Misrepresenting Epilinguistic ("Semovergent") Body Language As Protolinguistic

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 61):

Secondly, it is clear that not all forms of adult facial or bodily gesture that first arise in the protolanguage are assigned to the ‘protolinguistic body language’ category by Zappavigna and Martin (2018). The pointing gesture, for example, has already been discussed as arising in early protolanguage but becomes generalised during the transition to function in concert with a variety of ideational and interpersonal forms of linguistic (or paralinguistic) expression. This gesture is accordingly accepted by Zappavigna and Martin as semovergent and part of the textual metafunction. 

In addition, forms of mime that first arise within the imaginative microfunction of protolanguage (e.g. raising an imaginary cup to the lips) are recognised in Table 2.4 as ideational and so also within the semovergent paralanguage category. It is not therefore the case that having a clear origin in protolanguage is regarded by Zappavigna and Martin as sufficient grounds for classing an adult gesture as a protolinguistic ‘leftover’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the second of authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. Where the first argument was a false claim about what is wrongly included in the category, this second argument is a false claim about what is wrongly excluded from the category.

[2] This is misleading because it is not true. The protolinguistic category of body language includes all semiosis that does not require the evolution of language in the species and the development of language in the individual. See further below.

[3] To be clear, the reason why the pointing gesture is classified as epilinguistic by Cléirigh, and so as semovergent by his plagiarisers Zappavigna and Martin, is because its meaning as 'deictic identification' (p56) only emerges in the developmental transition to language, as the authors themselves acknowledge. The fact that it is not protolinguistic is demonstrated by the inability of other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus haematodus) to interpret a pointing gesture as referential.

[4] To be clear, the reason why mime is classified as epilinguistic by Cléirigh, and so as semovergent by his plagiarisers Zappavigna and Martin, is because it only emerges in the developmental transition to language, as the authors themselves acknowledge. The fact that it is not protolinguistic is demonstrated by its absence in other social semiotic species, such as rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus haematodus). 

But in any case, this 'let's pretend' function is of a very different nature to the expression of the ideational meanings of language in gesture for an addressee to understand, as in a game of Charades. As Halliday (2004 [1976]: 73) explains:

Finally we have the imaginative function, which is the function of language whereby the child creates an environment of his own. As well as moving into, taking over, and exploring the universe which he finds around him, the child also uses language for creating a universe of his own, a world initially of pure sound, but which gradually turns into one of story and make-believe and ‘let’s pretend’, and ultimately into the realm of poetry and imaginative writing. This we may call the ‘let’s pretend’ function of language.

[5] To be clear, as demonstrated above, the two examples of body language provided by the authors both arise only in the transition to language, and so do not qualify as protolinguistic body language.

Misrepresenting Protolinguistic Body Language As Non-Semiotic ("Somatic")

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60-1):

The first point to be made is that some of the phenomena counted as protolinguistic in Zappavigna and Martin (2018) may in fact be somatic rather than semiotic. For example, forms of fidgeting, scratching a cheek or crossing feet may simply be a matter of relieving some bodily discomfort, rather than having symbolic import. It is necessary to have criteria for discriminating somatic and semiotic expression in such cases (see Chapter 1, Sections 1.4–1.5), but their ambiguity is not grounds for classing them as protolinguistic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is the first of the authors' arguments against Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language. However, it is an argument against what the authors mistake to be included in the category rather than an argument against the grounds for the category itself.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Cléirigh's category of protolinguistic body language is restricted to semiosis, by definition. The criterion for discriminating the semiotic from the non-semiotic is simply that if a gesture or posture means something other than itself, then it is semiotic. If fidgeting, for example, does not mean something other than itself, then it is not semiotic, and so cannot be an expression of protolinguistic body language. If, however, the fidgeting of a young offender facing a tribunal — as in the data — means that he is nervous and 'itching to leave', then it is semiotic, and because such semiosis does not require the prior evolution and development of language, it is protolinguistic.

Importantly, the authors' mistaken notion of there being ambiguity in the interpretation of such cases derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', contrā the SFL method of giving priority to the view 'from above'. That is, the authors ask what the gestures mean, instead of asking how meanings are realised in gesture. This, in turn, derives from the authors misunderstanding body language as an expression-only semiotic system, as previously explained.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the authors' category of 'somatic' confuses two different orders of complexity: biological (behaviour) and social (communion). 

Questioning The Notion Of Protolinguistic Body Language

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60):

This model usefully distinguishes paralinguistic behaviour that can only accompany speech (being closely tied to the interpersonal and textual systems of spoken language) from all the rest. This is our category of sonovergent paralanguage, where paralinguistic expression moves with speech prosodies. The remaining paralinguistic behaviour is divided in Table 2.4 between protolinguistic and semovergent categories, both of which may (but need not) accompany speech. The question, then, is whether it is helpful to separate out some of this expressive behaviour as protolinguistic – which would be to suggest that the adult semiotic communicative system simultaneously deploys language and (paralinguistic) protolanguage.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's 'linguistic body language' as 'sonovergent paralanguage' demonstrates two serious misunderstandings of Cléirigh's model. On the one hand, linguistic body language is not sonovergent, because its gestural expression is divergent from phonology. And on the other hand, it is not paralanguage because it is language (Halliday 1989: 30): like prosodic phonology, it realises the grammatical systems of INFORMATION (textual) and KEY (interpersonal).

[2] To be clear, the use of the terms 'paralinguistic behaviour' and 'expressive behaviour' confirm the observation made in the previous post that the authors have misunderstood paralanguage to be an expression-only semiotic system.

[3] To be clear, there is no question that adults simultaneously deploy language and protolanguage.  Halliday (2002[1996]: 389):

Certain features of the human protolanguage, our primary semiotic, persist into adult life; for example expressions of pain, anger, astonishment or fear (rephonologised as “interjections”, like ouch!, oy!, wow! …).

Halliday (1994: 95):

Exclamations are the limiting case of an exchange; they are verbal gestures of the speaker addressed to no one in particular, although they may, of course, call for empathy on the part of the addressee. Some of them are in fact not language but protolanguage, such as Wow!, Yuck!, Aha! and Ouch!.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425):

Interjections are certainly quite different from adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions; they tend to be protolinguistic remnants in adult languages.

Moreover, the theoretical advantage of separating protolinguistic body language from the other types is that it distinguishes the body language common to all social semiotic species from the body languages that are unique to humans and require the prior evolution and development of language.

The Fundamental Misunderstanding Behind The Terms 'Sonovergent' And 'Semovergent'

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 60):

See Table 2.4, based on Martin et al. (2013b), where the terms ‘sonovergent’ and ‘semovergent’ replace the terms ‘linguistic and ‘epilinguistic’ used in the original.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin et al. (2013b) is Martin, Zappavigna, Dwyer and Cléirigh, and the model of body language in that paper was created and developed by Cléirigh, alone. See, for example, Cléirigh's Original Notes (2009-10).

[2] To be clear, while the function of rebranding Cléirigh's linguistic and epilinguistic body language as the authors' sonovergent and semovergent paralanguage is to disguise the fact that the authors are using Cléirigh's model, the choice of these terms discloses serious misunderstandings of not just body language and Cléirigh's model, but of semiotic systems in general.

To explain, the minimum condition of semiosis is two levels of symbolic abstraction, variously labelled 'identifier' and 'identified' (Saussure), 'expression' and 'content' (Hjelmslev), 'form' and 'meaning' etc. The authors, however, misconstrue body language as expression only. It is this misunderstanding that leads them to model body language as 'para-' to language, since, without its own content plane, it must require another semiotic system, language, to provide its content.

It is this misconception of body language as an expression-only system 'alongside' language that motivates the notion of paralanguage 'converging' with language. When paralanguage expression converges with language expression, it is classified as 'sonovergent', and when it  converges with language content, it is classified as 'semovergent'.

This misconception of body language of an expression-only system led Martin and Zappavigna (2019: 26-8) — the original version of Chapter 1 in this volume — to the self-contradictory conclusion that paralanguage is an expression system of language itself, thereby undermining the notions of convergence and of paralanguage itself. See the clarifying critiques of this conclusion at The Argument That Paralanguage Is An Expression System Of Language and Paralanguage As Language Expression.

As a result of these multiple misunderstandings, the authors' 'sonovergent' and 'semovergent' paralanguage are not valid rebrandings of Cléirigh's 'linguistic' and 'epilinguistic' body language because each opposition of terms arises from different criteria. In Cléirigh's model, body language, like all semiotic systems, has both content and expression planes. What distinguishes the different types is not a convergence with language, but the type of semiotic system involved: protolinguistic, linguistic, or epilinguistic.

Linguistic body language is the use of the body to realise the same content as prosodic phonology by different means. As such, it is language, not paralanguage, and "sono-divergent", not 'sonovergent. Like prosodic phonology, it realises the grammatical systems of INFORMATION and KEY. As language, its content plane is stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar.

Epilinguistic body language is the use of the body to realise content made possible by the evolution and development of language, but unlike language, its content plane is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar.

Protolinguistic body language is the use of the body to realise content that does not require the evolution and development of language, and thus occurs in all social semiotic species. Again, unlike language, its content plane is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. In this chapter, the authors will argue for excluding this type of body language from their model of paralanguage.

Misrepresenting The Grounds For Protolinguistic Body Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 59-60):

Although the term ‘protolanguage’ in SFL theory referred in origin to a phase in linguistic ontogenesis, Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) have suggested that for the adult communicative system, one of three proposed categories of paralanguage can be interpreted as ‘protolinguistic’ in nature. This is on the grounds that, like the infant meaning system, but unlike the other two categories they propose, it is organised in terms of microfunctions rather than metafunctions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because 'protolanguage' in SFL Theory also refers to a phase in phylogenesis. Halliday (2003: 14, 16):

When our primary semiotic evolved into a higher-order semiotic (that is, when protolanguage evolved into language) …

… in the evolution of language out of protolanguage …

[2] This is misleading, because 'protolinguistic' was Cléirigh's proposal, and for body language, not paralanguage.

[3] With regard to Cléirigh's proposal, this is very misleading indeed. The category of protolinguistic body language is not proposed on the grounds that it is microfunctionally organised. It is proposed on the basis that it is a bi-stratal social semiotic system that is evolutionarily and developmentally prior to language (and as such, also to be found in other social semiotic species). The microfunctions are the SFL way of modelling paralanguage, not criterial for the category. That is, the microfunctions are a result of the categorisation, not the reason for it.

The Disadvantage Of Modelling Protolanguage From The Perspective Of Affect

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 54):

While modelling protolanguage from the perspective of affect does not lend itself as readily to tracking the development of the system as protodialogue (involving calls, greetings, offers, refusals, acknowledgements, playful exchanges) and imaginative play, it has the advantage of emphasising the continuity with the earlier, emotion-charged forms of social communion and of allowing for a clearer focus on the origins of the verbal ATTITUDE system in the adult semantics of APPRAISAL (Martin and White, 2005).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, a model of protolanguage from the perspective of emotion ("affect") is a model of the sensing that might accompany protolanguage — like a model of sensing that might accompany language — not a model of the meaning that is actually expressed. As previously explained, it is not a question of whether protolanguage is "emotion-charged", but of whether it is emotions that constitute the content of what is expressed.

[2] To be clear, it is Halliday's linear taxonomy of complexity that provides a means of understanding the developmental move from pre-semiotic social communion to protolanguage. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 509):

… a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" … . A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is social; it is biological with the added component of value. Again, the value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors.

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver. It is when this value becomes symbolic value that the social system acquires the added component of meaning that makes it a semiotic system: protolanguage.

[3] To be clear, the 'clearer focus' that is allowed by modelling protolanguage from the perspective of emotion ("affect") is the important distinction between the protolanguage systems that are common to all social semiotic species and the language systems that are unique to humans.

Moreover, the ATTITUDE system of AFFECT is concerned with the interpersonal assessment by reference to emotion, not with emotion as experiential meaning. As Halliday (2008: 179-80) explains, as a system of interpersonal assessment, the system of ATTITUDE arises from the systemisation of POLARITY and MODALITY:

In terms of children’s early language development, the interpersonal metafunction provides the prototype of how meanings come to be grammaticalised. The two systems that were first grammaticalised by one small child (Nigel, aged 0;10) were:

POLARITY: positive / negative
MODALITY: VALUE: low / high

followed shortly by the two forms of “appreciation” in conjunction with the feature “positive”:

APPRECIATION (positive): impact (“that’s interesting”) / quality (“that tastes nice”)

Note that these were not yet mother tongue; they were protolanguage, realised by sounds and gestures. But they were systemic, or at least proto-systemic; and they provided the model for the linguistic systems of appraisal, where each lexical item realises the intersection of an appraisal feature with polarity and/or modality.

The Problem With Reinterpreting Early Protolanguage As A System Of "Semioticised Affect"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 52-3):

Despite the strongly emotional nature of earlier protoconversation, in this [Halliday's] interpretation, symbolic expressions of feeling are seen as restricted to the personal microfunction, where the child uses symbols to construe a sense of self in contradistinction to the environment. However, it could be argued that emotional states underlie each of the four initial microfunctions as shown in Table 2.3. 

This makes room for an alternative interpretation of the early protolanguage as a system of semioticised affect, as argued in Painter (2003). Figure 2.2 presents a representation of Hal’s protolanguage at ten-and-a-half months in these terms. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the expression of 'affective and cognitive states' are restricted to the personal microfunction in Halliday's model (e.g. Halliday 2004 [1998]: 18), is that these are expressions of personal states, not expressions of regulatory, instrumental or interactional states.

[2] To be clear, it is not a question of whether emotional states underlie the microfunctions, but of whether they constitute the content that is expressed in each case. After all, 'it could be argued that' emotional states underlie absolutely everything that humans participate in, both semiotic and material.

[3] To be clear, as the authors admit, this alternative interpretation is a model of emotional states that underlie protolanguage, not of protolanguage itself. That is, it is a model of the inner experience of the meaner, "proto-sensing", not a model of the symbolic processing of the meaner's protolanguage, "proto-saying".

[4] To be clear, the use of the word 'affect' here foreshadows the upcoming confusion of 'emotion', in its experiential sense of sensing, with 'affect' in its interpersonal sense of appraising.

∞

Significantly, the authors' interpretation of emotional expression as protolinguistic directly contradicts the overall argument of this chapter, which is to argue against the theoretical utility of including a protolinguistic category in their model of paralanguage.

Misrepresenting The Proposal Put Forward By Cléirigh (2010)

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 50):

This section will outline the nature of the protolanguage system from the descriptions in the case studies by Halliday (1975), Painter ([1984] 2015) and Torr (1997). This will provide a basis for a later discussion of the proposal put forward by Cléirigh (2010) and found in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) that some aspects of adult paralanguage remain protolinguistic in nature.

Blogger Comments:

On the one hand, it is revealing that Cléirigh is only properly acknowledged when there is to be critique. On the other hand, this is misleading because Cléirigh's proposal is not about paralanguage, but about body language, which may or may not serve as paralanguage, and also applies to species without language, in which case it cannot serve as paralanguage

Somasis: Confusing Biological And Social Orders Of Complexity

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 47-8):

By two or three months of age, then, the infant’s expressive but pre-symbolic behaviour can be modelled, as shown in Figure 2.1, as either ‘biological behaviour’ or ‘social communion’. The former may have meaning for the adult but is unaddressed, while the latter involves shared address but no content. Both are regarded here as examples of ‘somasis’, that is, human vocal and bodily behaviour that is not being deployed for meaning-making.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, bodily behaviour that does not realise meaning is irrelevant to a model of semiotic systems. It has only become an issue here because the authors take the view 'from below', expression, in contradistinction to the SFL perspective 'from above', content.

[2] To be clear, classifying 'social' as 'biological' confuses different orders of complexity. On Halliday's model, which the authors have previously cited, but misunderstood, a social system is of a different order of complexity, because it is a biological system with the added component of value. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 508, 509):

Physical systems are just physical systems. Biological systems, however, are not just biological systems; they are at once both biological and physical. Social systems are all three: social, biological and physical. …

A biological system is a physical system with the added component of "life"; it is a living physical system. In comparable terms, a social system is a biological system with the added component of "value" (which explains the need for a synoptic approach, since value is something that is manifested in forms of structure). A semiotic system, then, is a social system with the added component of "meaning".

On Halliday's model, an infant's pre-symbolic behaviour of 'social communion' is, as the name implies, social, not biological ('somatic'). That is, it is biological with the added component of value. The value, in this model, can be understood in terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, which proposes that neural systems include inherited 'values', which bias the perceptual categorisation of experience toward categorisations that have been naturally selected to be of adaptive value to the organism's ancestors. This can be seen, for example, in the peacock's courtship display, where the fanning of a peacock's tail selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of a peahen. 

In the case of the 'social communion' of a human infant, the infant's 'expression with no symbolic content' selects a perception of positive value in the neural system of an adult, thus biasing the behaviour of the adult towards the caregiving of the infant, and through that, the strengthening of a social structure: a social bond between infant and caregiver.

The Model Of Paralanguage In Martin et al. (2013b) And Zappavigna And Martin (2018)

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 45):

This chapter elaborates in greater detail the ontogenetic perspective underlying the accounts of paralanguage provided by Matthiessen (2009) and Cléirigh (2010) – the latter informing Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) – which have influenced our model. … 

Following this account, Section 2.6 presents a case for our current adaptation of the model of adult paralanguage found in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) by expanding the semovergent category of adult communication to include aspects previously regarded as ‘protolinguistic body language’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, this is misleading, because Cléirigh (2010) is a model of body language in which one type, linguistic, is language, not paralanguage, and the other two types, protolinguistic and epilinguistic, can function in the absence of language.

On the other hand, the perspective underlying Cléirigh (2010) is as much phylogenetic as ontogenetic, since the types of body language are distinguished in terms of the evolution of semiosis in the species just as much as in terms of the development of semiosis in the individual.

[2] To be clear, the terms 'informing' and 'influenced' here are misleading because the model in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) is Cléirigh's model.

[3] Here again, the authors remind the reader that Cléirigh's model of body language is their model of paralanguage. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[4] Again, the model in Martin et al. (2013b) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018) is Cléirigh's model.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, expanding the semovergent category means contracting the number of paralanguage types to just one, since sonovergent paralanguage is language, not paralanguage, because it serves the same function as prosodic phonology.

On the other hand, including protolinguistic body language in the semovergent category creates a contradiction in terms, since the semovergent category is the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language, which is distinguished from the protolinguistic variety in requiring the prior development/evolution of language. Since protolinguistic body language is the body language that humans share with all other social semiotic species, the authors are here claiming that the body language of, say baboons, requires the prior development/evolution of language.

The Inspiration For Zappavigna & Martin’s Model Of Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 43-4):

The remainder of this book proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2 we review the SFL ontogenesis research that inspired Zappavigna and Martin’s (2018) model of paralanguage and consider its implications for the revision of terminology and some of that model’s parameters here. In Chapter 3 we introduce the SFL description of English rhythm and intonation, which paralanguage converges with in spoken interaction. We then explore paralanguage from an ideational perspective in Chapter 4, from an interpersonal perspective in Chapter 5 and from a textual perspective in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the book with a discussion of intermodality, including consideration of mime, emblems and the place of paralanguage in a functional model of language and semiosis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here the authors misrepresent Cléirigh's model (2010) as the work of Zappavigna and Martin (2018), which satisfies the definition of plagiarism. The plagiarism in this work is effected through myriad small steps.

[2] To be clear, Cléirigh's model of body language was not inspired by SFL ontogenesis research. Instead, it simply differentiated gestures and postures according to whether they were protolinguistic, linguistic or epilinguistic. Protolinguistic systems do not require the prior evolution or development of language, whereas epilinguistic systems do. This is a taxonomy based on types of semiotic systems, not on any actual research on ontogenesis.

Emblems As Language Expressions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 42-3):

The relationship we are emphasising between emblems and alternative expression form systems is outlined in Figure 1.10, using the words zero, one, two, three, four and five as examples. These words can be alternatively expressed in English through segmental phonology (e.g. /tuw/), graphological characters (e.g. ‘2’) or hand gestures (e.g. index and middle finger vertical).

An outline of the place of emblems in our overall system is presented in Figure 1.11. Rather than treating them as a dimension of paralanguage, we treat them as part of language proper – as an alternative manifestation of its own expression form.

Blogger Comments:

This is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Notion That Emblematic Gestures Are Linguistic Alternatives To Phonology And Graphology.

To be clear, Kendon's 'emblems', which he describes as 'quotable gestures', are conventionalised signs, such as 'thumbs-up', the 'V-sign', or the 'middle-finger salute'.  As signs, they are meaning/expression pairs, not tri-stratal language.

The authors, however, here present hand-shapes representing numbers as emblems and, on that basis, argue that the gestures involved are an alternative form of linguistic expression, along with phonology and graphology. An easy way to falsify this claim is to try to use emblematic gestures alone to express the following verse from Kenneth Grahame's The Wind In The Willows:

The clever men at Oxford
Know all that there is to be knowed.
But they none of them know one half as much,
As intelligent Mr. Toad!

The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 42):

These gestures differ from the semovergent ones illustrated thus far in critical ways (cf. McNeill, 2012: 7–10). For one thing they commit very specific meanings and can be readily recognised without accompanying co-text (linguistic or paralinguistic). As part of this specificity they can enact moves in exchange structure on their own, for example, statements and requests, alongside greetings and leave-takings (hand waving), calls (beckoning gestures), agreement (nodding head), disagreement (shaking head), challenges (upright palm facing forward for ‘stop’) and so on. For another they are the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions gesture. And in this regard they are often commented on as culturally specific (e.g. the difference between an Anglo supine hand beckoning gesture and its Filipino prone hand equivalent). In both respects emblems contrast with common-sense dismissals of the paralanguage as idiosyncratic (although none of us has any trouble successfully interpreting another speaker’s sonovergent and semovergent systems). From the perspective of the sign languages of the deaf, emblems most strongly resemble signs; they are expression form gestures explicitly encoding meaning. Similarly, from the perspective of character-based writing systems (such as those of Chinese), emblems most strongly resemble characters (but gestured rather than scribed). 

This indicates that from an SFL perspective emblems are better treated as part of language than as a dimension of paralanguage.

 Blogger Comments:

This is recycled almost verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language.

To be clear, here the authors outline their argument for classifying what Kendon terms 'emblems' as language rather than semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language).

[1] Incidentally, here the authors exemplify the use the word one as a constituent of a conjunctive Adjunct; see the preceding post on the vlogger gesturing the meaning 'one'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, unknown to the authors, the conventionalisation of the meaning of specific gestures in a community corresponds to the move of the sign (content/expression pair) from the instance pole to the system pole of the cline of instantiation.  However, since this can occur in the development of semiotic systems in general — e.g. protolanguage, emoji, pictorial signage — it does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't "commit" meanings, they realise them, since realisation is the relation between expression and content.  'Commitment', on the other hand, in Martin's own terms, is concerned with  instantiation, the relation between potential and instance, though, as previously explained here, the notion derives from Martin's misunderstanding of systemic delicacy.

[4] To be clear, here the authors have switched attention from tone groups to exchange structures in an attempt to fudge their argument.  In their own terms, these moves would constitute examples of interpersonal semovergent paralanguage, since the meaning of these gestures "resonates" or "converges" with the meanings of Martin's interpersonal discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION.  Accordingly, this does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[5] The authors' "argument" here is that because these gestures are regarded as prototypical gestures, they are therefore part of language.

[6] To be clear, on the one hand, some emblems are culturally-specific and some are not.  So culture specificity cannot be used as an argument about emblems as a type.  On the other hand, in any case, the culture-specificity of semiotic systems is not confined to language, as demonstrated, for example, by differences in the protolanguages of separated populations of the same species.

[7] To be clear, Halliday (1989: 30-1) distinguishes paralanguage from indexical features, the latter being those that are peculiar to the individual ("idiosyncratic").  So the authors' argument here is that  emblems are language because they are not indexical features.

[8] As this blog demonstrates, the authors do have trouble in interpreting both the meaning of the vlogger gestures and the type of body language involved.

[9] To be clear, the authors' argument here is that emblems are part of language because their expressions resemble the expressions of language (Sign and Chinese), and that, in the case of one of these, at least, the expressions "explicitly encode" meaning.

On the one hand, if this is true, it applies to all languages, not just Sign and Chinese.  On the other hand, the reason it is not true is that the expressions of Sign and Chinese, encode the wording that encodes meaning, whereas the expressions of emblems only encode meaning.  That is, Sign and Chinese, being languages, are tri-stratal, whereas emblems, not being language, are bi-stratal.  Once again, the authors' argument does not support their claim that emblems are part of language.

[10] As the above clarifications demonstrate, not one of the arguments offered by the authors supports their hypothesis that emblems are part of language.

Emblems

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 41-2):

We conclude with a comment on what Kendon (2004) refers to as emblems, drawing on Ekman and Friesen (1969). Included here are gestures such as thumbs-up or thumbs-down (as praise or censure, respectively), index finger touching lips (for ‘quiet please’), hand cupped over ear (for ‘I can’t hear’), middle finger vertical (for ‘get fucked’) and so on. Our vlogger uses one of these gestures to introduce the first of her explanations as to why her hair is darker than usual – raising her index finger as an emblem for the numeral ‘1’.

Blogger Comments:

This is recycled almost verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): Emblems.

To be clear, in terms of SFL theory, the word one here functions like firstly, as a conjunctive Adjunct, realising a textually cohesive temporal conjunctive relation internal to the discourse.  On this basis, the index finger gesture, on Cléirigh's original model, is an instance of textual epilinguistic body language, an expression realising the same meaning as the word.

On Martin's (1992) model, cohesive conjunction is misunderstood as a logical discourse semantic system, now rebranded as CONNEXION.  On this basis, the authors here missed an opportunity to present an instance of logical semovergent paralanguage.  (It will later be seen that the authors regard emblems — what Kendon glosses as 'quotable gestures' — as expressions of language, rather than stratified paralanguage).

Semovergence Implies Sonovergence

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 41):

As we will illustrate in the chapters which follow, it is probably safe to claim that whenever semovergent paralanguage is deployed, it will be coordinated with tonality, tonicity and rhythm; this is equivalent to arguing that semovergence implies sonovergence. Sonovergent paralanguage on the other hand can be deployed without semovergence, through gestures in tune with or in sync with prosodic phonology (but no more).

Blogger Comments:

Apart from the initial clause, this is recycled verbatim from Martin & Zappavigna (2019). Here are the comments from the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019): The Notion That Semovergence Implies Sonovergence.

[1] To be clear, the authors have provided no evidence in support of this bare assertion, as the posts on semovergent paralanguage on this blog demonstrate.  This is merely a reassertion of their earlier claim (p3):

We will in fact suggest that SFL’s tone group, analysed for rhythm and tone, provides an essential unit of analysis for work on paralanguage as far as questions of synchronicity across modalities are concerned.

[2] As previously explained, "sonovergent" paralanguage (Cléirigh's linguistic body language) is the direct opposite of "sonovergent" because the expression plane is where it differs from language.  The reason Cléirigh called it linguistic body language is because it realises the same content as prosodic phonology.