Stratification And Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 10):

Phonology and lexicogrammar are treated as different levels of abstraction, with phonological oppositions realising lexicogrammatical ones. The Danish linguist Hjelmslev (1961) referred to these levels of languages as the expression plane and content plane, respectively.

In the model of stratification assumed here, Hjelmlsev’s content plane is itself modelled as a stratified system, with discourse semantics realised through lexicogrammar. This makes it possible to entertain the possibility that [hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back ] was in fact negotiated in conversation as a request for goods and services rather that an offer of information. … What is significant here is that even though the first move is grammatically declarative, its speech function is negotiated as one we might normally associate with an imperative clause (a clause such as Get some of my hair dye from Target for me, will you?, for example).

(16)
So hopefully next time I will get my hair colour back.
— OK, I’ll go to Target for you.

The process whereby the content plane makes meaning on two levels, one symbolising the other, is referred to in SFL as grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1985). The grammatical metaphor in (16) is an interpersonal one, with declarative mood symbolising a command.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misleading because it is not true. Hjelmslev modelled semiotic systems in terms of content and expression planes. Halliday stratified Hjelmslev's content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar.

[2] To be clear, the 'model of stratification assumed here' is Halliday's, with Halliday's 'semantics' rebranded as Martin's 'discourse semantics'. For the theoretical shortcomings of Martin's discourse semantics, see here (English Text 1992) and here (Working With Discourse 2007).

[3] This deliberately misleads the intended readership of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. It is not Martin's derived model of stratification, but Halliday's original model that provided the system of SPEECH FUNCTION and its metaphorical realisation in the grammatical system of MOOD.

[4] To be clear, this text is from a monologue in which there is no conversation and no negotiation. The data can be viewed here.

[5] To be clear, in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, commodities, goods–&–services and information, are either demanded of given, not requested or offered. An offer is the giving of goods–&–services.

More importantly, this declarative clause is not a demand for goods–&–services, a command, but a giving of information, a statement, and so is not an instance of metaphor. The speaker states that she hopes to get back her preferred hair colour now that her preferred brand of hair dye is back in stock. She is not commanding anyone to do anything.

[6] This is a very serious misunderstanding of grammatical metaphor. Symbolisation is simply the relation between strata. Grammatical metaphor is an incongruent symbolisation: when meaning and its symbolisation in wording do not agree.

Syntagmatic Units Of Content And Notional Definitions Of Metafunctions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8-9):

Kress and van Leeuwen’s breakthrough depended on their paradigmatic perspective on how images make meaning – formalised as system networks and tables in Kress and van Leeuwen (1990: 49, 61, 86, 108). This relational approach enabled them to bypass the pseudo-problems arising when scholars searched for syntagmatic units in semiotic systems that realise systems in structure very differently from the way language does. As critiqued in Martin (2011b), very little of the work inspired by Kress and van Leeuwen has proceeded along similar lines – unfortunately relying instead on notional definitions of ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning to explore modalities of communication other than language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, syntagmatic units are units of form, and so are restricted to the strata of lexicogrammar and phonology in language. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) have argued, language is unique in having a content plane stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar, so other semiotic systems are organised into content and expression planes only. Consequently, the difficulty that scholars faced in finding syntagmatic units on the content plane of other, epilinguistic, semiotic systems was due to the fact that there are no forms to be found there.

[2] For some of the problems with Martin's work in epilinguistic semiotic systems, see

here (Working With Discourse 2007), and
here (Deploying Functional Grammar 2010).

[3] To be clear, in linguistics, 'notional' means

denoting or relating to an approach to grammar which is dependent on the definition of terminology (e.g. ‘a verb is a doing word’) as opposed to identification of structures and processes.

In SFL Theory, the metafunctions are not identified 'from below' by their structures, but 'from above' by their meanings (i.e. 'notionally'). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language… . The textual metafunction … is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared.

Metafunctions As Generalisations About Bundles Of Oppositions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8):

Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1990) groundbreaking publication and its better-known reworking (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996) are both organised around the spectrum of meaning SFL calls metafunctions (Kress and van Leeuwen’s interaction, representation and composition). It is crucial to keep in mind that metafunctions are generalisations about bundles of oppositions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section, those unfamiliar with SFL Theory, since it fails to acknowledge Halliday as the intellectual source of 'metafunction', his first publication on the subject being Language Structure and Language Function in 1970.

[2] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section, those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. To be clear, the metafunctions are highly generalised functions of the linguistic system that extend over all of the local dimensions of the content plane, not just the paradigmatic order of axis. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The content plane of a natural language is functionally diverse: it extends over a spectrum of three distinct modes of meaning, ideational, interpersonal and textual. These highly generalised functions of the linguistic system are referred to in our theory as metafunctions. The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others. The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared. But this does not mean processing some preexisting body of information; rather it is the ongoing creation of a semiotic realm of reality.

Metafunctional Oppositions

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8):

In this respect SFL is very different from models of language which distinguish form and meaning, treat meaning as representational (semantics) and then ask questions about how representational meanings are used (pragmatics). SFL’s paradigmatic perspective on meaning suggests on the other hand that [metafunctional oppositions] are not stacked up in layers – from form to meaning to use. Rather the sets of oppositions are seen as complementary kinds of meaning, generalised as metafunctions and manifested simultaneously in everything we speak, write or sign.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. Firstly, contrary to the implication above, SFL does distinguish form from meaning, modelling form as rank scales on the strata of lexicogrammar and phonology. Lexicogrammar is theorised as forms realising meanings.

Secondly, contrary to the implication above, SFL does treat meaning as "representational", as demonstrated by the Chapter title Clause As Representation in IFG (Halliday ± Matthiessen 1985, 1994, 2004, 2014). This is the ideational meaning that SFL complements with interpersonal meaning (Clause As Exchange) and textual meaning (Clause As Message).

Thirdly, contrary to the implication above, SFL does "ask questions" about how all meanings are used, including ideational meanings. This is modelled as subpotentials of the semantic system, registers, which realise specific situation types. In the case of ideational semantics, this is termed a domain model (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 563).

With regard to pragmatics, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 12) identify its two distinctive aspects and how they relate to SFL Theory:

There is no separate component of "pragmatics" within our interpretative frame. Since it emerged as a distinct field of scholarly activity, pragmatics has by and large been associated with two aspects of language. 

On the one hand, it has dealt with those aspects of the meaning of a text which depend on specific instances — particulars of the situation and of the interactants, and inferences drawn from these. But just as, in grammatics, we do not distinguish between the grammar of the system and the grammar of the instance — a systemic theory is a theory of both, and necessarily (therefore) of the relationship between them — so in semantics we would not want to separate the system from its instantiation in text. In this aspect, pragmatics appears as another name for the semantics of instances. 

And on the other hand, pragmatics has served as an alternative term for the interpersonal and textual domains of semantics. Here the distinction that is being labelled is one of metafunction, not of instantiation; but it seems undesirable to obscure the relationship between ideational meaning on the one hand and interpersonal and textual meaning on the other hand by locating them within different disciplines.

[2] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. Metafunctional oppositions are "stacked up" in layers, but these layers are the strata of lexicogrammar, semantics and context. Moreover, it is not SFL's paradigmatic perspective that suggests this, since axis is a local dimension of language, whereas stratification is a global dimension. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

The Flow Of Information

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8):

Interpersonal resources are concerned with enacting social relations, ideational resources with construing what is going on and textual resources with composing the flow of information in discourse.

Blogger Comments:

In contrast, Halliday (2003: 17) argues against the notion of 'information flow':

There was in fact a third systemic cluster: those systems concerned with organising the clause as a message. This is an aspect of what subsequently came to be called "information flow"; but that term suggests that all meaning can be reduced to "information", so I prefer the more inclusive term "discourse flow". These are the systems which create coherent text — text that coheres within itself and with the context of situation.

A Phonological Analysis Of Tone And Tonicity

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 8):

(14')

// … so

//3 hopefully next / time I will

//1 get my / hair colour / back //

(15')

//3 [handclap] / um / but for / now

//3 this will / do //

Blogger Comments:

This phonological analysis first appeared in Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 9-10). See Misunderstanding Rhythm And Tonicity. The problems with the authors' analysis are as follows.

[1] In the first tone group, the tonic is on next not time:

//3 hopefully / next time I will

This also makes more sense in terms of meaning, since it identifies next as the Focus of New information (contrasting with 'last' time).

[2] In the second tone group, the tone is tone 13, not tone 1, so the analysis misses the second tonic on back:

//13 get my / hair colour / back

Importantly, the handclap coincides with this tonic the authors have missed, and so the gesture is linguistic in Cléirigh's model, realising, with the tonic, a Focus of New information. That is, the authors have missed an important instance of what they have rebranded as "sonovergent" paralanguage.

[3] In the third tone group, the only problem is the significant mistiming of the handclap: 

//3 um /but for / now

[4] In the fourth tone group, the tone is tone 1-, a narrow fall in pitch, not a tone 3, a level or low rise in pitch:

//1- this will / do //

This also makes more sense in terms of meaning, since here the speaker has completed a section of discourse, which is more consistent with tone 1 than tone 3, since tone 3 tends to signal more meaning to come, as in the previous tone group.

∞

These analyses can be verified by listening to the data here.

Metafunction As A Parameter That Organises Paradigmatic Relations

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 6):

Over the past five decades of research (Martin, 2016), SFL has generalised a number of key parameters concerning the way paradigmatic relations are organised in language. One is metafunction.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading to the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. These key parameters were not "generalised" over five decades of research, and Martin played no role in their formulation. SFL Theory was devised entirely by Halliday, with the first statement on the theory appearing in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar in 1969, and the first statement on the metafunctions appearing in Language Structure and Language Function in 1970.

[2] This misunderstands the architecture of language proposed by Halliday. It is not that metafunction organises paradigmatic relations, but that paradigmatic relations, like syntagmatic relations, are orders of a local semiotic dimension, axis, over which the global semiotic dimension of metafunction extends. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

"System Depends On And Is Motivated By Structure"

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5, 6):

These grammatical oppositions are formalised in Figure 1.2. …

We will not go into detail about this kind of formalisation here; detailed accounts can be found in Matthiessen and Halliday (2009) and Martin et al. (2013a). We introduce the system network in Figure 1.2 at this point to clarify what it means to say that SFL involves a relational theory of meaning (rather than a representational one). This means that SFL treats language (and semiosis) as a resource for meaning (rather than a set of rules about what one can say or not). What matters are the relationships among choices, as they are formalised in system networks. The basic organising principle for descriptions is thus paradigmatic, rather than syntagmatic. Note however that for a paradigmatic choice to be meaningful, it must have structural consequences; system depends on and is motivated by structure (Martin et al., 2020).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, having just presented clause structures that differ in terms of their realisation of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION (see previous post), the authors misrepresent these as the grammatical oppositions of MOOD.

[2] This is potentially misleading for the intended readers of this section: those unfamiliar with SFL Theory. The system network was introduced by Halliday in A Brief Sketch of Systemic Grammar (1969) to represent Firth's notion of system.

[3] To be clear, SFL is a dimensional theory of meaning. Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

• (i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 
• (ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 
• (iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance); 
• (iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest); 
• (v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic); 
• (vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Martin, on the other hand, misunderstands SFL as modelling language in terms of "interacting modules". For example,  Martin (1992: 488):

The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface? What is the nature of the conversation among components?

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. Semiotic systems that do not have "structural consequences" include paralanguage and traffic lights.

[5] This is very seriously misleading indeed, because it is the exact opposite of SFL methodology. SFL does not give priority to structure in such matters, since this would be giving priority to the view 'from below' instead of the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness…

This methodological error is the dominant recurring motif in Martin (2013), as demonstrated here. Moreover, Martin's notion that structure is necessary to meaning derives from the 'syntacticist' tradition of Formal linguistics. Halliday (2007 [1978]: 186):

But it is impossible to ignore the fact that there is a great deal of meaning in a one-word sentence. Whether one claims that there is also structure is likely to depend on whether one subscribes to the syntacticist notion that structure is necessary to meaning.

Illustrating Speech Function

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5):

By way of illustration, consider the following examples – taking note in particular of the segments highlighted in bold and the effect they have on meaning:

(1) Because I would be talking to the people in the comments…

(2) Can we talk about it?

(3) What else can we talk about?

(4) Talk about it.

In the first example the sequence I would indicates that the clause is giving information. In the second and third the sequence Can we indicates that the clauses are asking for information. In the third What else specifies the kind of information being asked for. And in the fourth example the absence of these indicators and the tenseless verb talk (which comes first in its clause) indicate that we are asking someone to do something.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here — as in Martin (2013) — Martin's methodology is to give priority to the view 'from below', how meaning is expressed in structure. In SFL methodology, priority is given to the view 'from' above', the meaning that is expressed, which in this case is speech function, rather than how it is realised.

[2] To be clear, the wording I would is insufficient to indicate that the clause is giving information. For example, the same wording appears in a clause that is demanding goods-&-services: I would like your silence, please.

[3] To be clear, the wording Can we is insufficient to indicate that the clause is realising a demand for information. For example, the same wording appears in a clause that realises the giving of goods-&-services: Can we get the next round of drinks?.

Stratification, System And Axis

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 5):

In this section we introduce the three main theoretical parameters which have shaped our model of paralanguage: axis (the complementarity of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations), metafunction (kinds of meaning) and stratification (levels of semiosis). 

Systemic functional linguistics, as the name of the theory implies, distinguishes itself from other linguistic theories by foregrounding systems as the foundational organising principle for description. Drawing on Saussure’s notion of valeur, it conceives of language (and semiosis in general) as a network of systems (Martin, 2016; Martin et al., 2013a). Each system involves choices (usually two or three) which have structural consequences shaping anything we mean. The relationship between system and structure is referred to technically as axis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here the authors are reminding the reader that Cléirigh's model of body language is the authors' model of paralanguage.

[2] This misunderstands stratification. Strata are levels of symbolic abstraction in semiotic systems. A common feature of the work of Martin and his students is the failure to understand stratification. See, for example, from Martin (1992): 

Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification

Misconstruing Stratification

Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification

Misconstruing Strata And Metafunctions As Modules

Misunderstanding Stratification

Misunderstanding The Principles Of Metafunction And Stratification

Not Understanding Interstratal Realisation

Misconstruing Strata As Modules

Misunderstanding Stratification And Realisation

[3] To be clear, in devising SFL Theory, Halliday adopted Firth's notion of system and introduced the system network as a way of modelling it. Halliday (2003 [1995]: 433, 434):

The name 'systemic' derives from the term 'system', in its technical sense as defined by Firth (1957c); …

A system is a set of options together with a condition of entry, such that if the entry condition is satisfied one option, and one only, must be chosen; for example, in English grammar, [system] 'mood', [entry condition] finite clause, [options] indicative/imperative. The option selected in one system then serves as the entry condition to another; e.g. [entry condition] indicative, [options] declarative/interrogative; hence all systems deriving from a common point of origin (e.g. [clause]) are agnate and together form a 'system network'.

[4] Here the authors mislead the reader by citing the work of Martin, instead of Halliday, as the source of Halliday's theorising. (The authors (p3) intend this section for readers unfamiliar with SFL Theory.) Plagiarism is defined as the practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and passing them off as one's own.

[5] This misunderstands the SFL notion of axis. Axis is not 'the relationship between system and structure'. Axis is a local dimension of language, whose orders are the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic, the dimensions of which are system and structure, respectively. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32, 20):

This misunderstanding of axis as 'the relationship between system and structure' appears in Martin (2013), where realisation statements on the paradigmatic axis are misinterpreted as expressions of 'axial relations'. See, for example:

Misunderstanding The Dimension Of Axis As A Relation
The Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Axis In This Monograph
Misrepresenting Axis As the Origin Of Metafunction And Rank

The Reason For Using Martin's Discourse Semantics

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 4):

We also feel that further development of Martinec’s pioneering modelling is timely in light of theoretical and descriptive developments in SFL since his work. This has mainly to do with proposals for the stratification of language as levels of phonology, lexicogrammar and discourse semantics (e.g. Martin, 2010, 2011b; Martin and Rose, [2003] 2007); this model of stratification is the one adopted for this book. Martinec’s work draws largely on Halliday’s lexicogrammatical systems (those proposed in Halliday, 1985), the same systems which inspired Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1990) breakthrough. We have found it illuminating to further develop this work by drawing on ideational, interpersonal and textual systems at the level of discourse semantics (IDEATION, APPRAISAL, IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY in particular).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This pretext for using Martin's stratification is deliberately misleading. This model of stratification was proposed in Martin (1992), but it is omitted from the references because it precedes Martinec (2002) by a decade.

[2] To be clear, the reason for Martin and his group using Martin's model is that it is Martin's model. For the serious problems that invalidate Martin's model, see the Review of Martin (1992).

See also Drawing On Martin's Discourse Semantics To Model Paralanguage.

The Tone Group As A Unit Of Analysis For Paralanguage

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 4):

We will in fact suggest that what SFL refers to as a tone group, analysed for rhythm and intonation, provides an essential unit of analysis for work on paralanguage as far as questions of synchronicity across modalities are concerned.

Blogger Comments:

Here the authors mislead by misrepresenting what Cléirigh's model of body language "suggests" as their own suggestion. In Cléirigh's model, 'linguistic' body language, is concerned with bodily movements in time with the rhythm of speech and in tune with the pitch movements of speech. This means that these gestures can potentially coincide with rhythmic and tonic prominences in tone groups. Whether protolinguistic and epilinguistic gestures are timed with tone groups, however, is another matter. This was shown not to be the case in the review of Martin & Zappavigna (2019).

The exact same wording as the above appears in Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 3). See Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Ideas As Their Own.

Paralanguage Defined As Semiosis Dependent On Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 3):

As noted earlier, for this framework we adopt the term ‘paralanguage’ to refer to semiosis dependent on language and realised through both voice quality and body language (including facial expression, gesture, posture and body movement).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this definition of 'paralanguage' excludes protolinguistic expressions that humans maintain after the onset of language, and includes epilinguistic expressions that can occur without language, such as mime. The latter are dependent only on the ontogenesis of language, not the logogenesis of language.

For Halliday (1989: 30-1), on the other hand, paralanguage is linguistic and accompanies speech, but it is not part of the grammar and not systematic:

Textual Body Language

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 2):

Textual meaning corresponds roughly to the beats and pointing/deictics shown in Figure 1.1 …

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here the authors are making unacknowledged use of Cléirigh's model of body language, in which the 'beats' of gestures constitute textual linguistic semiosis when they match the rhythm and/or tonicity of speech, and pointing gestures constitute textual epilinguistic semiosis. 

Cléirigh coined the term 'epilinguistic' for socio-semiotic systems that Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 606) described as 'parasitic' on language, in the sense that they require the prior evolution and development of language. Epilinguistic systems are also distinguished from language in being bi-stratal only; that is, their content plane is not stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar.

The Acknowledgement Of Sources

Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: 1, 231):

In this chapter we introduce our social semiotic framework for analysing paralanguage that accompanies spoken English discourse. Our approach draws on the New South Wales Youth Justice Conferencing research consolidated in Zappavigna and Martin (2018).² The foundational unpublished paper is titled ‘Gestural and Postural Semiosis: A Systemic-Functional Linguistic Approach to “Body Language” ’ (by Chris Cléirigh); this model informs work published by Zappavigna et al. (2010), Hood (2011), Martin (2011b), Martin and Zappavigna (2013) and Zappavigna and Martin (2018). Cléirigh’s work drew in part on Matthiessen’s synopses (2004, 2007, 2009) of work on early child language development informed by systemic functional linguistics (hereafter SFL).

 

² This chapter incorporates material previously published in Martin and Zappavigna (2019).

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it gives the false impression that the authors have properly acknowledged their sources.

First, it is misleading to claim that Cléirigh’s work drew in part on Matthiessen’s work, because it is not true. Cléirigh merely noted Matthiessen's distinction between body language and paralanguage in Matthiessen (2007), and his extension of paralanguage to include pictorial mode:

For Matthiessen (2007: 6-7), body language and paralanguage emerge as distinct semiotic systems during the transformation of (multimodal) protolanguage into language during ontogenesis (and phylogenesis). That is, the multimodality of protolanguage is distributed across language, body language (eg facial expressions and gestures) and paralanguage (eg vocal timbre, tempo, loudness), and the instantiation of the three systems is co-ordinated during logogenesis. (Matthiessen (2007: 24-5) also extends the category ‘paralanguage’ to include such visual parameters as font family, type face (“style”), and layout (graphic design).

Second, it is misleading to claim that Cléirigh’s model merely "informs" the work of Martin and his colleagues, because it is not true. The model that Martin and his colleagues use is Cléirigh’s model, though misunderstood, as will be seen. The paper that is strategically omitted here — but acknowledged only 230 pages later in the endnotes — is Martin & Zappavigna (2019), which is the paper that rebrands Cléirigh’s model of body language as the authors' model of paralanguage, as demonstrated here. In this chapter, the authors will continually cite Martin & Zappavigna (2019) as the source of "their" ideas, as will be seen in later posts.

Third, it is misleading to claim that the authors' social semiotic framework is their own, because it is not true. The authors' framework is Cléirigh’s model, rebranded as the authors', again, as demonstrated here.

See also An Approach "Inspired" By Cléirigh’s "Contributions"

About This Book

 Ngo, Hood, Martin, Painter, Smith & Zappavigna (2022: xiii):

This book is based on a series of workshops involving the authors held at the University of Sydney, beginning in January 2016. Their goal was to further develop the work on paralanguage, which was developed as part of the research on Youth Justice Conferencing consolidated in Zappavigna & Martin (2018). Chris Cléirigh, who worked as a research assistant on that project, was a key figure in developing the model deployed in that work.

Blogger Comments:

This is seriously misleading. Cléirigh was not "a" key figure; he was the only figure who not only developed the model of body language in the original research project on Youth Justice Conferencing, but created it in the first place. Not one of the authors of this book played any role whatsoever in creating or developing that model.

The series of workshops involving the authors at the University of Sydney, beginning in January 2016, were held in their attempt merely to understand Cléirigh's model. Cléirigh had declined Martin's invitation for him to drive the 200km/3.5 hour round trip to the university and back, and do unpaid work for full-time academics, at a time when he had no income whatsoever. 

The invitation was made in 2015 when Cléirigh was looking after his distraught, grieving father who, wrongly blaming himself for his wife's death from mesothelioma, caused by the asbestos dust in his overalls, was twice admitted to psychiatric emergency for threatening to kill himself, and died in late September that year from discontinuing his heart medication. For more context, see David Rose Falsely Vilifying A Friend Whose Mother Had Just Died Tragically.

That is, Martin was not only setting out to exploit, for his own advantage, someone whose inherited disability prevented him from securing an academic post, but he was also doing so at a time of enormous personal tragedy in Cléirigh's life. For comparable behaviour, see Jim Martin Falsely Accusing The Late Ruqaiya Hasan Of Plagiarism At The Symposium To Honour Her Lifetime Achievements.

The series of workshops in 2016 were followed by a paper in 2019 by Martin & Zappavigna, Embodied Meaning: A Systemic Functional Perspective On Paralanguage, in which the authors rebranded Cléirigh's 'body language' as the authors' 'paralanguage', with Cléirigh's 'linguistic body language' rebranded as the authors' 'sonovergent paralanguage', and Cléirigh's 'epilinguistic body language' rebranded as the authors' 'semovergent paralanguage'. For evidence, see 

An Approach "Inspired" By Cléirigh’s "Contributions"

Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Ideas As Their Own

The Pretext For Rebranding Cléirigh's Body Language Systems As The Authors' Paralanguage Systems

Misrepresenting Cléirigh's Work As The Authors' Work

Martin's Model Of Paralanguage

In this paper, the authors became so confused by their own misunderstandings that they concluded that paralanguage is an expression plane system of language, thereby invalidating their own model of paralanguage being 'sonovergent' and 'semovergent' with language. For evidence, see

The Argument That Paralanguage Is An Expression System Of Language
Paralanguage As Language Expression