of KEY, INFORMATION and THEME. On the other hand, the body language that the authors call "semovergent" is epilinguistic, and so has no grammar. 

To be clear, the reason why the authors related paralanguage to discourse semantics is that discourse semantics is Martin's model (of cohesion as semantics), though the ideational 'discourse' semantics used was, in truth, the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rebranded by Martin's former student, Hao.

[4] Here the authors misrepresent the Sign language of the North American Plains Indians as not having a content plane that is stratified into semantics and grammar, the distinguishing feature of language.

Misrepresenting Sonovergence As Semovergence

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 188):

In this instance, as shown in (19''), each of the lecturer’s hand beats syncs sonovergently with a tonic syllable, in just those cases where the tonic falls on one of the named nutrients in the phase / glucose, / vitamins, a- / mino / acids or / water. At the same time each of these named nutrients is given prominence as the Theme of a clause (see (19)). The lecturer’s hand beat thus reinforces informational prominence both sonovergently and semovergently. From a discourse semantic perspective, in (19'') we have a sequence of four state figures, each construed by the same (relational circumstantial) grammatical structure – most of the [X] / lots of [X] is back in the bloodstream.

 

 

Blogger Comments:

Here the authors misrepresent their own model. The hand beat functions only "sonovergently", not "semovergently", because it converges with the phonology of language, not with the content of language. The hand beat realises the information Focus, not the Theme. It is just that, in these instances, it is the Theme (and Carrier) that is the information Focus.

Importantly, the rhetorical function of this misrepresentation is to forge a misleading link between "sonovergent" paralanguage and the hyper-Theme and macro-Theme of "semovergent" PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. This is demonstrated by the fact that the authors only cite the Theme function of these nominal groups, even though their Carrier function is also given prominence.

Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of Hand Shape

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 183-4):

In (17'') we present a sequence of images and descriptions of the lecturer’s paralanguage. …

In terms of size, the beat synchronous with the first tonic on (Foucault) and the last (form of power) extends the furthest, with the stroke of the latter extending maximally downwards from shoulder height. The final beat is also extended in duration as it is held beyond the completion of the tone group.

Variation in the shape of the beating hand is noted in image 4 and magnified in (17''') to reveal the co-instantiation of a depicted paralinguistic entity. In this instance the gestural beat synchronises with self; the pronoun refers anaphorically to the semiotic entity form of knowledge. The paralinguistic beat thus assigns textual prominence to an ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this display does not present the text as spoken:

[2] To be clear, this distinction in the amplitude of the beat serves the same function as the distinction between tonic salient syllables and non-tonic salient syllables.

[3] To be clear, the location of the holding of the gesture suggests the function of the holding is demarcative.

[4] Clearly, the hand shape is not recognisable as meaning '(it)self' or 'form of knowledge', so it cannot be said to be realising this ideational meaning. 

[5] To be clear, it is the beat of linguistic gesture, not the hand shape, that gives rhythmic salience, highlighting what could have been chosen as realising the focus of New information, but was not. However, the fact that an emphatic pronoun was not given tonic prominence in this analysis, gives reason to doubt the accuracy of the analysis.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Theme

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 181-2):

As outlined by Halliday (1967, 1970a), English grammar and phonology structure textual meaning as waves of information. One peak of prominence is realised grammatically through Theme at the beginning of an English clause. It functions as the point of departure for the message by encoding an angle on the field. A complementary peak of prominence, termed New, is realised phonologically in the unmarked case through the major pitch movement on the final salient syllable of a tone group – its Tonic segment (Halliday, 1970a; Martin and Rose, [2003] 2007: 189–92). A secondary peak of informational prominence is realised through a salient syllable, which in SFL notation begins each foot. As noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.6, a salient syllable can be made super-salient where there is a significant jump in pitch, usually upwards, which does not involve a choice of tone. Super-salience is indicated via a vertical arrow, ‘↑’, before the syllable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion of the textual meaning of a clause as a wave of prominence is first set out in Halliday (1985: 169).

[2] To be clear, the Theme functions as the point of departure for the clause as message. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 89):

The Theme is the element that serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that which locates and orients the clause within its context. The speaker chooses the Theme as his or her point of departure to guide the addressee in developing an interpretation of the message; by making part of the message prominent as Theme, the speaker enables the addressee to process the message.

Field, on the other hand, is the ideational dimension of context — two strata above lexicogrammar — which Martin (1992) misunderstands as register.

[3] To be clear, the New is peak of prominence of the information unit, which may or may not be co-extensive with the clause.

[4] This is misleading, because it credits Martin and Rose with theorising that is entirely Halliday's.

[5] To be clear, a salient syllable is a peak of phonological (rhythmic), not informational prominence. Here the authors confuse expression with content. Each salient syllable that is non-tonic realises what was not selected as the Focus of New information.

Misrepresenting The Relative Size Of Referents As Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 174):

The three images in (10) show variations in SCOPE of paralinguistic deixis through vectors expressed with hand or fingers. SCOPE varies from relatively [broad] via the palm of the hand in image 1, to relatively [narrow] via an index finger in image 2, to maximally [narrow] via a little finger in image 3.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these gestures make exophoric reference to metaphenomena in the environment of the paralanguage through physical contact. The identity that recoverable from the different finger gestures in the second and third images is a written word [narrow], whereas the identity that recoverable from the splayed hand gesture is a written paragraph [broad]. The efficacy of the latter gesture diminishes rapidly with distance between the gesture and the referent. Again, 'broad' and 'narrow' are features that distinguish the size of referents. They are not deictic in function because they do not make distinctions with regard to the here-&-now of the speaker/gesturer.

The Confusion That Invalidates The Authors' Model Of Paralinguistic Identification/Deixis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 165):

In spoken language a primary distinction is made between the recoverability of entities from assumed shared knowledge (homophora) and from the immediately present situation (Figure 6.1). If the latter, then recovery is either from within the text (endophora) or from outside the text (exophora). In paralanguage on the other hand, options for the recoverability of entities in discourse primarily distinguish between the feature [actual] realised through a resolved vector that is directed to visibly or sensibly (as if) present phenomena, and the feature [virtual] realised through an unresolved vector – that is, one that cannot be situationally resolved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents the source of this theorising, Halliday & Hasan (1976: 33):

That is, exophoric reference is situational, whereas endophoric reference is textual, as the prefixes make plain. By the same token, homophoric reference is self-specifying.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. As the preceding post explained, textual epilinguistic body language also distinguishes between endophoric and exophoric reference. The features 'actual' and 'virtual', on the other hand, are not types of reference, but classifications of referents. It will be seen that the authors' system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is organised on the basis of this confusion, which thereby invalidates their model.

[3] In mathematics, a vector is a quantity with both magnitude (length) and direction, and a resolved vector is one that has been broken down into smaller component vectors; so an unresolved vector is one that has not been broken down into smaller component vectors. For the authors, however, 'vector' just means the direction of the pointing gesture, and its resolution is the identification of what is indicated by the pointing gesture, the referent.

[4] To be clear, if the referent of a pointing gesture (vector) is not identifiable, then the pointing gesture does not serve a reference function.

Misrepresenting Paralinguistic Deixis And The Problem With Presuming Reference

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 162-3):

The management of information flow in discourse is supported by the system of textual semovergence we refer to as PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS. Here the focus is on how paralanguage supports the introduction of people, things and places into texts and keeps track of them once there (Martin, 1992: 95). This section begins with a brief overview of the linguistic system of IDENTIFICATION. … 

The IDENTIFICATION system in English discourse semantics draws a basic distinction between presenting reference, which introduces entities in discourse, and presuming reference, which tracks them once there. …

The types of entities (Hao, 2020a) introduced by presenting reference include people (anyone), concrete thing entities (a stripy shirt, a beautiful green scarf) and semiotic entities (some of the key things, what kind of sense, what feeling, an idea). The linguistic resources deployed include non-specific determiners (e.g. a, an, some), an indefinite nominal group (anyone) and several instances of a ‘wh’ entity (what). …

Proper names also function as presuming reference.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this 'presuming reference' is Martin's rebranding of anaphoric reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976). It will be seen in later posts that the reference in the system of PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS is exophoric, not endophoric, and so does not "support" keeping track of people, things and places 'once there' in the text.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'presenting reference' (Martin 1992) confuses referents with reference items (his, that etc.). It arises from confusing 'reference' as textual meaning with 'reference' as the ideational meaning of lexical items. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 33):

[3] To be clear, none of these resources indicate a recoverable identity elsewhere, so none of them function as reference items.

Problems With The System Of Voice Affect

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 129, 131):

It is the particular ‘mixture’ of options [from the system of VOICE QUALITY] which realise one feature or another in the system of VOICE AFFECT (see Figure 5.7).

Blogger Comments:

The system in Figure 5.7 models paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

Further, in Figure 5.7, the authors again misrepresent 'threat' as an emotion, with its result (fear, anxiety) and reason (anger) as its subtypes. Moreover, within the emotion of threat, it groups one result (anxiety) with a reason (anger) instead of with a result (fear).

Misrepresenting 'Threat' As An Emotion

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 120-1, 239n):

An additional opposition proposed by Darwin (1872) is between facial movements interpreted as ‘fear’ and ‘anger’. For Darwin, ‘fear’ is a feeling caused by the anticipation that one could be harmed (which we interpret as a response to what might happen, i.e. an irrealis trigger) and ‘anger’ is a feeling that might result in one harming others (which we interpret as a response to something real happening, i.e. a realis trigger). In the network of FACIAL AFFECT in Figure 5.3 [fear] and [anger] are opposing features of [threat]. Each feature is realised through a different set of facial expressions shown in italics. In the intersemiosis of facial expression and the unfolding storyline in language and action, the facial feature [fear] is interpretable as negative and irrealis, that is, it is a negative emotional response to what might happen. In contrast the feature [anger] is interpretable as negative and realis, an emotional response to what is happening or has happened.

Blogger Comments;

[1] As previously explained, the title Darwin (1872), The expression of the emotions in man and animals, demonstrates that the meanings here are protolinguistic, since other animals do not express the meanings of language. So, to model protolanguage as language, as FACIAL AFFECT, is theoretically invalid. On Halliday's model, the expression of emotion serves the personal microfunction of protolanguage. 

[2] To be clear, here the authors misrepresent the result of anger (harming others) as the reason for it (trigger).

[3] To be clear, in Figure 5.3, the authors misrepresent 'threat' as an emotion, with its result (fear) and cause (anger) as its subtypes.

[4] Again, the system in Figure 5.3 confirms the fact that here the authors model paralanguage as a bi-stratal semiotic system, and although this is consistent with the notion of a semiotic system, it is inconsistent with the preceding chapters in which paralanguage is misunderstood as an expression-only semiotic system. Where in previous chapters it was just paralinguistic expression that was semovergent with language, in this chapter it is both paralinguistic content and expression that is semovergent with language.

Misrepresenting Expression Stratum Systems As A Semantic Stratum Network

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 95-6):

In terms of how they are construed in paralanguage, entities vary across two main dimensions – SPECIFICITY and DEPICTION, as represented in the system network in Figure 4.1. SPECIFICITY deals with how much meaning is committed in terms of shape and size, while DEPICTION addresses how the entity is visually formed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here the authors misrepresent systems of expression stratum features as a semantic stratum network. This confusion follows directly from their previous misunderstanding of linguistic entities that are realised by paralinguistic expressions as paralinguistic entities, thereby classifying content in terms of how it is realised on the expression plane. This is analogous to classifying these discourse semantic units as phonological entities, since this is how they are realised on the expression plane of language. Cf.:

In terms of how they are "construed" in phonology, entities vary across two main dimensions – PLACE and MANNER (of articulation).

This error invalidates the authors' network — a network being a theory of the system (Halliday). 

[2] To be clear, the relation between meaning and expression/form is realisation.

Confusing Epilinguistic Pictures With Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

As we have seen, much of what is assigned to body protolanguage involves the expression of emotions. Here we meet again the challenge of discriminating somasis and semiosis. Nonetheless, in the analysis of visual depiction, Painter et al. (2013) propose VISUAL AFFECT as an interpersonal meaning system complementing that of verbal AFFECT within the linguistic domain of APPRAISAL. 

The details of the system remain unspecified by them, but Martinec (2001) provides networks of meaning options for basic emotions with realisations specified in terms of facial movements. These systems are again treated by him as belonging within the interpersonal metafunction and thus able to be put into play alongside meanings originating from within the other metafunctions. For our own work in this domain, see Chapter 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As we have seen in previous posts, this false claim derives from the authors misconstruing Halliday's microfunctions of protolanguage as types of emotions. See

• The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"
• The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

In Cléirigh's model, following Halliday ((e.g. 2004 [1998]: 18), since emotions are personal states, they are restricted to the personal microfunction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. If body movements and postures mean something other than themselves, emotions, they are semiotic, not merely "somatic" (the authors' confusion of biological and social orders of complexity).

As previously explained, this challenge to the authors only arises from their taking the view 'from below' (body movements and postures) instead of the SFL view 'from above' (the meanings expressed), and this error derives from misunderstanding paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system..

[3] As previously explained, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. This means that its meaning is metafunctionally organised. Painter et al simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in instances of an epilinguistic system. Importantly, the visual depiction of emotions is irrelevant to the issue of protolinguistic body language, since it is not concerned with the meanings that can be made by an organism of a social semiotic species in whom language has not developed. See the earlier post

• Misrepresenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

For a more detailed consideration of the epilinguistic depiction of protolinguistic body language, see the review of Chapter 5 of this publication on interpersonal paralanguage.

[4] As previously explained, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

∞

Most importantly, just as an image of a pipe is not a pipe, an image of body language is not body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Either Somatic Or Interpersonal

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62-3):

What is common to most of the meanings assigned by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) to ‘protolinguistic’ microfunctions is that, if not simply somatic, they are interpersonal in nature – but not accommodated by a linguistic model that includes only SPEECH FUNCTION, MOOD and MODALITY in that metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] As previously explained, in Cléirigh's model, protolinguistic body language, by definition, excludes non-semiotic ("somatic") behaviour, and the authors' misunderstanding in this regard derives from taking the view 'from below' (body movement) instead of the view 'from above' (meaning). And, as also previously explained, in terms of orders of complexity, the authors' model of somasis confuses the biological order with the social order, and includes what Halliday (2004: 18) models as protolanguage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As explained in the previous post, this false claim derives from the authors misrepresenting epilinguistic pictorial systems, which do include interpersonal meaning, as protolinguistic body language, which does not.

[4] To be clear, a model of an evolutionarily prior system, protolinguistic body language, is not required to "accommodate" a model of an evolutionarily later system, a linguistic model, any more than a description of therapod dinosaurs must accommodate a description of the birds that evolved from them.

Misrepesenting Epilinguistic Pictures As Evidence Against Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62):

If we turn now to other SFL theorists, particularly those who have considered the visual depiction of human communicative interaction, we can see some common threads. There is a general agreement about the meanings of the way the body is oriented in relation to an addressee. 

For example, Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) system of INVOLVEMENT within their ‘visual grammar’ explains the meaning as relative detachment or involvement of the viewer with the content of the image. The meaning is realised by horizontal angle, with an oblique angle signifying greater detachment than a front-on angle. 

Painter et al. (2013) extend this to analysis of the depicted interacting characters in picture books to propose a system of ORIENTATION with different orientations between characters (face to face, side by side, back to back) comparably realising different degrees of engagement, solidarity or detachment. 

Martinec (2001) similarly has a comparable system of ANGLE (operating alongside one of SOCIAL DISTANCE) again with similar realisations.  

In all of this work the meaning systems are placed within the interpersonal metafunction and are thus seen as available alongside textual and/or ideational paralanguage systems and all three metafunctions of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since these are not independent theorists. Painter et al, at least, theorise on the basis of Kress and van Leeuwen's work, at least.

[2] Importantly, visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system — "semovergent" in the authors' terms — since it requires the prior evolution and development of language. So here the authors are using an epilinguistic system as evidence that a protolinguistic system is epilinguistic.

[3] To be clear, Kress and van Leeuwen are concerned with a human's interpretation of an image, and Painter et al are concerned with relations within an image. Both are irrelevant to the issue at hand, since neither is concerned with the body language of an organism of a social semiotic species.

[4] To be clear, because visual depiction is an epilinguistic semiotic system, its meaning is metafunctionally organised. These colleagues have simply applied the interpersonal metafunction to what is depicted in such epilinguistic systems.

[5] To be clear, this is simply a description of paralanguage, whether protolinguistic or epilinguistic. As such, it does not serve the authors' argument against protolinguistic body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [2]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 62):

Another group of behaviours from Zappavigna and Martin’s (2018) ‘body protolanguage’ category involves relative uprightness of body posture, frontal or oblique facial and body orientation and the leaning forward or backwards of the torso in relation to the addressee. These expressive movements of the body are similarly independent from any ideational meanings with which they may combine and, similarly to facial movements, may also combine with other interpersonal strands of meaning, whether linguistic (e.g. a variety of spoken mood forms) or paralinguistic (e.g. smiling or widening the eyes). There is thus neither fusion of ideational/interpersonal meaning in relation to ‘content’ nor multimodal fusion in the form of expression. The characteristics of protolanguage as a developmental semiotic are not therefore in evidence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviours' and 'expressive/facial movements' here again betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[2] Again, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[3] To be clear, these postures and orientations also occur in other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets. When they are meaningful, they are protolinguistic on the basis that they do not require the evolutionary or developmental emergence of language.

[4] To be clear, on Cléirigh's model, these are simply examples of protolinguistic body language accompanying the ideational or interpersonal meanings of language; that is, of protolinguistic body language being used paralinguistically. 

The authors' confusion here derives from their misunderstanding that such body language expressions realise the metafunctional meanings of the linguistic instance rather than the microfunctional meanings of the protolinguistic instance. This misunderstanding, in turn, derives from the authors' notion of convergence, in which paralanguage expression is said to converge with language content. This misunderstanding, in turn, derives from the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system — a misunderstanding that invalidates their model of paralanguage.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions are irrelevant to a characterisation of protolanguage, since they do not evolve or develop until the emergence of language. The microfunctions are predecessors of the metafunctions, not a fusion of them. On the other hand, as Halliday's previously cited data (Halliday 2004 [1975]: 36) demonstrate, multimodality is not a necessary condition of protolanguage.

[6] To be clear, the characteristics of protolanguage as a developmental semiotic are merely characteristics of protolanguage in relation to the ontogenesis of language. Protolinguistic body language is concerned with protolanguage in its own right, not as a means to a linguistic end. 

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Paralanguage As Evidence Against The Category [1]

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

To explore this, some examples of adult paralinguistic behaviour classified by Zappavigna and Martin (2018) as protolinguistic will be briefly discussed. One group comprises various facial expressions such as smiling, raising, lowering or widening the eyes, opening the mouth and the presence or absence of eye contact with the addressee, all features of ‘social communion’ that predate even protolanguage (see Figure 2.1).  

As has been discussed, during the transition phase there is evidence that facial affect can be separated from other strands of interpersonal expression (e.g. looking happy while saying oh dear) and in the adult semiotic system affective facial expressions can clearly combine freely with any ideational meaning. In these respects, such expression forms are unlike protolinguistic signs, and the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether that instance is somatic or semiotic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors (Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna) are not here arguing with themselves (Zappavigna and Martin); they are arguing to exclude protolinguistic body language from Cléirigh's model which they have claimed as their own. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'behaviour' and 'expression(s)' here betray the authors' misunderstanding of body language as an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, this misunderstanding arises from again giving priority to the view 'from below', facial expression, instead of the view 'from above', meaning. The meanings of facial expressions cannot predate protolanguage, since protolanguage is the initial semiotic system. Before protolanguage, such facial expressions have a social function only: the selection of value in the other, not a semiotic function: the expression of symbolic value for the other.

[4] Here the authors provide evidence against their own argument. To be clear, a child looking happy while saying oh dear, and an adult combining facial expressions with language are both instances of the paralinguistic use of protolinguistic body language. They are paralinguistic because they are used alongside language, and they are protolinguistic because they are semiotic systems that do require the prior evolution and development of language.

[5] This is misleading. The difference here is only that, in these instances, the protolinguistic signs are being used paralinguistically, rather than pre-linguistically.

[6] To be clear, the issue to be resolved in a particular case is whether the instance is social (carries value) or protolinguistic (carries symbolic value). As previously explained, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two distinct orders of complexity: the biological and the social.

Misrepresenting The Microfunctions As Criterial Of Protolinguistic Body Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

Nor is it possible to argue that certain forms of adult paralanguage are organised in terms of microfunctions simply because it is possible to interpret them this way. As explained earlier, there is no formal way to determine the microfunction of an infant expression – it is an interpretation from context. Therefore, given that any adult communication could be assigned to a microfunction on contextual grounds, since adult language has limitless uses, this does not in itself count as evidence for microfunctional organisation. It would therefore be more appropriate for the term ‘protolanguage’ to be used only if it can be shown that the defining characteristics of protolinguistic communication are apparent, that is, if the expression form is an irreducible multimodal complex and if the meaning is similarly an inseparable bundle of ideational and interpersonal meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents the micofunctions that are used to model protolanguage as criterial of the category. To be clear, protolinguistic body language is simply body language that does not require the prior evolution or development of language, and as such, can be found in all other species with a social semiotic system. The microfunctions are not criterial in determining the category 'protolinguistic', they are merely Halliday's means of modelling paralanguage.

So here again the authors are arguing against their own misunderstanding of Cléirigh's model, instead of against Cléirigh's model itself. In terms of logical fallacies, this is an example of the

Straw man fallacy – refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognising or acknowledging the distinction.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. For example, protolinguistic interjections like yuck! and ouch! are not expressed by "an irreducible multimodal complex". Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Moreover, Halliday's publications provide a wealth of examples of expressions that are not multimodal. For example, Halliday (2004 [1975]: 36):

In other species, the expression may be unimodal or multimodal. For example, in rainbow lorikeets, a 'prohibitive' regulatory function, which could be glossed as 'you just try it!) is expressed as rough growl with low rising tone (tone 3), whereas a 'threatening' regulatory function, which might be glossed as 'you're asking for it!', is expressed by the arching of the back, a lowering of the face and eye ridges, a fierce glare, and multiple wing-flaps while standing on 'tippy-toes' as if the bird was about to make a flying attack. Other examples can be found here.

[3] To be clear, this characterises human protolanguage in terms of the semiotic system it will evolve and develop into, metafunctional language, instead of in its own terms as microfunctional protolanguage. In evolutionary terms, this is analogous to characterising the features of therapod dinosaurs in terms of the features of birds.

Halliday (2004 [1975]: 52) provides a summary of the development from microfunction to metafunction:

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Non-Semiotic ("Somatic")

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60-1):

The first point to be made is that some of the phenomena counted as protolinguistic in Zappavigna and Martin (2018) may in fact be somatic rather than semiotic. For example, forms of fidgeting, scratching a cheek or crossing feet may simply be a matter of relieving some bodily discomfort, rather than having symbolic import. It is necessary to have criteria for discriminating somatic and semiotic expression in such cases (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4–1.5), but their ambiguity is not grounds for classing them as protolinguistic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the first of the authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. However, it is an argument against what the authors mistake to be included in the category rather than an argument against the grounds for the category itself.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language is restricted to semiosis, by definition. The criterion for discriminating the semiotic from the non-semiotic is simply that if a gesture or posture means something other than itself, then it is semiotic. If fidgeting, for example, does not mean something other than itself, then it is not semiotic, and so cannot be an expression of protolinguistic body language. If, however, the fidgeting of a young offender facing a tribunal — as in the data — means that he is nervous and 'itching to leave', then it is semiotic, and because such semiosis does not require the prior evolution and development of language, it is protolinguistic.

Importantly, the authors' mistaken notion of there being ambiguity in the interpretation of such cases derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', contrā the SFL method of giving priority to the view 'from above'. That is, the authors ask what the gestures mean, instead of asking how meanings are realised in gesture. This, in turn, derives from the authors misunderstanding body language as an expression-only semiotic system, as previously explained.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two different orders of complexity: biological (behaviour) and social (communion).