Misrepresenting Matthiessen As Endorsing Martin's Misunderstanding Of Register

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207-8):

Modelling concurrence and resonance is more of a challenge. One response would be to quantify the semantic ‘weight’ of the contributions from alternative modalities in terms of degrees of commitment – where commitment refers, following Martin (2010), to the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy of selections from both optional and obligatory systems. Figueredo and Figueredo (2019) outline a quantitative model for measurements of this kind. This would offer us a gauge of how much meaning language and paralanguage were committing but not tell us much about the kinds of meaning involved. 

Another response, perhaps better suited to this shortcoming, would be to turn to a higher-order semiotic such as register (Matthiessen, 2007) or genre (Bateman, 2008) and assign it responsibility for the distribution of meaning across modalities. Models of this kind take advantage of work on the relation of hierarchically organised categories in language (i.e. system realised in structure, higher ranks realised by lower ones and more abstract strata realised through more concrete ones) to explore intermodality – in effect treating co-instantiation across modalities as if it were realisation within a modality.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis. That is, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do. But Martin also confuses 'delicacy' in the technical sense of a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' in the sense of a scale of decreasing generality in a hyponymic taxonomy experiential meanings. See the earlier post Why Martin's Notion Of Commitment Is Invalid.

[2] This is very misleading indeed, because it knowingly misrepresents Matthiessen as supporting Martin's misunderstanding of register as a higher-order semiotic. Matthiessen, of course, follows Halliday in modelling register as a language variation (instantiation), not as a system more abstract than language (stratification).

[3] This confuses constituency (rank scale) with symbolic abstraction (realisation). All ranks are of the same level of symbolic abstraction, so a higher rank is not realised by a lower rank.

[4] To be clear, here the authors advocate making the same type of theoretical error that Martin made in his misunderstanding of register. With register, Martin modelled different types of language in terms of a more abstract stratum, and here he proposes modelling different types of semiotic system in terms of a more abstract stratum.

The Linguistic Coordination Of A Convergence Of Language With Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207):

From the perspective of instantiation (the system to text relation in SFL), this raises the central challenge of intermodal studies, namely, the ineffable process whereby systems from different modalities end up seamlessly instantiated as coherent text. As in film (van Leeuwen, 1985, 2005), textual meaning has a critical role to play, as the ‘beat’ of feet and tone groups (TONALITY, TONICITY, SALIENCE and RHYTHM) coordinates the convergence of linguistic and paralinguistic resources (the focus of Chapter 6).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, instantiation is the relation between potential and instance at a given level of symbolic abstraction, of a given semiotic system. For example, instantiation is the relation between the system of phonology as potential, and an instance of that system in a text; or the relation between a system of paralinguistic content, and an instance of that system accompanying an instance of linguistic content.

[2] To be clear, the ineffability of grammatical categories means that they only mean themselves. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 303, 306):

The meaning of a typical grammatical category … has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. … they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorisation of our experience.

[3] To be clear, the expression plane systems that realise the grammatical system of the information unit are language, not paralanguage, whether vocal or gestural. So there is no coordination of a convergence of linguistic and paralinguistic resources.

[4] Trivially, SALIENCE is a lexicogrammatical distinction realised by distinctions in RHYTHM, its phonological counterpart. 

[5] To be clear, Chapter 6 presents a system of DEIXIS which classifies referents, and a system (though no network) that merely correlates speaker location with categories from writing pedagogy.

Problems With The Semovergence Of Discourse Semantics And Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207, 208):

And, as outlined in Table 7.2, semovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems concur with one another (ideational meaning), resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, 'semovergence' derives from the authors' original misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system that "converges with" (realises) the content of language. This view was assumed in Chapter 1, which was previously published as Martin & Zappavigna (2019), and was partially maintained in Chapter 4, where ideational networks confused content with expression, but abandoned by Chapters 5 and 6, where interpersonal and textual networks distinguished content from expression.

[2] To be clear, the authors' model of semovergent paralanguage substitutes the discourse semantics of Martin for the semantics of Halliday in Cléirigh's model of epilinguistic body language, but maintains Cléirigh's terms 'articulatory' and 'mimetic'. Cf.

Of the authors' paralinguistic discourse semantic systems,

• IDEATION is a rebranding of the semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rather than the discourse semantics of Martin (1992);
• APPRAISAL is a linguistic system misapplied to protolanguage;
• IDENTIFICATION is a system of DEIXIS that classifies referents; and
• PERIODICITY is a system without a network that merely correlates the location of a speaker with what he says, without regard to how each identifies the other (realisation).

Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Model As The Authors' Innovation

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 207):

As reviewed in Section 7.1, our project involves developing paralanguage as a semiotic system alongside language. We adopted our model of the relation of paralanguage to language from earlier work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013). As outlined in Table 7.1, sonovergence was explored in terms of how linguistic and paralinguistic systems resonate with one another (interpersonal meaning) and sync with one another (textual meaning).

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed. The origin of the notions of gestures being in tune with TONE, and in sync with TONICITY and RHYTHM is Cléirigh's model (2009), which predates, by four years, the "earlier" work on the convergence of language and image in children’s picture books (Painter et al., 2013):

The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps with Martin, the author of this chapter, the driving force.

Mistaking Language For Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 203-4):

This raises a question of how we might position onomatopœia (e.g. animal noises such as meow, woof, neigh, baa) and phonæsthesia (e.g. slinky, slimey, slinky, slippery, slither, slurp, slushy) were we to further develop our description of language and paralanguage. This would involve bringing relevant dimensions of voice quality (outlined in Chapter 5) to bear, as well as exploring the potential for human articulatory resources to imitate sounds (arguably an ideational resource) and attitudinally ‘colour’ phonæsthetic series (arguably an interpersonal one). Our expectation is that these resources could be brought into a model of paralanguage based on further research (cf. Chapter 5, Section 5.5, on voice quality differentiation between miserable and angry meows).

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands language as paralanguage. To be clear, words, including those classified as onomatopœic or phonæsthetic, are of the lexicogrammar of language, and so are not part of paralanguage. Onomatopœic words that imitate the meaningful vocalisations of other animals are linguistic representations of non-human protolanguage. Phonæsthetic words are those whose phonetic realisations imitate the perceptual qualities of material order phenomena.

Misunderstanding Emblems As An Expression Form Of Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 203, 204):

In reviewing our proposals for sonovergent and semovergent systems, it is important to keep in mind that we are treating emblems as part of the expression form of language and not as paralanguage (Figure 7.4) – and thus excluded thumbs-up or thumbs-down (as praise or censure), index finger touching lips (for ‘quiet please’), hand cupped over ear (for ‘I can’t hear’) and so on from our description. Our reasoning was presented in Chapter 1, Section 1.6. This was the basis of our argument that semovergent paralanguage cannot be used to support NEGOTIATION by distinguishing move types in dialogic exchanges (although sonovergent paralanguage can of course support tone choice in relation to these moves).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, emblems involve both content and expression, and so are not merely an expression form. Moreover, they are not language because their content plane is not stratified into semantics and grammar. Instead, the use emblems requires the prior evolution and development of language, as demonstrated by the fact that other species do not use them, and so are classified as 'epilinguistic' in Cléirigh's model, which does indeed make them 'semovergent' in the authors' model. See also the previous post: Emblems As Language Expressions.

[2] Figure 7.4 misrepresents all language content as 'form'. To be clear, the only form on the content plane is the formal constituency of grammar: clause, phrase, group, word, morpheme.

[3] See the previous post: The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language.

[4] To be clear, the authors (p202) have themselves presented an instance of a move type, a gestured command, but failed to recognise it as a SPEECH FUNCTION:

She then mimes his ideational paralanguage as he twice gestures for her to leave (including a deictic pointing gesture).

Mime As Semovergent Paralanguage That Does Not Accompany Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 200-1, 202-3):

An important exception to these principles is what is commonly referred to as mime. In terms of our model mime is semovergent paralanguage that does not accompany language, an apparent contradiction in terms. To explore this further we will return to a miming segment in our vlogger’s ‘Parking Lot’ phase. …

In this sequence, there is a miming segment where tone groups might have been, as the vlogger mimes the paralanguage of her parking spot assailant. She first mimes his exasperation. 

She then mimes his ideational paralanguage as he twice gestures for her to leave (including a deictic pointing gesture).

The third time his motion gesture is mimed in fact concurs with language.

As we can see, the two miming segments are heavily co-textualised by language that makes explicit what is going on. The orientation to the narrative introduces the recurrent problem of someone following the vlogger in a parking lot and waiting for her to leave. The miming segments are introduced with an incomplete tone group //3 cars be- / hind him and he was like // [mimics man’s gesture and expression] //, with a missing Tonic segment. The vlogger then mimes the expected information before making it linguistically explicit in a tone group converging with the third iteration of the gesture.  

Setting aside the mime performances of mime artists (the ‘art of silence’ Marcel Marceau referred to), we can predict that co-textualisation of this kind is a generalisable pattern as far as semovergent paralanguage (in the absence of language) is concerned. What the moment of mime does not provide as far as language is concerned, the immediately preceding and following co-text does. The convergent nature of semovergent paralanguage as a recurrent pattern is clear.

Blogger Comments:

With the exception of the correction of 'pantomime' to 'mime', all but the first paragraph is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26). See the original review at Mime As Paralanguage.

[1] Importantly, this is an instance of using body language to depict body language. In Cléirigh's original model, the miming body language is epilinguistic, since it is a depiction that is only made possible by the ontogenesis of language, as evinced by the inability of other animals to do it.

The body language of the motorist, on the other hand, is at first protolinguistic (personal microfunction: exasperation) and then epilinguistic (SPEECH FUNCTION: gesturing a command for her to leave).

[2] As the authors demonstrate, this type of mime does indeed accompany language, thereby invalidating their model of mime as semovergent paralanguage that does not accompany language.

[3] Significantly, the authors do not actually identify the system of linguistic meaning that the mime is said to converge with in their model, being only concerned to relate this semovergent paralanguage to phonology, as if it were sonovergent instead. The authors frequently state categorically that paralanguage cannot "converge" with NEGOTIATION (p29, 34, 38, 203), which the gesture of a command, above, clearly contradicts.

The Circular Reasoning Underlying 'Semovergence Implies Sonovergence'

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 200):

It is probably fair to say that when semovergent paralanguage is deployed, it will almost always be coordinated with TONALITY, TONICITY and RHYTHM; this argues that semovergence implies sonovergence. Sonovergent paralanguage on the other hand can be deployed without semovergence, through gestures and body movement in tune with or in sync with prosodic phonology (but no more).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is an example of the logical fallacy of circular reasoning known as begging the question' (petitio principii), because the argument's premiss assumes the conclusion instead of supporting it. 

Premiss: semovergent paralanguage is co-ordinated with textual phonology

Conclusion: semovergent paralanguage is co-ordinated with textual phonology (= sonovergent)

[2] To be clear, this is because language ("sonovergent paralanguage") can be deployed without body language ("semovergent paralanguage").

Some Of The Problems With The Paralinguistic System Networks

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199-200):

Our final step, for this book, was to map the meaning potential of each of these five paralinguistic systems. Ideational resources were presented in Chapter 4, focusing on the construal of paralinguistic entities and paralinguistic figures (both static and dynamic). Interpersonal resources were presented in Chapter 5, focusing on the enactment of FACIAL AFFECT, VOICE QUALITY and a range of attendant social relations. Textual resources were presented in Chapter 6, focusing on PARALINGUISTIC DEIXIS and PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. The affordances of each resource were formalised in system networks, outlining the range of meanings involved and their relation to one another (i.e. their valeur).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 4, the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system, and all eight of the system networks confused discourse semantics with expression plane systems and features.

[2] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 5, the authors mistook depictions on animated clay puppets for human paralanguage, modelled the bodily expression of emotion in terms of a linguistic system, AFFECT, despite the fact that other species express their emotions bodily demonstrates that these systems are protolinguistic, and so pre-metafunctional, not interpersonal.

[3] As demonstrated in the review of Chapter 6, the authors' system of DEIXIS models potential referents, not deixis, and the authors' model of PERIODICITY merely correlates a lecturer's location with what he is saying at the time, without demonstrating any realisation relation between his language and his location.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. No networks were provided for the system of PERIODICITY, and all eight of the ideational networks confused meaning with expression features.

Blatantly Claiming Credit For Cléirigh's Work

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 199):

We used metafunction to distinguish between paralanguage systems converging with ideational, interpersonal or textual meaning (Figure 7.3).

Seen in these terms, sonovergent paralanguage resonates with interpersonal meaning and syncs with textual meaning; there is no sonovergent concurrence with ideational meaning. Semovergent paralanguage on the other hand resonates with interpersonal meaning, coordinates with textual meaning and concurs with ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed, because these distinctions were already present in Cléirigh's model, below, and were not the work of the authors. The plagiarism in this work is more blatant when Martin is the author, as in this chapter.

Linguistic ("sonovergent"):

Epilinguistic ("semovergent"):

Importantly, "sonovergent paralanguage" is the linguistic realisation of grammatical systems, and "semovergent paralanguage", being epilinguistic, has no grammar, but has meaning that derives from the fact that its users have a grammar.

On The Truth Of The Authors' Claim That They Didn't Relate Paralanguage To Grammatical Structure

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198-9):

With the exception of mime (discussed later in the chapter) and some pointing deixis (discussed in Chapter 6), paralanguage converges with the intonation and rhythm of spoken language in our data. This argues for a linguistically informed model of prosodic phonology as a prerequisite for the analysis of paralanguage. It also provides one useful criterion for distinguishing somasis from semiosis (since somatic behaviour is not coordinated with prosodic phonology). 

Note that in relating paralanguage to discourse semantics rather than lexicogrammar, we are suggesting that the grammatical structure of a spoken language (specifically, the nature of its syntagms) is not relevant to its paralanguage. In this respect paralanguage resembles the ‘language-neutral’ sign language of the North American Plains Indians, but not the sign languages of Australia’s indigenous communities (Kendon, 2004: 299–303), at least for their more proficient signers.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously, paralanguage that "converges" with intonation and rhythm is not paralanguage, but language that realises the grammatical systems of KEY and INFORMATION by bodily means other than the vocal tract.

[2] To be clear, semiosis makes meaning, "somasis" does not.

[3] This is misleading, because the authors have related "sonovergent" paralanguage, explicitly or implicitly, to the grammatical systems of KEY, INFORMATION and THEME. On the other hand, the body language that the authors call "semovergent" is epilinguistic, and so has no grammar. 

To be clear, the reason why the authors related paralanguage to discourse semantics is that discourse semantics is Martin's model (of cohesion as semantics), though the ideational 'discourse' semantics used was, in truth, the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), rebranded by Martin's former student, Hao.

[4] Here the authors misrepresent the Sign language of the North American Plains Indians as not having a content plane that is stratified into semantics and grammar, the distinguishing feature of language.

What The Authors Say They Did vs What The Authors Actually Did

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 198, 199, 240n):

We then moved to build a general model of paralanguage, drawing on the concept of stratification (levels of abstraction) and metafunction (kinds of meaning) in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) theory.¹ We used stratification to distinguish between paralanguage that converges with the prosodic phonology (intonation and rhythm) of spoken language and paralanguage that converges with its discourse semantics (IDEATION, APPRAISAL, IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY) – sonovergent versus semovergent paralanguage, respectively (Figure 7.2).

¹ In this respect our model contrasts with the syntax, semantics and pragmatics framework assumed in most related studies. We do not oppose form to meaning (syntax vs semantics); and we do not conflate resources enacting social relations with those composing information flow (as pragmatics).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed. The authors actually began with Cléirigh's general model of body language that was already organised in terms of stratification and metafunction. The plagiarism in this book is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, what the authors actually did was rebrand Cléirigh's 'linguistic' body language as 'sonovergent' paralanguage and Cléirigh's 'epilinguistic' body language as 'semovergent' paralanguage. This created many of the inconsistencies that invalidate the authors' entire model of paralanguage. To explain:

The distinction in Cléirigh's model is between body language that functions as protolanguage ('protolinguistic'), body language that functions as language ('linguistic'), and body language made possible by the evolution and development of language ('epilinguistic'). That is, the types are distinguished in terms of semogenesis: phylogenesis and ontogenesis.

Despite semogenesis being the criterion for these types, the authors renamed the types as if they differed in terms of the linguistic strata they converged with. This generated many confusions. The notion of convergence arose in the first place because the authors misunderstood paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system. This led two of the authors, Martin & Zappavigna (2019), to conclude that paralanguage is an expression system of language — evidence here — thereby invalidating the notion of convergence. 

In this publication, the misunderstanding of paralanguage as an expression-only semiotic system persists in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 (ideational semovergent paralanguage). In contrast, Chapter 5 (interpersonal semovergent paralanguage) and Chapter 6 (textual semovergent paralanguage) understand paralanguage as both content and expression, thereby making the notion of 'semovergence' with language redundant.

And as previously observed, because 'sonovergent paralanguage' serves the same functions as prosodic phonology, it is language, not paralanguage, and so realises grammatical systems (INFORMATION and KEY) rather than "converging" with vocal tract systems.

[3] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. Of course SFL opposes 'form to meaning': phonology is form, semantics is meaning, and lexicogrammar is form interpreted in terms of its function in realising meaning.

The Irrelevance Of 'Somatic Behaviour' To A Model Of Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 197-8):

An early step in our work involved drawing a distinction between somatic and semiotic behaviour (Figure 7.1), drawing on functional studies of language development – where the distinction bears critically on the emergence of protolanguage (our focus in Chapter 2).

 

We accept in drawing this distinction that all behaviour has the potential to be treated as meaningful or not by speakers. A clear example comes from the data underpinning Chapter 5, as Coraline swings rhythmically back and forth several times on a squeaky door, staring at her father who is busy at this desk as she does so (example (1)) – until he responds verbally and paralinguistically to this behaviour as a request for attention.

We can further illustrate this point anecdotally to show that it is not just human behaviour that can be construed as meaningful. In 2018 one of our authors, along with her sister-in-law and her partner (another of our authors), participated in an informal memorial ashes ceremony on the edge of a reef in South Australia – pouring the sister-in-law’s partner’s ashes into the ocean there where that couple, keen divers, had spent many weekends and holidays exploring the reef together. As they did so a large ray swam slowly by. This was interpreted by all involved as a remarkable meaningful event, retold and enjoyed on many occasions with close relatives and friends – with the ray construed as a dear loved one saying goodbye. In cases such as these somasis is recontextualised as semiosis by the meaning-making interlocutors involved. What is crucial from the perspective of discourse analysis is the uptake of what went on, or not, by meaners.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, an earlier step in their work involved taking Cléirigh's model and having multiple meetings in attempts to understand it.

[2] To be clear, the perspective taken by SFL theory is 'from above'; that is, it is concerned with questions of what meanings are distinguished and how they are expressed. From this perspective, gestures that do not realise meanings are irrelevant to a model of paralanguage. The need for a distinction between semiotic and "somatic" behaviour only arises from mistakenly taking the opposite perspective 'from below': the question of whether gestures express meanings.

[3] To be clear, the authors' focus in Chapter 2 was an argument against Cléirigh's 'protolinguistic' body language, the type that humans share with all other social semiotic species. The purpose of removing this type of body language was to allow for the interpretation of facial expressions of emotion in terms of one linguistic system of APPRAISAL, AFFECT, in Chapter 5, despite the fact that emotions are facially expressed in species without language.

[4] To be clear, this confuses two different roles of interlocutor: speaker ('sayer') and interpreter ('senser'). The fact that interlocutors can mentally construe material order phenomena as semiotic order metaphenomena is irrelevant to a model of paralanguage. In SFL Theory, a model of body language identifies the potential meanings that can be distinguished by speakers, with their bodies, while speaking.

Why The Model Of Paralinguistic Periodicity Is Invalid

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 194):

In spoken English, prominence is composed through the TONALITY, TONICITY and RHYTHM systems of prosodic phonology. It is also composed in multiple layers of predictive prominence in discourse, from clause-level Theme to hyper-Theme to layer upon layer of macro-Theme, and in layers of aggregating prominence from clause-level New to hyper-New and so on.

In the face-to-face discourse of live lectures we have noted the potential for expressions of prominence at multiple layers in discourse to synchronise aurally with prosodic phonology and visually with PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY. Such intermodal convergences amplify the prominence of the meanings involved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in spoken English, the phonological resources for assigning prominence are TONICITY and RHYTHM. TONALITY is the system for selecting the distribution of tone groups.

[2] To be clear, the grammatical resources for assigning prominence are "clause-level" Theme and "information unit-level" New. As previously demonstrated, the authors' avoidance of the information unit allowed them to make an unwarranted connection between grammatical Theme and discourse semantic hyper-Theme and macro-Theme.

As previously pointed out, Martin's 'hyper-Theme', 'macro-Theme' and 'hyper-New' are rebrandings of terms from writing pedagogy: 'topic sentence', 'introductory paragraph' and 'paragraph summary' respectively.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. All the authors have done is describe the movement of a lecturer around his lecturing space and correlated his position in space with what he was saying at the time. They provided no evidence that the position assigns prominence, or that it realises the correlated discourse semantic category, such that the position identifies the meaning or the meaning identifies the position.

Significantly, the authors produced no system networks to theorise their system of PARALINGUISTIC PERIODICITY, their system of meaning named after a structure type.